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Executive Summary
This report cannot possibly cover all the issues of concern in the Colorado River
basin.  The basin is vast and diverse geographically, ethnically, and politically. 
Conflicts over water are part of its history, as water has been the defining resource
in the settlement and development of the Colorado River basin.  A complex set of
laws, a treaty, court decrees, contracts, agreements, regulations and traditions of
use have evolved over this past century which have governed water policy and
management decisions.  Over the last few decades, new social values have emerged
in the basin and across the country which reflect an appreciation of the important
functions of river systems along with a desire to preserve this natural heritage for
succeeding generations.  In addition, the residents of the basin states, and those
who visit, take advantage of the natural beauty of the Colorado River basin to
recreate in increasing numbers, rafting, hiking, fishing, and boating on or near the
lakes, rivers and streams that make up the watersheds of the basin.  Today,
recreation and tourism are major elements of the economy of every basin state.
The growing constituencies for recreation, tourism, and conservation values conflict
on occasion with the  traditional view that the first prioirty must be to store and
deliver water for people, to grow food, produce electricity and for other commercial
uses.  The incredible growth that is continuing in the basin means more water must
be found for these uses from an uncertain and limited supply.  Someday, new
technology and the economics of water development may free up new supplies by
cost-effective desalinization or other technological breakthroughs, but these are not
yet on the horizon.  Yet decisions need to be made in the coming years as to how
existing water supplies and apportionments can be utilized in a more efficient and
equitable way to meet these growing needs within the sustainable limits of the
ecosystem.
As we enter the 21st century, these conflicting values also must be reconciled with
those held by Native Americans, who have lived the longest in the basin and hold
the most senior rights to water in most cases.  The Winters decision by the Supreme
Court was issued almost 90 years ago -- in 1908 -- but today most of the Indian
communities and reservations in the basin hold only paper rights or claims to their
share of the basin’s water resources.  The next generation of leaders in the basin
and in Washington must make substantial progress toward meeting these legal and
equitable obligations.  Settling these claims, which is a national obligation, and
sharing the wealth that water brings to the basin with its Native American citizens
must become a reality.  Water management decisions must involve tribes as equal
partners and institutions developed that effectuate this partnership.
At the outset of this report, it is stated that there should be goals and objectives
against which water policy and management decisions should be measured. 
Whether efficiency, equity, and sustainability accurately reflect the basin’s current
goals is problematic; what is important is that a vision be developed that does reflect
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the basin’s values and objectives for the next century.  This report suggests some
recommendations that might be starting points.  They are:
• The basin states and Secretary of the Interior should agree on and formalize a
cooperative management structure for the basin to address and resolve major
water management issues affecting the public interest and which defers to
state implementation and management wherever possible.
• The federal government should undertake a thorough review with the basin
states and tribes over the next several years to determine how the various
agencies could be reorganized to provide more efficient, cost-effective service
in administering their programs without sacrificing the national interest or
trust responsibilities.  In addition, whenever feasible, federal agencies with
water management programs and responsibilities should be organized along
watershed or sub-basin boundaries.
• A centralized and integrated data center for the Colorado River basin should
be established to collect and provide a comprehensive, reliable, scientific and
economic database that is electronically available to all who need it.
• The Secretary, basin states and Indian tribes, with input from other interests,
should agree on a plan for reservoir operation and surplus and shortage
criteria that is equitable to all interests and meets federal statutory
obligations and treaty obligations to Mexico.
• An interstate water bank should be established in the Lower Basin along the
lines proposed by Arizona, with maximum flexibility for marketing and
banking water, including tribal water.
• The basin states and local water managers need to develop stronger
conservation programs to maximize conservation and reuse potential and
more clearly define and regulate reasonable beneficial use.  In the lower
Colorado River basin, the Bureau of Reclamation and the states, working
together, need to more clearly define and regulate reasonable beneficial use.
• Recovery plans for endangered fish in the Colorado River basin should be
consolidated in one multi-species recovery plan and recovery goals more
clearly defined.  In addition, the three different recovery implementation
programs in the basin should be coordinated.
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• The Secretary should establish a policy which allows for more public input
into the development of reasonable and prudent alternatives under Section 7
of the Endangered Species Act.  The FWS should develop policies that provide
water development interests with more clearly defined, realistic mitigation
requirements that will provide the maximum possible certainty for existing
and planned water development projects.
• An environmental trust fund should be established with dedicated funding for
endangered species recovery, habitat restoration, and environmental
enhancement in the basin.
• A Binational Commission should be established to review and make
recommendations on the potential for restoration of the Colorado River delta
and the environmental and economic benefits and costs of such restoration.
• The Secretary should commission a comprehensive study of alternatives to
operation of the Yuma Desalting Plant and what should be done with this
facility if it is determined not to be in the long-term interest to operate the
Plant.
• Future salinity control programs should emphasize on-farm irrigation
management, reuse and conservation, fallowing agreements, and retirement
of marginal lands. 
• The federal government should develop a more effective strategy and
establish priorities for settling and implementing Indian water rights claims
in the basin.
• The basin states and tribes should agree on a plan for integrating tribal water
use, banking, and leasing of tribal water in state and interstate water
marketing systems. 
Introduction
The Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission (Commission) requested
that this study include background information on the Colorado River and its
geology, geography, and hydrology; a description and analysis of the most critical
issues facing the basin in the near future and efforts being made to address these
problems; and also provide specific recommendations to the Commission including
the proper role for the federal government in basin water management and
governance over the next twenty years.  The opinions expressed in the
recommendations are my own and reflect, of course, my own view of the history, law
and politics of the Colorado River Basin and the current issues.  I did my best to
provide an objective discussion of the issues and to recommend changes needed to
improve water management in the basin in the 21st century. 
In addition, the report was to include a case study of a specific watershed and a
discussion of how water management problems are and can be dealt with at the
watershed level.  The Dolores River Watershed, located in southwestern Colorado,
was chosen for this case study.
I would like to acknowledge the able assistance of David Gold, John Thomas, Peter
Livingston, and Dorothy House of SWCA, Inc., all of whom contributed to the
development of the draft report, along with Mary Wallace, a senior research
specialist with the Water Resources Research Center in Tucson, Arizona, who
contributed research and writing on a number of issues.  I am especially grateful to
the extraordinary work done by David Gold to produce this report; his research,
editing and production of the graphics included were invaluable and the task would
have been impossible to accomplish without him.  I would also like to thank Frank
Gregg, Helen Ingram, Gary Hansen, and Steve Carothers, who served as an
informal advisory committee, for their comments and advice on the study.
In finalizing the report, I have reviewed and analyzed well over 800 specific
suggestions for changes and  comments, both pro and con, that were sent to the
Commission by over 40 entities and individuals before the comment deadline.  In the
vast majority of cases, the comments were constructive, corrected factual or
technical points, or helped clarify the discussion and were incorporated in the final
report.  In some cases, commenters simply disagreed with the text, my emphasis,
analysis, or the recommendations.  I want to thank all those who took the time to
comment on the draft and hope they will again take the time to read the final report,
which has been improved in my mind considerably as a result of their comments.
Writing about the Colorado River is an awesome challenge given the body of
scholarly work and commentary that has been done over the years on the Colorado
River.  I have mined some but not of all this material in the limited time allotted for
this report and have included a representative but by no means complete
bibliography of the voluminous literature that exists on the subject.
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Background Information
The Colorado is one of the great rivers of the American West.  It has a dramatic
history going back millions of years; within its watershed are located some of the
most majestic geologic features in North America, including the Grand Canyon. 
Today, it is considered the lifeline of the Southwest, providing water for nearly 25
million people, three million acres of irrigated land, and 11.5 billion kilowatt-hours
of hydroelectric power.  Its water yield is only eight percent of the annual flow of the
Columbia and three percent of the Mississippi, yet it is arguably the most regulated
river in the country, and has spawned the most litigation and controversy.  The river
has been the source of disputes between states, between the United States and
Mexico, between cities and farms, between power users and conservationists, and
between Indian tribes and non-Indian water users.  To provide context for the
current issues in the Colorado River basin, the geography, hydrology, water
development, and water uses in the basin are described below.
Geography
The Colorado River basin, depicted in Figure 1, covers almost a quarter of a million
square miles and includes portions of seven states, part of Mexico, and 34 Indian
reservations.  Reservation lands in the basin are depicted in Figure 2.  The federal
government owns 56 percent of the land within the basin, Indian reservations
occupy 16.5 percent, states 8.5 percent, and 
19 percent is privately owned land (Weatherford and Brown, 1986).  Approximately
two percent of the basin is in Mexico.  The Salton Sea was filled when the Colorado
River broke its channel in 1905 and flowed into the Imperial Valley for three years
before it was contained.  It is now replenished primarily by return flows from the
Imperial Irrigation District and other discharges of waste water into the New River. 
Additional areas outside the natural drainage area, including the Imperial and
Coachella valleys and 
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Figure 1.—Colorado River Basin.
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Figure 2.—Reservation lands in the Colorado River Basin.
(Source:  USBR, 1996).
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1 Section 7, Seven Party Water Agreement, August 18, 1931.
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other portions of southern California, are considered part of the Lower Colorado
River Basin for the purposes of determining priorities to the use of Colorado River
water in California.1 
From its headwaters in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado and Wyoming, the
Colorado River flows 1,450 miles to the Gulf of California, dropping more than
10,000 feet in elevation along the way.  It flows southwest through Utah into
Arizona, where it winds west through the Grand Canyon and turns south to form
Arizona’s western border with Nevada, California, and Mexico.  The river crosses
then into Mexico and  empties into the Sea of Cortez.  Much of the river runs a steep
course through narrow canyons, sometimes hidden from sight in thousand-foot-deep
chasms, carved over some five million years.  The river runs through the hottest,
driest regions of the United States and contains some of its most spectacular
scenery.
The Colorado River Compact of 1922, negotiated by the seven basin states and the
U.S. government,  divided use of Colorado River water between the Upper Basin and
the Lower Basin.  Lee Ferry in Arizona is the division point between the Upper and
Lower Basins.  The Upper Basin  includes portions of Arizona, Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming and the Lower Basin includes portions of Arizona,
California, Nevada, Utah and New Mexico.
Hydrology
The Colorado River was named by a Spanish explorer for the reddish color of its
waters, which comes from sediments contributed by colorful sandstones and other
rocks along its course.  Historically, the river’s sediment load was high due to the
low volume of vegetation in the arid Colorado Plateau and the force of the river
coursing down its steep gradient.  Sediments moved downstream with spring floods,
forming marginal sand bars and terraces and a vast delta at its mouth in the Gulf of
California, known in Mexico as the Sea of Cortez.  These sediments provided
substrate for riparian vegetation habitat and for wildlife.  Today, dams trap much of
the vast quantity of sediment that once flowed through the river.  Historically, the
average annual basin-wide sediment discharge was approximately 85 millions tons. 
The construction of dams and reservoirs, and the diversions in the Lower Basin and
Mexico preclude the river from flowing to the gulf in most years. 
Principal tributaries to the Colorado River upstream of Glen Canyon Dam include
the Green, San Juan, Escalante, Gunnison, and Dolores rivers.  Principal tributaries
Colorado River Basin Study
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between Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams include the Paria, Virgin, and Little
Colorado rivers.  Downstream of Hoover Dam are the Bill Williams and Gila rivers. 
Major tributaries to the Colorado River are depicted in Figure 3.
Historically, the flow of the Colorado River, measured at Lee Ferry, fluctuated
widely from year to year, season to season, and over long periods of time.  Annual
flows in excess of 24.0 million acre-feet (maf) and less than 6.0 maf have been
calculated (Harding et al., 1995).  The long-term historical average measured is
14.95 maf but tree-ring studies covering hundreds of years suggest a long-term
average annual flow of about 13.5 maf (Stockton and Jacoby, 1976).  Most of the
flow for the Colorado originates in the Upper Basin, which encompasses some
109,800 square miles.  About 86 percent of the annual runoff originates within only
15 percent of the area, in the high mountains of Colorado (Stockton et al., 1991).
The natural flow of the Colorado followed a distinct seasonal pattern, with more
than 70 percent occurring in the months of May, June, and July (Harding et al.,
1995).  Historically, floods of May and June peaked at greater than 86,000 cfs
(Collier et al., 1996).  Since flows are now regulated by several major dams, peak
flows are significantly lower.  Over the last 
20 years (with Glen Canyon Dam in place), peak daily discharges at Lee Ferry
averaged 20,005 cfs in May and 25,735 cfs in June (USGS, 1996).  
Over the past century, the bulk of the highest flows occurred in a “wet” period from
1896 to 1930, when the average annual natural flow during this period at Lee Ferry
was about 17 maf/yr.  By contrast, the average flow from 1930 to 1996 was about
13.9 maf/yr (Merritt, 1997).  In the early 1980s, heavier than anticipated runoff led
to releases from Lake Powell of over
90,000 cfs2 and the emergency installation of flashboards on top of the spillway
gates and Hoover Dam spilled for the first time since 1941.  Flood 
control releases totaling over 50 maf led to substantial flooding and damages along
the lower river.  The wettest 10-year period on record (1914 to 1923) 
saw an average annual flow of 18.8 maf.  This period is especially significant
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Figure 3.—Major tributaries and water developments in the Colorado River Basin.
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because the Colorado River Compact, which allocated the river’s water, was
negotiated in 1922.  Since 1922, estimates of the river’s average flow have been
consistently revised downward. 
Water Development
While most river basins in North America have less than two times the annual
water supply in reservoir storage, reservoirs on the Colorado River 
have a total live capacity more than four times the average annual flow.  As shown
in Table 1, the total live storage capacity of major reservoirs in the basin is more
than 60 maf.  The capacity of the two principal reservoirs, Lake Mead and Lake
Powell, is greater than 50 maf.
The unusually large storage capacity has diminished impacts of drought within the
basin, at least in the short term.  Growing demands on the river, however, may
reduce the ability of these reservoirs to provide a buffer against drought.  Most of
the reservoir storage is located too far downstream for direct use in the Upper
Basin, and most of the water in storage in the Upper Basin is used to satisfy
Compact guarantees to the Lower Basin and for Mexico’s entitlement.
Evaporative losses from the Colorado River reservoirs are especially high due to the
arid climate of the region.  As shown in Table 2, the average annual evaporative loss
from reservoirs in the basin is more than 2.0 maf.  It has been reported that the
optimum level of storage in the basin, beyond which there is no net increase in
usable supply due to evaporative losses, has been surpassed (Langbein, 1959;
Hardison, 1972).
Diversions
Colorado River water is diverted for use both in and out of the basin at hundreds of
diversion points.  There are considerably more diversions in the Upper Basin, but
Lower Basin diversions are much larger.  Representative water development
projects in the Upper Basin are shown in Figure 4.  On an annual basis, more than a
third of the river’s supply is exported from the basin, including diversions to such
cities as Denver, Colorado Springs, Salt Lake City, Albuquerque, Los Angeles, and
San Diego.  These service areas, in combination with the actual Colorado River
basin, have been referred to as 
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Table 1.—Major storage reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin
Reservoir
Active
capacity(maf) Basin State
Lake Mead 25.88 Lower AZ, NV
Lake Powell 24.32 Upper AZ, UT
Flaming Gorge 3.75 Upper WY
Mohave 1.81 Lower AZ, NV
Navajo 1.7 Upper NM
Strawberry 1.1 Upper UT
Blue Mesa 0.83 Upper CO
Havasu 0.62 Lower AZ, CA
McPhee 0.38 Upper CO
Fontenelle 0.35 Upper WY
Starvation 0.26 Upper UT
Morrow Point 0.12 Upper CO
Taylor Park 0.11 Upper CO
Scofield 0.07 Upper UT
Ridgway 0.06 Upper CO
Joes Valley 0.06 Upper UT
Quail Creek 0.04 Upper UT
Steinaker 0.04 Upper UT
Moon Lake 0.04 Upper UT
Upper Stillwater 0.03 Upper UT
Red Fleet 0.03 Upper UT
Crystal 0.02 Upper CO
     Total 61.62
     Sources:  Anderson, 1997; Carson, 1997; Lindon, 1997; Ryan, 1997; BOR,
1996; Harding et al., 1995.
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Table 2.—Estimated evaporative losses (1,000 acre-feet) from the Colorado River Basin
(1981-1985).  These are the most recent estimates available from BOR
Year
State 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Average
Main stem1 1,598.4 1,402.9 1,896.2 1,197.1 1,782.9 1,575.5
Arizona 279.7 212.1 280.4 274.5 266.2 262.6
California 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Colorado 82.7 78.4 82.3 84.2 86.3 82.8
Nevada 4.2 3.9 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.5
New
Mexico
44.3 42.3 39.0 44.9 38.4 41.8
Utah 65.0 59.4 63.0 64.7 69.0 64.2
Wyoming 41.6 39.2 36.7 34.5 30.5 36.5
     Total 2,115.9 1,838.2 2,402.2 1,705.0 2,278.0 2,067.9
     1 Main stem reservoir evaporation in Upper and Lower Basins and main stem channel
losses for Lower Basin.
Source:  BOR, 1991.
the Colorado "hydrocommons" (Weatherford, 1994) and the total population served
is nearly 25 million people (Water Education Foundation, 1995).  Major out-of-basin
diversions are depicted in Figure 5.
Major Water Use And Allocation
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 apportioned the use of 7.5 maf/year each to the
Upper Basin and Lower Basin, with an additional 1 maf allocated to the Lower
Basin.3  The 1944 Mexican Water Treaty guarantees delivery of 1.5 maf to Mexico,
but provides for a pro rata reduction in times of shortages.  Under current
conditions, demands on the river are much greater in the Lower Basin.  In 1996, the
Lower Basin exceeded 7.5 maf of beneficial use 
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Figure 5.—Major out-of-basin diversions in the Colorado River Basin (Fradkin, 1981).
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4 Harkins, 1997.
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(Table 3).  California diverts and uses well over its 4.4 maf apportionment, Nevada
is approaching its 300,000 af apportionment, and Arizona is in the process of
diverting its entire 2.8 maf apportionment.  The Upper Basin, 
which has been slower to develop, is using approximately 60 percent of its
entitlement (Table 4) and projections vary as to when full development will occur. 
In 1996, Lower Basin water use is estimated to be 8.00 maf, compared to 3.79 maf in
the Upper Basin.4 
Table 3.—Annual water use (1,000 af) in the Lower Basin, 1990-1996
Year
State
Apportion-
ment 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Arizona 2,800 2,26
0
1,86
4
1,906 2,246 2,152 2,22
1
2,704
Californi
a
4,400 5,22
0
5,00
6
4,546 4,835 5,234 4,92
5
5,316
Nevada 300 178 180 178 204 228 217 249
Un-
measured
returns
(233) (214) (202) (221) (254) (283) (266)
     Total 7,500 7,42
5
6,83
6
6,428 7,064 7,360 7,08
1
8,003
1 Arizona v. California (1963).
2 Preliminary estimates (Source: Harkins, 1997).
Approximately 80 percent of the river’s supply is used for agriculture.  The largest
user of agricultural water is the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) in 
southern California, which alone accounts for approximately 2.87 maf annually
(1964-96 average), or almost 20 percent of the river’s average annual flow.  Other
major agricultural users include the Palo Verde Irrigation District and the Coachella
Valley Water District, which are also in southern California, the Central Arizona
Project, the Central Utah Project 
and various other water districts in the Upper Basin.  Municipal and 
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Industrial (M&I) water from the Colorado River water is provided by Denver Water,
the Central Utah Water Conservancy District (CUWCD), the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California (MWD), the San Diego 
Table 4.—Annual water use (1,000 af) in the Upper Basin, 1981-1985, 1990
State Apportionment1 1981-1985
average2
1990
Arizona 50 42 423
Colorado 3,079 1,994 2,2064
New Mexico 669 377 4454
Utah 1,369 657 7374
Wyoming 833 332 4224
     Total 6,000 3,402 3,852
     1 For planning purposes this assumes the total Upper Basin entitlement is 6.0 maf, of
which 50,000 af is the Upper Basin allocation to Arizona.
     2 Source: BOR, 1991
     3 Source: Trueman, 1996.
     4 Source: Cook, 1997.
County Water Authority (SDCWA), the Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA),
Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD), the City of Phoenix and
various other municipalities. 
Depending on which flow estimates are used, the river has been over allocated by 20
to 30 percent.  As shown in Table 5, a total of 17.5 maf has been allocated to the
seven basin states and Mexico.  While the Upper Basin 
is not close to fully utilizing its legal entitlement and uses 6.0 maf as the number for
planning purposes, there is increased concern in the Upper Basin about future
demands on Colorado River water.  (Projected use to 2030 in the Upper Basin is
depicted by state in Figures 6 to 10).  Water use estimates were compiled in 1995
and projections were made to the year 2060 by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
(BOR) in consultation with individual states within the Colorado River Basin and
the Upper Colorado River Commission.
Tribal uses and claims will be discussed below in the “Indian Water Rights” section,
but it should be noted that the general consensus is that these uses and claims to
Background Information
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Rights, Navajo Nation, April 4, 1997).
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reserved rights are considered within each state’s apportion-ment under the “Law of
the River.”5
Table 5.—Water allocations in the Colorado River Basin
Entity
Apportionment
(maf/year) Authority
Upper Basin 7.5 1922 Colorado River Compact.  (The Upper Basin
has the right to use 7.5 maf only if that quantity is
available after it has satisfied its delivery requirements
of 7.5 maf/year to Lower Basin plus the amount
required to satisfy the Mexican Treaty obligation.)
Arizona 0.05 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
Colorado 3.86 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.
(Colorado is apportioned 51.75% of the remaining
flows after the Upper Basin’s delivery requirements
have been met.)
New Mexico 0.84 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (New
Mexico is apportioned 11.25% of the remaining
flows after the Upper Basin’s delivery requirements
have been met.)
Utah 1.71 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (Utah is
apportioned 23% of the remaining flows after the
Upper Basin’s delivery requirements have been met.)
Wyoming 1.04 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
(Wyoming is apportioned 14% of the remaining
flows after the Upper Basin’s delivery requirements
have been met.)
Lower Basin 8.5 1922 Colorado River Compact
Arizona1 2.8 1963 U.S. Supreme Court decision Arizona 
v. California
California2 4.4 1963 U.S. Supreme Court decision Arizona 
v. California
Nevada3 0.3 1963 U.S. Supreme Court decision Arizona 
v. California
Additional 1.0 Article III(b) of 1922 Colorado River Compact
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Figure 6.—Projected Colorado River water use in Arizona (Upper Basin).
Source: BOR, 1996.
Mexico 1.5 Mexican Water Treaty of 1944
     Total 17.5
1 Plus 46% of the surplus water available, as determined by the Secretary.
2 Plus 50% of the surplus water available, as determined by the Secretary.
3 Plus 4% of the surplus water available, as determined by the Secretary.
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Figure 7.—Projected Colorado River water use in Colorado
Source: Cook, 1997.
Figure 8.—Projected Colorado River water use in New Mexico.
Source: Cook, 1997.
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Figure 9.—Projected Colorado River water use in Utah
Source: Cook, 1997.
Figure 10.—Projected Colorado River water use in Wyoming.
Source: Cook, 1997.
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There is increasing demand for non-consumptive, instream uses for fish, wildlife,
habitat, and recreation.  These uses, however, sometimes require changes in flow
regimes which can impact power generation and diversions for other uses, which are
generally senior in priority.
Operation of the River
Federal Involvement in the Colorado River Basin 
Many if not most of the unresolved issues in the Colorado River basin discussed in
this report require the active involvement, cooperation, and sometimes decisions by
the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) or other federal officials as well as
significant federal appropriations.  As will be discussed in more detail below, the
allocation and use of water in the 
Colorado River basin is affected or influenced by at least ten federal agencies,
including the Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), National Park Service (NPS), Natural Resource
Conservation Service (NRCS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Forest Service
(USFS), and the Western Area Power 
Administration (WAPA).  The geographic jurisdiction of these agencies is depicted
on the maps in Appendix A.  While the western states control the 
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allocation and use of water within the states under state water law regimes--  and
the federal government must acknowledge water rights established under state law
-- a number of federal laws and court decisions (such as those establishing and
interpreting reserved water rights on federal and Indian reservations) impact water
allocation and use in the basin, whether directly or indirectly, including the Clean
Water Act (CWA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).  Furthermore, the Secretary of the Interior has
multiple sometimes conflicting responsibilities that impact water use in the basin
such as his fiduciary responsibility to Indian tribes, to enforce the ESA, to manage
federal lands and to administer reclamation law and the Law of the River.
Over the course of the last century, there has been massive federal investment in
the basin to construct, operate, and maintain the dams, delivery systems and other
infrastructure associated with federal projects.  The federal government has an
interest in protecting this investment, assuring repayment where applicable, and to
operate these facilities consistent with federal law.  In the Upper Basin, it is
estimated that federal investment in water development totals around $3.6 billion
(Calhoun, 1997).  In the Lower Basin, this number is even greater.  For example, the
recently completed Central Arizona Project cost over $3.5 billion (of which some $1.8
to $2.2 million will be repaid over time).  And although the BOR’s new role in the
West is primarily as a water management agency rather than as a project builder,
its budget for this fiscal year for the Colorado River basin is approximately $285
million, which does not include hundreds of millions of dollars of revenues from
power sales that are used to finance project OM&R and other costs.
In addition, the CWA has made the ACOE and EPA major players in important
water policy arenas such as water quality issues involving municipal and industrial
discharges, mine waste, and approving permits for new projects under Section 404 of
the CWA.  For example, the Two Forks Dam in Colorado was ultimately vetoed by
the EPA Administrator pursuant to Section 404.
And, the ESA has generated a whole new level of federal-state-tribal tension in the
basin because most water projects have a federal nexus and must undergo
consultation with the FWS to determine if current or proposed water development
will have an adverse effect on listed species.  Federal, state, tribal and stakeholder
efforts to develop, fund and implement plans for species protection and recovery
within the framework of federal and state law and the ESA have been a major
source of contention in recent years.  Even if the ESA is amended to address the
provisions in the law most objectionable to states, tribes, and water users, it seems
clear that broad public support for preserving biodiversity and protecting ecosystems
will require a continuing federal presence for the foreseeable future.
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The Law of the River
The Law of the River (LOR) is the legal and institutional framework for managing
the river and defining the states’ and individual entitlement holders’ rights and
obligations.6  Over the years, the LOR has evolved to some extent to accommodate
changing policies and values about water management in the basin.  The Grand
Canyon Protection Act of 1992, for example, led to changes in the operating criteria
for power production at Glen Canyon Dam to reflect concerns about downstream
impacts on environmental and cultural resources and recreation.  And, the
enactment of the federal environmental statutes mentioned above add an overlay to
many of the other components of the LOR which is still being sorted out.
While there is broad acceptance of the LOR within the basin’s water interest
community, some aspects of the LOR are still unsettled and may create
management problems for the future as competition for Colorado River water
increases.  For example, nothing in the statutes or the Arizona v. California decree
specifically authorizes interstate marketing of apportionments, and some provisions
arguably prohibit it.  When BOR tried to clarify the legal authority for interstate
marketing in its rule-making process in 1994, a number of states and water users
raised legal objections.  As will be discussed in this report, water marketing,
including off-reservation and interstate leasing of Indian water rights, and other
issues remain unresolved under the LOR.
Furthermore, the Arizona v. California decree did not settle the extent of “Winters
rights” for many of the Indian tribes in the Lower Basin.  Paragraph VIII© of the
decree states that the decree shall not affect the “rights or priorities, except as
specific provision is made herein, of any Indian Reservation.”  The main stem rights
of the Navajo Nation the Hualapai Tribe, and the Havasupai Indian Reservations,
all located between Lee Ferry and Hoover Dam were not adjudicated in that case
and remain as significant unresolved claims in the Lower Basin.
Other federal reserved rights for a number of national parks and monuments and
other federal reservations have not been quantified.  Grand Canyon National Park
(GCNP) is a prime example.  This is now a major problem for the GCNP, which is in
need of additional water supplies to serve its growing number of visitors and for
park facilities.  On a more positive note, negotia-tions concluded recently between
federal, local, and state officials in Utah that resulted in an agreement that will
protect Zion National Park from 
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upstream dam proposals, recognizing a federal reserved water right to the Virgin
River, which flows through the park.  There are a number of other outstanding
federal claims in the basin which must be addressed and quantified through similar
negotiations.
Arizona and Nevada, who claim the right to tributary water under the Compact, can
divert water from the tributaries but cannot divert it once it has flowed into the
Colorado River.  Thus, Nevada would have to build a pipeline approximately 60
miles long at great expense to divert Virgin River water.  Arizona would have to do
something similar to make use of water from the Bill Williams River, even though it
flows into Lake Havasu very near the CAP diversion point.  The issue of rights to
tributary water and a number of other issues remain unsettled despite the LOR.
The Secretary of the Interior:  Water Master in the Lower Basin
While the states have authority over water management within their borders,7
Congress delegated considerable authority to the Secretary of the Interior over the
use and management of Colorado River water in the Lower Basin.  The Boulder
Canyon Project Act of 1928, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
California, vested extraordinary authority with the  Secretary to serve as “water
master” for the Lower Basin.  Any user of main stem Colorado River water in the
Lower Basin (with few exceptions for prior perfected rights) is required to have
executed a contract with the Secretary to use Colorado River water.  The Secretary
has the authority to define what is “reasonable beneficial use,” to contract for the
disposition of hydropower, to develop an annual operating plan for the reservoirs,
and to establish surplus and shortage criteria, among other things.
The Secretary is required, under Section 602(b) of the Colorado River Basin Project
Act, to consult with the seven basin states regarding the annual operating plan and
the BOR regularly consults with the states, tribes, and other interests on a range of
management issues on an ad hoc basis.  If consensus cannot be reached on an
operational issue, such as reservoir operations, however, it is clear that the
Secretary has the authority to act.
Although the Upper Basin states have a significant interest in the annual operating
plan, reservoir operations, and other decisions regarding water use in the Lower
Basin, they are not subject to the same level of “federalized” management.  In 1948,
the Upper Basin states approved the Upper Colorado 
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River Basin Compact, subsequently approved by Congress, which established each
state’s apportionment and the Upper Colorado River Commission to address issues
related to water development in the Upper Basin.  While the Secretary has
responsibilities to administer the various reclamation laws and statutes that
authorized projects in the Upper Basin, he does not have the level of authority to
regulate water use as was delegated to him by Congress in the Lower Basin.  The
Upper Basin states control the rights to use Compact water under state water law.
Proposed Regulations for the Lower Basin
In 1994, the BOR proposed regulations to address a number of issues in the Lower
Basin.  Initially, the purpose of these regulations was to deal with the increasing
problem of illegal pumping of the river’s “sub-flow” (groundwater hydrologically
connected to the river).  However, growing interest in water marketing and a
number of other unresolved issues led the BOR to also draft regulations to deal with
beneficial use, new conservation requirements, prohibited uses, establishing fees for
services to water users, and to govern leasing, banking and exchanging water
entitlements, including tribal water rights, on an intrastate and interstate basis.
Under the draft regulations, water conserved as a result of “extraordinary”
conservation measures or land fallowing could be marketed.  One of the more
controversial provisions provided that conserved water would be considered a
“beneficial consumptive use” within the state in which it occurred and, therefore,
would no longer be considered “Colorado River water” which was subject to LOR
restrictions.  This water could therefore be conveyed  for use in another Lower Basin
state or banked as “top water” in Lake Mead (meaning it had the lowest priority of
stored water and would be released first when flood control releases were
necessary).
Another major point of controversy in the proposed regulations was the
Department’s position that tribal water rights could be leased off reservation under
existing law.  The BOR set forth an extensive legal analysis defending this proposal,
relying on a number of statutes, Solicitor opinions, and court cases, including
Arizona v. California (and the 1979 Supplemental Decree), and concluded:
In summary, it is the Department’s preliminary conclusion that it is
appropriate to include Indian reserved water rights in the direct leasing and
banking-marketing provisions of the proposed regulations ... that most of the
legal commentators who have considered the subject of Indian water
marketing have agreed that Indian reserved rights are 
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transferable property rights which have the potential to generate not only
financial benefits, but also to create jobs, increase services, and stimulate
reservation economic growth (BOR, 1994).
The rules also proposed new requirements for conservation plans required for all
contractors of Colorado River water, if economically feasible, and a time schedule for
meeting these objectives.  If the water user failed to implement a plan, the BOR
could make a determination that the user was engaging in unreasonable beneficial
use and presumably reduce the diversion right under the contract. 
As the state with the largest unused apportionment in the Lower Basin, Arizona
was concerned with a number of these marketing provisions, which were viewed as
promoting interstate marketing of Arizona’s water without adequate state
involvement or control, and threatened to sue.  A number of other states and
interests expressed similar concerns about the draft regulations.  As a result, the
Secretary put the regulations on hold to allow the states time to seek a regional
solution and reach consensus on water marketing in the Lower Basin.
In a speech to the Colorado River Water Users Association (CRWUA) in December
of 1995, Secretary Babbitt acknowledged that the process had broken down, but
reiterated his optimism that consensus could be reached on a number of water
marketing and transfer issues and that “whenever possible, the administration of
the river should be by consensus among the three affected states...” (Babbitt, 1995).
In December of 1996, the Secretary was back before the CRWUA in Las Vegas. 
There was still no consensus on marketing apportionments and California’s failure
to resolve internal disagreements between major water users had become a basin-
wide issue.  In the interim, Arizona had established its water bank, which could
provide a solution for meeting future needs in Nevada and California, if necessary
federal regulations could be put in place.  Secretary Babbitt seemed less optimistic
about consensus than the previous year, but vowed to continue facilitating that
process.
The Secretary also took a less ambitious position on future regulations for the
Lower Basin, citing the need for incremental progress on a number of issues, such as
the water bank, finding a way to implement the San Luis Rey Indian settlement,
and resolving the internal dispute in California.  He deferred action, for example, on
adoption of surplus criteria until California had developed a plan to reduce their
use, over time, to their 4.4 maf/yr apportionment.  In the final analysis, however, the
Secretary does have the authority -- and hinted he may ultimately have to exercise it
-- if agreement cannot be found on these management issues that is acceptable to
the basin states and the federal government, given its statutory and trust
responsibilities.  Ultimately, the federal stick held by the Secretary may need to be
invoked in the Lower Basin to resolve some of these issues.
The BOR is currently drafting new rules for the Lower Basin, which are expected to
be less ambitious in scope given the controversy that accompanied the 1994 draft.  It
Background Information
8 Federal law directs the Secretary of the Interior to operate federal reservoirs so as to meet
the Mexican obligation (43 USCA § 1512).
9 Besides the Central Arizona Project, the CRBPA authorized Hooker Dam in the Gila
Wilderness of New Mexico, the aqueduct from Lake Mead to Las Vegas, the Dixie Project in
Utah, and the Utah Unit of the Central Utah Project.  It also authorized the San Miguel,
Dallas Creek, West Divide, Dolores, and Animas-La Plata projects in Colorado.
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is not anticipated that these regulations will allow for interstate marketing of tribal
water rights except as it may occur through state authorized water banks.
The Mexican Treaty Obligation and Augmenting the Basin Supply
There is no consensus within the basin as to how to meet the requirements to
deliver 1.5 maf/yr to Mexico as required by the 1944 treaty.8  There is some
ambiguity as to whether this is an obligation of the basin states, as contemplated by
the 1922 Compact, or whether this is now a federal obligation.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Colorado River Basin Project Act (CRBPA), which
authorized the Central Arizona Project and a number of water projects for the
Upper Basin.9  In section 202 of the CRBPA, Congress declared:
the satisfaction of the requirements of the Mexican Water Treaty from the
Colorado River constitutes a national obligation which shall be the first
obligation of any water augmentation project planned pursuant to section 1511 of
this title and authorized by the Congress.  Accordingly, the States of the Upper
Division (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) and the States of the
Lower Division (Arizona, California, and Nevada) shall be relieved from all
obligations which may have been imposed upon them by article III© of the
Colorado River Compact so long as the Secretary shall determine and proclaim
that means are available and in operation which augment the water supply of the
Colorado River system in such quantity as to satisfy the requirements of the
Mexican Water Treaty together with any losses of water associated with the
performance of that treaty: Provided, That the satisfaction of the requirements of
the Mexican Water Treaty (Treaty Series 994, 
59 Stat. 1219), shall be from the waters of the Colorado River pursuant to the
treaties, laws, and compacts presently relating thereto, until such time as a
feasibility plan showing the most economical means of augmenting the water
supply available in the Colorado River below Lee Ferry by two and one-half
million acre-feet shall be authorized by the Congress and is in operation as
provided in this chapter.
This provision seems to say that delivering to Mexico is now a national obligation,
but it could be interpreted to mean that it only becomes a federal obligation when
(and if) the basin’s water supply is augmented by 2.5 maf as a result of programs
funded by Congress.
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temporary right to approximately 130,000 af of water saved by lining the Coachella Canal. 
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“interim period” which will expire when there is not enough water to meet California’s needs,
at which time the Secretary has to find a substitute supply.
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Assuming that it is now a federal obligation, as the states maintain, how is it to be
met?  California and other states have repeatedly pressed for augmentation studies,
including cloud seeding in the Upper Basin, but very little federal money has been
budgeted for such research and there are no realistic plans on the drawing board to
augment the river’s supply.  While augmentation is not a dead issue, it does not
seem to be a very feasible option in the foreseeable future.  Congress has ruled out
looking to the Columbia River basin for an inter-basin transfer, which was once
considered.  The Colorado River basin may well have to live within the natural
supply.
Due to above-average flows in recent years, unused apportionments, and sufficient
storage, enough water has been available to meet the 1.5 maf/yr obligation to
Mexico. And it has not been necessary to operate the Yuma Desalting Plant (YDP),
which would produce approximately 68,000 af of the Mexico allocation and lower
salinity levels in the river by desalinating Wellton-Mohawk drainage water.  This
water is now bypassed through a BOR canal to the Cienega de Santa Clara in
Mexico and is not counted toward the U.S. obligation because of its excessive
salinity.10
This issue has been avoided for now, but will ultimately have to be confronted. 
Assuming this is a federal obligation, how is the water to be obtained in times of
shortage other than from state apportionments?  How will shortages be shared? 
Would the Upper Basin be required to deliver more than half of the Mexican
obligation if the Upper Basin is not using its full entitlement, as is now the case? 
Although shortages are not forecast for the river for some time to come, shortages
are inevitable and clarification needed as to how the Mexican obligation will be met
during an extended drought. 
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Major Issues
Water Management
How the over-appropriated Colorado River will be managed in the 21st century to
meet the ever-increasing demands for its water is one of the most critical issues in
the West.  The Colorado is relied upon by seven states and northern Mexico to
supply water for food, cities, and recreation, and to sustain a vast ecosystem that
stretches from the Rocky Mountains to the Gulf of California.
Water management issues in the 21st century will be more complex and even more
closely tied to the resolution of the other critical issues discussed in this report:
ecosystem protection, salinity control, and Indian water rights.  Issues such as
protecting habitat for endangered fishes and other species at risk, maintaining
water quality standards, adequate flows for sport fisheries and rafting, as well as
resolving Native American rights to Colorado River water and meeting our treaty
obligations to Mexico must all be dealt with within the context of water
management in the basin.  Thus, while these issues will be discussed separately, it
is important to keep in mind that they are integral components of successful water
management within the basin in the future.
Water Management in the Lower Basin
Current Uses and Projected Demand  .—Colorado River water currently serves
over 20 million people in the Lower Basin.  The majority of these people live outside
the Colorado River basin, primarily in the southern California metropolitan areas. 
(Table 6 shows the major water users in the Lower Basin.)  Lower Basin demand for
water is projected to continue to increase substantially (Figures 11 to 13).  By 2025,
California may gain more than 16 million people and the areas of Arizona and
Nevada using Colorado River water may double in the next 25 years (Pacific
Institute, 1996).  Arizona, which has historically relied heavily upon the use of
groundwater, now has the capacity to transport 1.5 maf/yr of Colorado River water
through the Central Arizona Project (CAP), which was completed in 1993, to central
Arizona cities and farms.  In addition, implementation of the Arizona Water Bank
(discussed below) means that Arizona will divert its full apportionment as early as
1998.  Nevada is projected to be using its full 300,000 af appor-tionment by 2010. 
California’s Water Issues  .—California is the largest user of Colorado River
water with a basic apportionment of 4.4 maf, but has consumptively used much
more than that for many years.  Between 1983 and 1996, California used from 4.2 to
5.2 maf/yr, taking advantage of unused apportionments.
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Table 6.—Colorado River main stem water use in the
Lower Basin, 1996
Entity
Water use1
(1,000 af)
Nevada 249
Southern Nevada Water System 209
Others 40
California 5,222
Metropolitan Water District 1,227
Irrigation Districts 3,962
Others 33
Arizona 2,532
Central Arizona Project 1,196
Others 1,336
Total Lower Basin 8,003
Delivery to Mexico 1,505
     1 Preliminary estimates.
Source:  Carson, 1997.
The 1931 Seven Party Agreement set priorities for apportionment and use of
Colorado River water in California.  Under the agreement, priorities for beneficial
use of Colorado River water within California were established, as shown in Table
7.
The total water right for the first three priorities for agriculture is not to exceed 3.85
maf, but it is not quantified per entity.  This has led the BOR to conclude that these
apportionments were “at best difficult to administer and, at worst, impossible to
administer” (Rieke, 1994).  It is difficult to assign responsibility for over-use if the
3.85 maf is exceeded (as it has been) and there are disagreements among the
agricultural entities over accounting and whether some irrigation uses are wasteful
and exceed beneficial use standards.  The Colorado River Board of California, which
is an umbrella agency for the seven entities, has been unable to obtain an
agreement among these entities to quantify their rights despite repeated efforts
over the past few years.
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Figure 11.—Projected Colorado River water use in Arizona (Lower Basin).
Source:  ADWR, 1997.
Figure 12.—Projected Colorado River water use in California.
Source:  BOR, 1996.
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11 Under the Seven Party Agreement, San Diego has an equal fifth priority right to MWD for
112,000 af, although the San Diego apportionment was consolidated with the MWD
apportionment in agreements made in 1946-1947, when San Diego became a member of
MWD.
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Figure 13.—Projected Colorado River water use in Nevada.
Source:  BOR, 1996.
MWD, which is the wholesale provider for southern California municipal users,
diverts about 1.2 maf/yr in its aqueduct.11  MWD faces a shortfall in supply as they
project the population of their service area to grow from the current 15.7 million to
19.5 million by 2010.  Comparing the existing supplies to the projected hot/dry
weather retail demands, MWD forecasts a water supply shortage of 1.1 maf in the
year 2000 and 2.1 maf in the year 2020 (MWD, 1996).
Beneficial Use Issues.—  IID’s rights stem from a water service contract
with the U.S. executed in 1932 for delivery of water stored behind Hoover Dam. 
This contract is for “permanent water service” and at no cost to the district, except
for their repayment obligations, which have been met.  IID submits that the
Secretary must deliver water “as reasonably required for potable and irrigation
purposes.”  This rather vague and unquantified right has led to attempts by the
State of California Water Resources Control Board in 1984 and, more recently, the
BOR to determine what is reasonable 
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Table 7.—Priorities for Colorado River water in California
1. Water to irrigate 104,500 acres in Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID) 
2. Water to irrigate 25,000 acres in Yuma Project (California Division)
3.a. Imperial Irrigation District and Coachella Valley Water District
3.b. Water to irrigate an additional 16,000 acres in PVID
     Subtotal 3.85 million acre-feet
4. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 550,000 acre-feet
5. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 662,000 acre-feet
6.a. Imperial Irrigation District and Coachella Valley Water 
   District AND
6.b. Water to irrigate an additional 16,000 acres in PVID 300,000 acre-feet
     Total divisions within California 5.362 million acre-feet
beneficial use on the qualifying IID acreage.  As cropping patterns have changed and
double and tripping cropping of water intensive crops has been introduced, other
users with junior priorities, such as the Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD),
have objected.
The BOR refused to approve IID’s water request this year for 3.1 million acre-feet
and is now evaluating how beneficial use should be quantified within the district. 
IID contends that state law as to what constitutes “reasonable beneficial use”
controls, not federal law, and that, under state law, extraordinary conservation (as
proposed in the MWD and SDCWA agreements) is deemed to be a beneficial use
which allows transfers of the conserved water.  CVWD argues that federal law
controls and that the Secretary has this regulatory authority under the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, as established by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California.
In fact, IID is now using as much or more water than it was before the investment of
over $110 million in water conservation improvements financed by MWD under a
1989 agreement.  Under this agreement, MWD has the right to use the 106,110 af/yr
that is conserved by these on-farm improvements.  A BOR consultant concluded that
despite water conservation measures implemented by IID from 1990 to 1994,
diversions of Colorado River water had remained at the same level (Jensen, 1995). 
The Jensen report found that runoff resulting from surface irrigation practices on
fine-textured soils was the main cause of irrigation inefficiency in the IID and
suggested pump-back systems be used to redistribute runoff and that irrigation
should be scheduled based on precise estimates of evapo-transpiration (ET) and soil-
water depletion.  IID complained that it had 
been bypassed in the review process and hired its own consultants to review the
Jensen report.  They concluded that the report contained many errors which skewed
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the results.  The BOR has agreed to work with IID to reconcile the different
assessments of water use and this effort is continuing.
Other Conservation Agreements.—  Last year, the SDCWA and IID reached
tentative agreement on a conservation program under which SDCWA would receive
approximately 200,000 af of water conserved as a result of SDCWA’s investment in
other on-farm conservation improvements in the district. SDCWA hopes to “ramp
up” this process in the future to acquire as much as 500,000 af from IID from
conservation.  Following the severe California drought in the early 1990s, San Diego
was determined to diversify its sources of supply and improve reliability and began
negotiating directly with IID.  MWD objected to this proposed agreement and
initially refused to agree to allow its aqueduct to be used to transport this water to
San Diego.  However, MWD and SDCWA are currently negotiating an arrangement
under which SDCWA would be able to transport conserved water from IID, although
questions involving the costs for wheeling this water through the MWD aqueduct
and other capital investment issues involving the MWD system have not been
worked out.
CVWD objects to the SDCWA-IID agreement and plans to file a lawsuit if it is
consummated.  CVWD maintains that it has the next junior right to any unused or
“conserved water” from IID under the Seven Party Agreement and the LOR.  CVWD
claims it needs this water to reduce a serious groundwater overdraft and that IID is
wasting water and exceeding beneficial use requirements under federal and state
law, citing the significant return flows discharged from the IID to the New River and
the Salton Sea.
IID claims, however, that it is operating efficiently, but that the high salinity level of
Colorado River water requires a significant amount of water for leaching, which
they deem to be a beneficial use.  IID recently offered to settle with CVWD by
amending their 1934 water agreement to provide CVWD with an equal priority for
330,000 af, but CVWD has rejected this proposal as insufficient.  This conflict has
created a difficult problem for California.  The Colorado River Board of California
does not have the authority to force a “state” position on any water user and
repeated attempts to facilitate settlement of this very public dispute have failed.  It
seems clear that a resolution of this dispute, either by legislation, agreement, or
litigation, is critical if California is to present an acceptable plan for reducing its use
to 4.4 maf/yr. 
In addition to the conservation agreement with IID, MWD entered into a pilot
fallowing agreement with the Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID) in 1992 under
which 20,000 acres of district irrigated lands was fallowed 
for two years at a cost to MWD of $26.7 million.  MWD in turn banked 186,000 af in
Lake Mead for use by the year 2000.  Unfortunately, with heavy precipitation this
past year, all of this water has been spilled, underlining the current difficulties with
top-water reservoir storage.
Major Issues
12 Mexico opposes this project, as it now uses the seepage from the All-American Canal.
33
MWD has also pursued a project, authorized by Congress, to build a concrete-lined
canal parallel to the existing All-American Canal.  Under a proposed agreement
with IID in 1995, MWD would receive or bank over 67,000 af/yr for 55 years for its
share of this investment; however, this proposal has lapsed and the project put on
hold for now.12
Reservoir Operations and Surplus Criteria.—  The vulnerability of top-water
reservoir storage to flood control releases and California’s concern about keeping its
aqueducts full led the state to propose new reservoir operating criteria several years
ago.  California argued that its proposal to draw down Lake Mead would make more
efficient use of the existing supply and reduce losses to flood control spills and
evaporation, with minimum or no risk to other states or users.  California pointed
out that in the early 1980s, when extreme runoff could not be contained in the main
stem reservoirs, over 
50 maf flowed to Mexico and that some of this water spilled could have been
conserved if the reservoirs were operated differently.  However, other states and
agricultural users with senior rights were concerned about just such risk, and there
was concern in the Upper Basin about the impact of this proposal on their ability to
meet compact obligations. 
Until California settles its internal disputes and develops a plan to reduce its
reliance on the Colorado River to its 4.4 maf basic annual apportionment, the other
six basin states will not agree to support future declarations of surplus by the BOR
in the annual operating plan (see letter of Dec. 9, 1996, from six states to California,
Appendix C).  The other basin states made it clear that they expect California to
develop an enforceable plan by next year.  Recently, California presented a “Draft”
Conceptual Water Budget to reduce con-sumptive use by up to 900,000 af/yr to 4.4
maf/yr.  The outline calls for up to 400,000 af/yr saved from IID conservation, up to
100,000 af/yr from fallowing agreements between MWD and PVID, 100,000 af/yr
from seepage recovery from the All-American and Coachella Canals, up to 100,000
af/yr from a conjunctive use program by CVWD, 100,000 af/yr from “additional
conservation” and 100,000 af/yr from a plan to desalinate agricultural drainage
water (California Draft Plan, May 27, 1997).  This draft is still a working concept
and there are many, many questions to be answered before a plan can be agreed
upon or put in place.  If California’s political leadership can resolve its internal
disputes and agree on a plan soon, major Colorado River facilities and operating
criteria issues affecting all the basin states conceivably could be resolved.  If not,
litigation and gridlock could continue for some time.
Arizona’s Concerns.—
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The Central Arizona Project.—  The Central Arizona Project was
authorized by the CRBPA of 1968 after years of conflict between California and
Arizona over Arizona’s share of the river and how it would be delivered.  The main
aqueduct system of the project was substantially completed in 1993 and the
regulatory storage facilities were declared substantially completed in 1996.  The
CAP cost approximately $3.5 billion to complete and will deliver 1.5 maf/year of
Arizona’s apportionment of 2.8 maf from its diversion point in Lake Havasu to
central Arizona through a 336-mile canal which terminates several miles south of
Tucson.  It is one of the most massive and expensive public works projects in U.S.
history.
Arizona was forced to compromise, however, to gain California’s support for the
legislation and as a result the CAP supply is now junior in priority to California’s
and Nevada’s apportionment.  However politically necessary, this compromise has
important future consequences for Arizona, as it means that in times of shortage,
CAP users may have to cut back.  Add the uncertainty about the extent and timing
of Upper Basin development, how the Secretary will allocate inevitable shortages,
and the need to satisfy Indian reserved rights, and it is easy to understand why the
question of Arizona’s junior CAP priority continues to haunt negotiations with
California.
The CAP was originally conceived as primarily an agricultural water supply project,
and was authorized with the understanding that it would be a substitute supply for
non-renewable groundwater that was being rapidly depleted by Arizona irrigators
and cities.  It was assumed that as the state population grew, the CAP allocations
would be converted to M&I uses.  Initially, 309,810 af was allocated to Indian tribes,
640,000 af was allocated to M&I uses, and the rest was contracted to irrigation
districts.
In 1980, Arizona enacted the Groundwater Management Act, which required that
future development be tied to an “assured water supply,” meaning for cities and
developers, a CAP contract.  Agricultural uses could continue (although only land
with a recent history of irrigation could be irrigated), and conservation goals were
established for all sectors.  The Act required the three Active Management Areas
(AMAs) created around Phoenix, Tucson, and Prescott to reach “safe yield,” meaning
ending the overdraft of ground-water, by 2025.  The Pinal AMA, where most of the
irrigation districts are located, was allowed to continue “planned depletion.”  Cities
were assured they could continue to expand their service areas and thus their use,
but would have to demonstrate an assured water supply for new development.  The
cities have contracted for as much M&I water as available and some, such as
Scottsdale, that have limited other supplies, are competing to acquire the
unallocated water or acquiring contracts from others who for one reason or another
cannot use their allocation.  A limited water market has developed for CAP water. 
Some tribal CAP allocations are also being leased to cities as part of negotiated
Indian settlements.
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Repayment Concerns.—  Although there were warnings forecast by
economists in the late 1960s that the CAP water would be too expensive for
agriculture to use by the time the project was built, they were ignored at the time.  A
number of factors, including the price of CAP water and a drop in cotton prices,
however, did lead to most of the major irrigation districts canceling their water
orders.  Districts found it cheaper to continue to pump groundwater, which they
have a right to do under the “grand-fathered rights” obtained in the 1980 Act, rather
than pay for CAP water.  Many irrigation districts filed for bankruptcy protection,
which upset repayment projections and touched off widespread speculation about
the ability of CAWCD to meet its repayment obligation.  
As of January 1994, the Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD),
which was established under state law to operate the CAP, began repayment of the
state’s obligation, which is $1.8 to 2.3 billion, an amount now in litigation.  The
CAWCD determined that it could save $12 million a year in repayment costs if
agriculture was using the water since agricultural costs are interest free under the
master contract.  Over a number of years, these savings are significant and as a
result, the CAWCD adopted a subsidized pricing arrangement whereby irrigators
could use the water under short-term contracts for about one third of the delivery
cost; some water was priced at $17/af and some at $27/af, both of which were
scheduled to increase by 1 af/yr for the next 10 years.  CAP M&I rates are expected
to be $140/af in ten years.  This policy was adopted and implemented to keep
agriculture using CAP water, to reducing repayment costs and to conserve
groundwater, despite criticisms that this subsidy was not justified and financially
questionable over time.
Critics pointed out that the CAWCD would quickly exhaust its reserve fund and not
be able to meet its repayment obligations, citing the fact that the CAWCD would
have to get legislative approval to raise the ad valorem tax on district property
owners (Glennon, 1995).  As of this year, agriculture was using nearly 600,000 af of
CAP water under this arrangement.  The then Chairman of the House Natural
Resources, Committee, Congressman George Miller of California, asked for a GAO
report on this and other CAP issues and held an oversight hearing in Phoenix in
1995 to explore CAP repayment and other related issues. The CAWCD assured the
Congress and the public that it was fully prepared and able to meet its repayment
obligation and pushed ahead with the new contracts.
The Governor’s CAP Advisory Committee.—  In late 1992, Governor
Symington created a CAP Advisory Committee to address the repayment 
and underutilization issues and to explore an Arizona solution for the CAP to avoid
any possible federal action to restructure the CAP.  Chaired by Mark DeMichele,
CEO of Arizona Public Service, the committee included representatives of all
interest groups.  In 1993, the Committee issued its report which endorsed steps to
maximize use of CAP water by subsidizing costs for both M&I and agricultural
customers in the short term.  Agri-cultural prices were to be set at or below
groundwater pumping costs and an additional 4 cent ad valorem tax and some
energy sales to increase revenues was recommended.  The Committee also
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recommended against the sale or lease of any of Arizona’s water to Nevada or
California.  Following up on these recommendations, the Legislature moved up the
date that munici-palities must demonstrate an assured water supply to 1997 to
encourage earlier CAP use.
The CAP Committee also looked to the federal government for additional financial
help by shifting more of the fixed OM&R costs to the federal government for federal
purposes, such as flood control, fish and wildlife and Indian water settlements.  For
example, if unallocated CAP water was reserved by the Secretary for other “federal
purposes” such as Indian settle-ments or for environmental uses, such as on wildlife
refuges, this would transfer the burden of repayment and OM&R costs from the
state to the federal government for this water.  The Committee also endorsed a
proposal by environmental members to reserve up to 150,000 af for environmental
enhancement purposes.13
The interim contracts for agricultural water will have to give way at some point to a
pricing mechanism that more realistically values CAP water or substantial revenue
will have to be raised from other sources, such as taxes, for the CAWCD to meet its
repayment obligation.  It is quite possible that the CAP’s main customer will
ultimately be the federal government as it is a primary source of water for the major
unresolved Indian settlements in the state and other federal purposes.
Indian Water Settlements and the CAP.—  A major unresolved issue between
the CAWCD and the Secretary is the extent of the CAP supply that ultimately will
be reserved for federal purposes and how project costs attributed to that water will
be paid. The tribes have been very concerned that Indian water will cost much more
than non-Indian water and that even if the federal government picked up the bill, it
would devalue the total settlement since there is a limit to federal money for any
one settlement so other financial aspects of settlements would be affected.  The
tribes suggested this was an equal protection violation and opposed the proposed
settlement of the lawsuit between the CAWCD and the Department of the Interior
(DOI) over the amount of the repayment obligation, which is one of the main
reasons it was not approved.  One solution explored in the settlement negotiations
was to use a cash payment from the CAWCD to “buy down” the cost of Indian water,
but this was only a short-term solution and the cost of the CAP water for tribes
would still be higher than non-Indian agricultural water.
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As it stood when negotiations ceased, under the proposed settlement the Secretary
would have retained 612,000 af, or roughly 43 percent of the total CAP supply to be
used for federal purposes within the state. Most if not all of this water was
earmarked for Indian settlements, which presumably could be leased to cities and
other users by the tribes since much of this water could not be put to beneficial use
by the tribes for some time.
CAP Environmental Issues.—  Environmental groups also requested that
the Secretary reserve some of the CAP federal purpose water for environ-mental
enhancement purposes, a position supported by the Governor’s Advisory Committee. 
Documentation provided the committee by the FWS stated that the three wildlife
refuges along the lower main stem needed an additional 78,000 af for habitat
purposes.14  The environmental interests pointed out that while fish and wildlife
conservation was an authorized project purpose under the Act, no money had ever
been specifically appropri-ated for that purpose (although there was mitigation
funding to offset  environmental losses from construction).  Congress had recently
restructured the Central Valley Project (CVP) and the Central Utah Project (CUP)
to include environmental water allocations and funding and a “greening” of the CAP
also seemed logical.  The groups petitioned Secretary Babbitt to provide funding for
an environmental trust fund from some of the proceeds of the proposed settlement
with the CAWCD and to reallocate some CAP water for environmental
enhancement purposes.  Secretary Babbitt had not responded to these requests
when the settlement collapsed.
In an unrelated event, a jeopardy opinion was issued by the FWS in 1994 concluding
that the delivery system of the CAP is likely to jeopardize endangered fish survival
throughout the CAP service area by the inadvertent importation of exotic species
that could escape into the Gila River basin threatening endangered native fish.  The
reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA) adopted by the BOR and FWS, without
input from the CAWCD, who will ultimately be responsible for the costs, includes
constructing fish barriers at an estimated cost of $6 million and 25 years of studies
at a total cost of $12.5 million ($500,000 a year).  The CAWCD strongly criticized the
opinion and RPA, believing the money will be wasted, and threatened to sue.  State
water interests have been successful in blocking appropriations to fund the
mitigation measures set forth in the RPA and the issue remains unresolved.  The
CAWCD is clearly unhappy about inheriting this obligation without being involved
in the Section 7 consultation process.
The Arizona Water Bank.—  As water use in the Lower Basin approached
the 7.5 maf a year level, water marketing and water banking proposals were widely
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explored and discussed in the Lower Basin.  In 1991, California proposed a seven-
state forum to develop an interstate water bank and develop a plan for dealing with
all states’ needs during critical periods (State of California, 1991).  This concept
paper also laid out California’s proposal for reservoir operations and surplus use.  In
1994, Nevada proposed a regional solution as well (discussed below) which included
a Lower Basin water bank to deal with these concerns.  Both the California and
Nevada proposals, however, had a number of problems from other states’
perspectives and were not pursued.
California has been diverting Arizona’s unused entitlement for a number of years
and expected to be able to continue to do so until the year 2020.  The idea that
California’s continued use and its formidable political power might ultimately result
in a claim to that water, or that federal regulations might be adopted that opened up
interstate marketing that the state could not control, did not sit well with Arizona
and the state responded aggressively.  First, they threatened legal action to
challenge the regulations proposed by the BOR in 1994 to facilitate leasing of
apportionments.  Then, in 1996, Arizona enacted legislation to establish and fund
the Arizona Water Bank, with the goal of diverting its entire apportionments as
soon as feasible, recharging some of the water in central Arizona aquifers and
exchanging the rest for future groundwater recovery rights in an “in-lieu recharge”
plan.
Funding for the program is expected to grow from $10 million in 1997 to 
$13 million in a few years, and Arizona expects to be diverting its entire allocation
as soon as next year.  In the near term, it is anticipated most of the water will be
banked through in-lieu recharge, with farmers using the CAP water directly and
banking the groundwater they would otherwise pump, which can be withdrawn by
the bank in years it is needed.  The initial rate to be charged an in-lieu user is  $21
per acre foot, with the Arizona Water Banking Authority (AWBA) making up the
difference in delivery costs.  The AWBA also hopes to involve the Arizona Indian
tribes, which could facilitate marketing of tribal water and to provide a pool of water
for Indian settlements.
The Arizona law also allows up to 100,000 af/yr to be banked by California and
Nevada once federal regulations governing these interstate purposes are
promulgated by the Secretary.  Nevada has responded positively to Arizona’s water
banking program and seems intent on participating.  As proposed, if California and
Nevada chose to participate they would pay the costs of transporting unused
apportionment to be recharged or used “in-lieu” in Arizona and acquire the right to
divert that amount of water from the river as needed.  Patricia Mulroy, General
Manager of the SNWA, estimates that the cost of banking the full 100,000 af/yr for
ten years would be $100 million, which translates to $100/af (Greene, 1996). 
Arizona has moved quickly to sign up agricultural users for this water since rates
are more favorable than pumping costs; the operation and maintenance and delivery
costs will be paid from state appropriations and a tax that was authorized in the
Groundwater Management Act.
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It seems clear that Arizona acted when it did to put an end to any specula-tion as to
what might happen to its unused apportionment vis-à-vis California and Nevada’s
unmet needs.  Its decision to divert its entire apportionment as soon as possible and
to commit state funds to do it was viewed by many in the state as a political coup. 
The water bank is widely supported in Arizona as a creative step to provide for the
state’s future water needs.  It remains to be seen, however, whether this program
will be more efficient and successful as a recharge program or as political leverage
with California on other issues -- and whether the expense is justified by the
Governor’s publicly-expressed fears that Arizona has to “use it or lose it.”
Many questions remain, especially since a plan has not been developed yet that
spells out how this water will be recovered when needed, and whether the water will
be recharged in ways that are consistent with existing Arizona groundwater
management plans and objectives (i.e., in areas of significant overdraft), and how
long the legislature will be willing to subsidize these water rates with
appropriations.  In addition, there are concerns that if most of this banking is done
through in-lieu agreements, farmers will enjoy a whole new subsidy of cheap surface
water, only delaying the time when groundwater again will be pumped.  Indeed, not
only did all the irrigation districts sign up for the program, but some retired land is
being put back into production in southern Arizona to take advantage of this cheap
water.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the interstate aspects of the Arizona law provide a
new marketing mechanism in the Lower Basin that allows for interstate banking
and storage by all three states as well as Indian tribes.  Moreover, Arizona’s move to
divert its entire remaining apportionment sooner rather than later has forced the
issue of how and when California will reduce its Colorado River use to 4.4 maf/yr. 
The Arizona Water Bank is potentially a new institution to facilitate interstate
water marketing in the Lower Basin while possibly helping to reduce Arizona’s
groundwater overdraft.
Nevada’s Concerns.—  When the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) was
enacted in 1928, an apportionment of 300,000 af/yr for Nevada seemed adequate. 
No one anticipated the phenomenal growth that would occur in the state once Las
Vegas was established.  Southern Nevada is now one of the fastest growing urban
areas in the country and Nevada is expected to fully utilize its basic apportionment
by 2010.
In 1994, Nevada proposed a tri-state Lower Basin water bank to be administered by
a three state Commission.  The Lower Basin bank would collect and allocate unused
Colorado River water and other voluntarily contributed water, assure MWD a full
aqueduct to fulfill municipal needs in Southern California, allow Las Vegas to divert
Virgin River water from Lake Mead, and put an end to Arizona’s junior
subordination of its CAP portion of its entitlement to California.  This ambitious
plan had perhaps too many changes in the LOR requiring too many sign-offs, (and a
troublesome provision providing for equal voting power for each state) and seems to
have given way to the more narrowly focused Arizona Water Bank plan.
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In addition to its Lower Basin proposal, Nevada has pursued a number of proposals
to augment its limited Colorado River apportionment in recent years, including
holding a “Nevada Water Summit” in 1993 where the state discussed some 30
proposals solicited for that purpose.  In addition, Nevada officials have been in
discussions with the State of Utah regarding an agreement to lease a portion of
Utah’s unused apportionment.  The other Upper Basin states, however, vehemently
oppose any transfers of Upper Basin apportionments to the Lower Basin and if this
proposal is consummated, it is sure to end up in court.15  Nevada has aggressively
pursued all possible sources to augment its supply and has been frustrated the most
by the gridlock in the Lower Basin.  Nevada had hoped that the 7/10 process
(meetings that included the seven basin states and ten Colorado River Indian tribes)
would lead to consensus and a regional solution that would satisfy the needs of all
the Lower Basin states, and “insure a level of interstate cooperation among
sovereigns not before contemplated” (Rogers, 1994).
In similar testimony before the U.S. Senate, Patricia Mulroy, General Manager of
the SNWA, spoke in terms of a “water crisis” in southern Nevada, due to a 32
percent population growth from 1989 to 1993 in Clark County, which is projected to
reach 1.3 million by the year 2000 (Mulroy, 1994).  In 1991, the Las Vegas Valley
Water District, the largest water provider in the Las Vegas Valley and a member of
the SNWA once it was created, suspended commitments for water delivery to new
projects for a year, to determine exactly how much water it had committed for future
years.  In 1995, during the SNWA’s resource planning process, SNWA’s citizen
advisory committee recommended that the SNWA utilize all available supplies to
meet water demands, including temporary supplies, while working to acquire more
permanent ones.  Before that time, the SNWA had considered only long-term water
to meet demands.  Now, Nevada is looking to unused apportionments, surplus, and
participation in the Arizona Water Bank for interim supplies and to the federal
government to expand its permanent supply.
Water Management in the Upper Basin
The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.—  In 1948, the Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact was signed which apportioned to the Upper Basin states their
respective rights to use Colorado River water.  The states’ apportionments under
the Compact are based on a  percentage of the total 7.5 maf/yr apportionment for
the Upper Basin, or the supply available 
if there are shortages, with the exception of Arizona which received 
50,000 af/yr of Upper Basin water in addition to its Lower Basin apportionment. 
These percentages and current and projected uses are depicted in Figures 6 to 10.
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The Compact established a Commission consisting of appointees by the governors of
the four Upper Division states (Arizona is excluded) and a Commissioner appointed
by the President to represent the United States.  The expenses of the Commission
are borne by the states in proportion to their apportioned  percentages.  The
Commission’s powers and duties primarily consist of data collection, forecasting and
measuring the water supply, assuring deliveries to the Lower Basin, commissioning
studies and preparing annual reports.  It is also a forum for discussing issues of
interest to the states in the Upper Basin and promoting those interests in
Washington.
The Colorado River Storage Project Act.—  In the early 1950s, Upper Basin
project reports were completed and in 1956 Congress passed the Colorado River
Storage Project Act (CRSPA), which was essentially a basin development plan,
authorizing Glen Canyon Dam, Flaming Gorge Dam on the Green River, Navajo
Dam on the San Juan, the Curecanti Unit on the Gunnison, which included three
dams and powerplants (Blue Mesa, Marrow Point and Crystal), and a number of
smaller projects, as well as initiating planning on a number of others.  It also
established a separate CRSPA fund in the Treasury Department to allow for
revenues produced from the power generated by these hydropower dams to repay
project costs and to fund O&M costs with any excess revenues apportioned among
the states.
A number of additional projects in the Upper Basin were authorized in the CRBPA
of 1968, which authorized the CAP.  They were the Animas-La Plata, San Miguel,
Dallas Creek and West Divide projects in Colorado, and the Uintah unit of the CUP
along with the reauthorization of the Dixie Project in Utah.  Of these, some units of
the CUP, the Dallas Creek Project and the Dolores Project have been built.
Upper Basin Concerns.—  The major concern of the Upper Basin states is
whether they will be able to fully develop their Compact  apportionments.  Although
a number of water development projects have been authorized, many have not
proved economically feasible and authorization and federal funding for these
projects or new projects is even more difficult to obtain in today’s fiscal climate. 
Water development took place sooner in the Lower Basin, much of it before the
enactment of major environmental laws such as the CWA, NEPA, and ESA and
before projects received the budgetary scrutiny they receive today.  In that sense,
the Upper Basin is being penalized for its timing.
The federal mandates under the ESA and other laws are seen today as major
obstacles to any significant new water development in the Upper Basin.  Federal
regulatory permitting under Section 404 of the CWA and ESA Section 7
consultations have been a major concern for some water development projects.  The
Animas-La Plata Project (ALP) has been stalled in large part due to legal challenges
under NEPA and ESA and, as mentioned, the Two Forks Dam in Colorado was
vetoed by the EPA.  The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP) in the San Juan
River basin has run into similar endangered species roadblocks which may limit full
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development of that project.  The fact that there are still viable populations of
endangered fish in the Upper Basin and more natural riparian and aquatic habitat
left than in the Lower Basin may mean that more fish recovery efforts will take
place in the Upper Basin, which raises questions of equity and how responsibility for
these recovery programs is ultimately shared.
There is concern also that the rapid growth in the Lower Basin will lead to even
more dependence by the Lower Basin states on unused Upper Basin
apportionments, particularly since the Lower Basin states are now consuming more
than 7.5 maf/yr.  The Upper Basin states have expressed concerns for years about
California’s use in excess of its basic apportionment and its proposals to bank
unused water in the reservoirs and to draw down Lake Mead.  Under the
“equalization criteria” included in the CRBPA of 1968, Lake Powell is maintained at
about an equal level with Lake Mead and Glen Canyon Dam was built in part to
store sufficient water to meet the Upper Basin’s Compact obligations.  The Upper
Basin does not want to see Lake Powell drawn down significantly to meet the Lower
Basin’s extra needs if it could result in losing power generation capability or leaving
an inadequate supply to fulfill Upper Basin needs and Compact requirements.
Another issue of concern is the controversy over bypass flows in national forests. 
The clash of state-sanctioned water rights and the USFS assertion of instream flow
needs through national forests has led to the establishment of a task force to review
the issues and make recommendations, which are expected soon.  Environmentalists
are also concerned that state instream flow programs in Colorado and elsewhere
have not received priority or funding needed to make a difference.  In Colorado,
instream flow rights have been established on over 7,000 miles of streams and are
held by the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) on behalf of the people of
the state.  A change of the law in 1987 clarified that only the CWCB can hold
instream flow rights in the state.  According to one environmental group, there has
never been a “call” issued to protect one of these rights from other depletions
(Glazer, 1997).  The CWCB has been successful in intervening in some proceedings
to protect instream flow rights and in some cases applicants received less water
(MacDonnell et al., 1989).  A senior conditional water right on the Gunnison River
was donated to The Nature Conservancy (TNC) several years ago; TNC effectuated
a transfer of that conditional water right to an absolute instream flow right and
entered into an agreement with the state to protect that right.
There are also continuing controversies in Colorado over the transfer of western
slope water to the front range, where the pace of urban growth continues to
frustrate water planners.  There are substantial water rights on the western slope
that have been acquired by urban water providers and diversion capacity exists to
transport this water to the front range.  Over half a million acre-feet is now
transferred in Colorado from the Colorado River Basin to the Platte, Arkansas, and
Rio Grande basins.  However, rural counties could halt some of the more recent
diversion plans based on a state law that provides counties with a right to regulate
projects of a statewide interest that occurs within their jurisdiction, such as power
lines, airports, or major water projects (House Bill 1041, C.R.S. 24-65.1-101).  These
issues involve protection of local communities, their economies and lifestyles, and
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the growing awareness that the future value of this water for local communities is
for recreation, meaning leaving much of it in the streams.  A 1995 report by
Resources for the Future entitled Economic Value of Freshwater in the United
States, (Frederick et al., 1995), as cited by MacDonnell and Driver, concluded that in
the upper Colorado region the value of water for recreation, fish and wildlife was
$51 an acre-foot as compared to $21 for hydropower and $5 for irrigation.  However
valid these numbers, they reflect the changing values of water rights in the new
west based on tourism and recreational economies.
Current Uses and Projected Demand in the Upper Basin.—  As shown in 
Table 4, the Upper Basin currently uses more than half of its basic apportionment. 
And, as discussed, more recent studies have shown the actual flows of the Colorado
River to be considerably less than was thought when the Compact was signed in
1922.  As a result, for planning purposes, the Upper Colorado River Commission
uses 6.0 maf/yr as full development.  Based on this number, current depletions in
the Upper Basin (including 520,000 af/yr of reservoir evaporation) are already over
75 percent of the available amount and projections show that the Upper Basin
states will be using 90 percent of 6.0 maf/yr by the year 2030 (see Figures 6 to 10). 
Central Utah Project Status.—  The CUP is the largest of the “participating
projects” authorized by the CRSPA.  The CUP was designed to capture snow-melt
from the south side of the Uinta Mountains and divert it out of the Colorado River
Basin to farms in the Sevier River basin and urban areas along the Wasatch Front. 
A complex network of reservoirs, tunnels, canals, and power plants was designed to
deliver some 136,000 af/yr of irrigation and M&I water.
Three major changes have since taken place: 1) the state’s CUWCD took over
construction of the CUP in 1992; 2) projected water users in the Sevier River basin
withdrew from the CUP; and 3) an environmental component was added to the CUP
when it was reauthorized in 1992.
Financial problems for the CUP emerged in 1985.  The project was burdened with a
supplemental repayment plan that mandated recovery of all costs before the CUP
would receive any further funding and the project exceeded its authorized ceiling.  In
1992, the CUP Completion Act (CUPCA) turned over control of construction to the
CUWCD and authorized $922 million to complete the project. 
In 1993, water users in the Sevier River basin, including Millard and Sevier
Counties, decided to withdraw from the CUP.  County officials determined that it
was no longer cost-effective to participate in the project, indicating that they could
fund their own water conservancy districts for approximately 50 percent of what
they paid for CUP water.  In addition, county officials feared that diversions into the
Sevier River basin would bring unwanted federal regulations and complicate an
already delicate balance of water rights along the river.
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When the CUPCA passed in 1992, Congress also balanced a “mitigation debt” which
had accrued over a number of years due to inadequate mitigation efforts associated
with federal water projects in Utah.  CUPCA authorized $15 million for the Utah
Reclamation Mitigation Conservation Commission (URMCC), to design and
implement a comprehensive program to restore, protect, and conserve fish, wildlife,
and recreation resources impacted by BOR projects in Utah.  A coalition of eight
conservation organizations, the Utah Outdoor Interest Coordinating Council, works
closely with the CUWCD on these fish, wildlife, and recreation issues and the
CUWCD has funded a position to facilitate this communication.  The URMCC was
authorized to spend approximately $141 million on mitigation efforts in its five-year
program.  The Congress also earmarked up to $50 million over several years to fund
water conservation projects.  Conservation efforts were expected to both increase
supplies for irrigation (delaying the need for large projects with significant impacts)
and restore some natural flows. 
Under an agreement between BOR, the State of Utah, and the CUWCD, fishery
flows have been allocated 44,000 af of CUP water, or 17 percent of the total
allocations of the project.  These flows, when added to 10,500 af from annual spills
or intentional bypasses to meet other uses, are expected to maintain 50 percent of
the historic adult trout habitat on the Strawberry River, Currant Creek, Rock
Creek, and West Fork Duchesne River.  Any or all of the 10,500 af may be released
at the discretion of the FWS and Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, in
consultation with the USFS and Utah Division of Water Resources.
Animas-La Plata Project Status.—  As authorized in 1968, the ALP would divert
flows from the Animas River near Durango, Colorado to produce some 191,230 af/yr,
including 111,130 af/yr of irrigation water and 80,100 af/yr of M&I water.  The
project has been embroiled in controversy; pitting farmers, ranchers, municipalities,
developers, and the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian tribes against
conservation interests, taxpayer groups, and a small but vocal group known as the
Southern Ute Grassroots Organization16.  Project opponents have indicated that the
diversion would jeopardize endangered fish species, cause water quality problems,
destroy riparian ecosystems and habitat, and impact recreational uses.  Proponents
argue that the project is needed to provide water for the settlement of Indian water
rights, as well as for growing populations in Colorado and New Mexico.
Resolution of the issues surrounding the ALP has proceeded at what some have
called a “glacial” pace.  Since authorized by Congress, the ALP has undergone
several modifications in response to fiscal and environmental concerns and to date a
total of only $60.5 million has been appropriated.  A key element of the ALP is the
1988 Ute Indian Water Rights settlement, under which ALP water is dedicated to
satisfy reserved water rights claims of the Southern Mountain Ute and Ute
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Mountain Ute Indian Tribes.  The tribes have claims to approximately one third of
the project water.  Most tribal council members favor the project due to its major
role in fulfilling the water rights claims of the 1988 settlement.  Opposition to the
project in the Indian community comes from the Southern Ute Grassroots
Organization, which is concerned about environmental damages and the financial
obligations the project would impose on the tribes.  In addition, the Navajo Nation
has recently raised issues regarding a conflict with their Winters rights claims,
which date from 1868 and have never been adjudicated, and which could be
impacted by the project.  The last Congress debated cutting funding for the project,
but $10.86 million in funding was restored for 
FY 1997 (Bingham, 1997).
In an attempt to resolve the continuing disputes about the project, Governor Roy
Romer and Lt. Governor Gail Schoettler convened a state-wide negotiating process. 
Among the stakeholders involved in this process are the Utes, Navajos, Animas-La
Plata Water Conservancy District, San Juan Water Commission, conservationists,
Southern Ute Grassroots Organization, and interests from New Mexico, Colorado,
EPA, and DOI.  Secretary Babbitt indicated that he believes the process “may
provide a helpful model for negotiated settlement of knotty problems within the
Colorado River Basin.”
Most agree that the Romer/Schoettler process is innovative.  High Country News
called the negotiations “revolutionary in their recognition of the newest arrivals’
right to be at the table” (Marston, 1996).   Financial support for this process is being
offered by an array of agencies, including DOI, EPA, and the State of Colorado
(through cost-sharing and in-kind contributions).
The Romer/Schoettler process is an alternative to the on-going litigation.  Project
proponents and opponents have entered into a “stand still” agreement, which places
pending lawsuits on hold and allows stakeholders to focus their resources on
resolving differences within the negotiating process.  To enhance the potential for
resolution, Governor Romer and Lt. Governor Schoettler have established a set of
ground rules for the stakeholders.  The rules require stakeholders to refrain from
publicly voicing or publishing personal attacks on the character or motives of other
parties and to recognize that each party deserves to be treated with dignity and
respect despite differing points of view.
Jim Lochhead, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources
(CDNR), stated that the 1986 settlement agreement “required vision, extraordinary
leadership, respect for the needs of all sides, a willingness to listen to and explore
new solutions, and a commitment to stay at the table until a solution is reached.  If
these same qualities are applied in [the Romer/Schoettler] process, we can reach a
positive and lasting result” (CDNR, 1996).
The process builds upon a trend in water resource management to identify and
solicit participation from all stakeholders.  This strategy was critical to the
resolution of controversies surrounding the Central Arizona Project and California’s
30-year water war in the Bay-Delta Accords.  Agreements on these projects were not
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reached easily, and consensus on the ALP will require new partnerships to form
among diverse and differing interests.17
State Conservation Programs:  Some Examples
There is great potential in the Lower Basin for conservation and reuse of water
supplies.  Estimates vary, but there is widespread agreement that the greatest
potential is in the agricultural sector where there has been little incentive to
conserve because cheap water is plentiful.  One report suggests that 1.2 maf in
savings could be achieved in this sector, which uses two thirds of the water, by
investments in irrigation efficiency and retiring marginal lands (Pacific Institute,
1996).  Another study suggested that a ten percent rise in prices could reduce water
use on some California farm crops by as much as 20 percent (Gardner, 1983).  In
1984, the California Water Resources Control Board found that with irrigation
efficiency improvements, the IID could save up to 400,000 af/yr.
Conservation programs do not generally receive a high priority in terms of
budgetary resources.  In California, the state Department of Water Resources was
allocated $2.3 million in water conservation staff support and $17 million in loan
funds to local agencies in its 1996-1997 budget (which are expected to increase $39
million in fiscal year 1997-1998) out of an overall Department budget of $415 million
(Letter from California Department of Water Resources, April 1, 1997).  California’s
municipal water conservation strategy is highly dependent upon programs requiring
significant invest-ments by water providers.  In 1991, M&I water providers signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Regarding Urban Water Conservation Best
Management Practices (BMPs).  Implementation of the BMPs is projected to result in
882,000 af in savings by the year 2020, approximately 50 percent of which would be
derived from relatively costly programs such as fixture retrofit programs and
distribution system leak repairs (MWD, 1996).  More than one million ultra-low
flush toilets have been installed under MWD’s conservation program, which are
expected to save 40,000 af/yr for 20 years.  By 1995, MWD and its member agencies
had invested over $8.5 million in toilet retrofits. 
There is a similar MOU being developed for agricultural users, as authorized by the
California legislature in 1990.  Water savings in agriculture are dependent on
financial investment in canal lining, installation of control structures and irrigation
systems to improve water deliveries, crop switching, and other structural and non-
structural measures.
Arizona’s Groundwater Management Code was widely praised when it was enacted
17 years ago, but it is debatable whether its conservation requirements have had
much effect in reducing water use in any sector.  Agricultural use was grandfathered
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and a liberal allowance provided for the right to irrigate all acres ever in production
during the five-year qualifying period, with water duties that allow high water use
crops.  Moreover, flexibility accounts were established for years in which the
maximum allowable was not used.  Due primarily to economic factors, considerable
land was fallowed during the 1980s.  These flexibility accounts now total millions of
acre-feet and these credits can be exchanged or transferred.  Perhaps the most
progress has occurred by providing on-farm services to farmers where savings can be
demonstrated by changes in water application at no cost to the farmer.
Municipal conservation efforts under the Arizona Groundwater Code have been
inconsistent; the gallons per capita per day (GPCD) measuring standard is arbitrary
and difficult to evaluate because large users and the number of users on a system
can skew the results.  Modest savings are expected from municipal conservation and
education programs, with GPCD rates decreasing slightly.
The SNWA has a minimum conservation goal of 10 to 15 percent by the year 2000. 
By the end of 1996, the SNWA claimed it had already achieved an estimated 11
percent cumulative savings from conservation programs and water rate increases
since 1991, when conservation programs began in the Las Vegas Valley.  All water
customers are metered and water rates are designed to encourage conservation
(increasing block rates whereby large users pay higher rates).  The SNWA has a
current conservation program budget of $3 million.  Programs include indoor
plumbing retrofit programs, daytime outdoor watering restrictions during the
summer, extensive conservation education, a “Cash for Grass” turf replacement
incentive program, and water audit programs for outdoor irrigation systems.
Denver Water has developed a Conservation Master Plan, which is a voluntary
program to provide guidance and suggestions to its customers to help reach water
conservation goals, including leak detection, metering, low use fixtures, and
education.  Denver Water expects to save 37,000 af through these efforts by 2035. 
San Diego’s conservation program includes financial incentives for low water use
fixtures, funding for programs on irrigation efficiency and low water use
landscaping, and elementary school education.  SDCWA estimates that county-wide
water use has dropped by 15 percent since 1990 and that new conservation
programs will save an additional eight percent by 2010.
The City of Steamboat Springs, Colorado has implemented a water efficiency
program that is expected to save 30 million gallons a year and over $230,000 for its
customers in that small city.  New Mexico has begun to develop a state program in
which conservation measures will be implemented at a state, regional, and local
level.  The state envisions its role as one of coordination, information, and
assistance.  The New Mexico state engineer requires that all water right
applications include a water conservation plan. 
Reuse Programs.—  Reuse of treated wastewater is an important component of
water conservation.  For every acre-foot of reclaimed water used for an existing non-
potable need, an acre-foot of drinking water is saved.  For purposes of augmenting
water supplies, reuse is particularly advantageous for coastal cities; it can provide
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new supplies in areas where wastewater is currently being discharged to the ocean. 
Water reuse is slower to develop in the Upper Basin, but one reason is because
there is considerable reliance by downstream users on return flows.  The law in
Colorado and many other appropriation states requires that return flows, whether
effluent or irrigation water, be returned to the stream and available to the next
senior water right.  More progress may be possible in municipal reuse programs. 
The City of Rock Springs, Wyoming reduced annual its expenses for ceme-tery
irrigation from $65,000 to $4,529 by converting to effluent, saving 33,000 gallons a
day of fresh water.  The City of Tucson, Arizona has had an extensive effluent reuse
program for years, building major distribution systems so that effluent could be
conveyed to golf courses and parks for irrigation.   In Utah, the City of Tooele will be
the first to use effluent on a golf course.
California has the most potential for expanding reuse.  California currently has an
active reuse program, with some 80 projects producing over 
150,000 af/yr in southern California alone.  These projects are used for a variety of
purposes, including groundwater recharge, hydraulic barriers to salt water
intrusion, landscape and agricultural irrigation, and direct industrial use. 
Approximately 80 more reuse projects have been proposed in California, and reuse
within the state is projected to provide about 1 maf/yr of water supply by the year
2020. 
There may be no better example of where reuse was not seriously considered in
water resource planning than the new South Bay Ocean Outfall in southern
California.  When completed, up to 195,000 af/yr of treated effluent from the new
International Boundary Water Commission (IBWC) International Wastewater
Treatment Plant and the City of San Diego’s South Bay Water Reclamation Plant
will be discharged into the Pacific Ocean via the outfall.  The outfall will have an
average daily flow capacity of 174 mgd and a peak flow capacity of 333 mgd.
In Arizona, over 140,000 af/yr of effluent is being used statewide, including about
60,000 af/yr for the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant west of Phoenix and 30,000
af/yr by the Buckeye Irrigation Company and 30,000 af/yr exchanged with the
Roosevelt Irrigation District for potable water. In southeast Arizona, a plan to
recharge the San Pedro River with effluent from the City of Sierra Vista is being
developed. 
Southern Nevada has a unique program in that it uses its wastewater to generate
“return flow credits.”  This means that, for every acre-foot of treated Colorado River
wastewater that Southern Nevada returns to the river, it can divert that much more
Colorado River water, as long as its consumptive use (defined in the LOR as
“diversions less return flows”) is no more than 300,000 af/yr.  Southern Nevada’s
existing diversion contract quantities are already based on the assumption that
most of the treated wastewater is returned for credit.  Because of this, more reuse of
the wastewater for outdoor irrigation and power plants, for example, rather than
returning it to the river for credit, would not increase the region’s supply.  Instead,
decisions to reuse are usually based on facility capacities and costs.  As a result,
effluent reuse has been increasing in Southern Nevada and is expected to continue. 
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Some water features on the famous Las Vegas Strip treat and use gray water and
nuisance shallow groundwater.
Ecosystem Sustainability
A century of development in the Colorado River basin has dramatically altered the
natural hydrograph and functions of the river system; a series of large dams and
reservoirs capable of storing four years’ average flow moderate or prevent most
floods, change the timing and reduce peak flows, lowering the water temperature,
fragmenting habitat, trapping sediment and altering instream and streamside
habitats. In the Lower Basin, from Lake Mead to the border, the river can be
characterized as a plumbing system of dams, reservoirs, huge diversion works,
canals, and flood control levees; only a small percentage of natural habitat remains
along the lower river.
The economic wealth in the American Southwest and southern Rockies is largely the
result of the power, water, and flood control benefits that resulted from the
substantial investment in the Colorado River basin.  And the great reservoirs have
become recreation meccas for millions of people who visit each year, providing
substantial economic benefits to the area as well.
This development, however, has not been without a price.  The diversion of millions
of acre feet of water, changes in water quality and temperature and the alteration of
the natural habitat, coupled with the intentional and unintentional introduction of
exotic species throughout the basin has impacted fish, birds and other aquatic
dependent species.  As stated by 
W.L. Minckley, “The fish fauna collapsed from downstream to upstream, in the same
sequence as the river was regulated” (Minckley, 1991).  The introduction of exotic,
non-native fish throughout the basin is now considered to be one of the major
reasons that native fish populations have crashed over the past 50 years and
perhaps is the most important reason, according to Dr. Minckley.  “Native fishes of
the American West will not remain on earth without active management, and I
argue forcefully that control of non-native, warm-water species is the single most
important requirement for achieving that goal” (Minckley, 1991). 
The four “big river fishes” -- the Colorado squawfish (once called the “salmon of the
Colorado”), the razorback sucker, the bonytail, and the humpback 
chub -- are all listed as endangered.  The squawfish has been extirpated in the
Lower Basin, but small populations still exist in the Upper Basin, primarily in the
Green and Yampa rivers.  The bonytail is the rarest, and viewed by some experts as
on the verge of extinction.  The razorback sucker population, once widely
distributed, now consists of primarily old fish living in Lower Basin reservoirs and in
the Yampa and Green rivers in the Upper Basin.  There has been an extensive
razorback augmentation program in the Lower Basin since the 1970s, where
razorback fry are reared in hatcheries and backwater areas of Lake Mohave and
Lake Havasu until they are large enough to escape predation.  The humpback chub
has a healthy population in the Little Colorado confluence in the Grand Canyon, and
persists in various areas of the Upper Basin.
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Recovery plans have been adopted for the squawfish, the bonytail and the
humpback chub, and the FWS is now developing a recovery plan for the razorback
sucker that is intended to integrate all four fish in a single multi-species plan.  A
draft of this plan has not yet been released for comment.
The Upper Basin Recovery Implementation Program
The Upper Basin Recovery Implementation Program (RIP) has been underway since
1988 when a coordinating committee was formed, consisting of the BOR and FWS,
the states of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming, and environmental and water user
representatives.  The San Juan sub-basin was excluded from this program as it
involved a different set of issues, including the controversial ALP and several Indian
tribes (see discussion below).  Major elements of the program include identifying
and protecting instream flows for fish, restoring, and protecting floodplain and
backwater habitats, installing fish passage facilities, controlling non-natives,
restocking natives and genetic conservation.  Some of the program’s
accomplishments to date include:
• BOR officials helped improve endangered fish habitat by altering the
timing of releases from Flaming Gorge and Blue Mesa reservoirs.  These
releases, which total 2.5 maf/year, improve endangered fish habitat by
providing higher spring flows and more stable flows the rest of the year.
• The Utah State Engineer set a water rights policy to benefit endangered
fish by protecting Green River flows between Flaming Gorge Dam and in
the Duchesne River.
• A 350-foot fish ladder has been built at the Redlands Diversion Dam in
Southwest Colorado, opening up 50 miles of historical habitat to
endangered fish.  The ladder is on the Gunnison River two miles upstream
of the Colorado River confluence. 
• An agreement is in place between Colorado State Parks, the Colorado
Water Conservation Board, and the FWS to release 3,300 af annually
from Steamboat Lake into the Yampa River to offset periods of low flows. 
Restoration of floodplain bottom lands is considered an important element of the
program, as these wetlands serve as important nurseries and food sources for young
fish and because a large percentage of wetlands have been lost since the region was
settled.18  A major unresolved issue is how to control and reduce the predation
threat that introduced and stocked non-native fish present for successful native
recruitment.
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There have been serious disagreements in Colorado over the level and variability of
instream flows needed for the fish, to what extent existing and planned water uses
would be protected from jeopardy opinions and where new water development can
occur.  There is also concern that establishing instream flows for fish by filing for
state appropriations could deprive Colorado of part of its compact entitlement.  The
Colorado Water Conservation Board has filed, on behalf of the state, for instream
flow water rights in several  important river reaches.  These rights, if adjudicated by
the state’s water court, will be junior to existing decreed rights, but will include a
base flow right during low flow conditions and a “recovery flow right” to create more
natural flow conditions at certain times of the year.
The major issue is whether water users will be able to obtain an acceptable level of
regulatory certainty from the FWS; whether the RIP agreed to and funded as the
“reasonable and prudent alternative” to jeopardy will be sufficient or whether it will
be reopened at the discretion of the FWS down the road.  Water users believe they
are entitled to “a deal is a deal” treatment and the same “no surprises” policy
promised private landowners under Section 10 habitat conservation plans for
endangered species on private lands.  Currently, proposals are being explored by the
parties that would protect a certain block of already developed water plus a future
block of water for projects already built, conditioned on sufficient progress taking
place toward recovery by the year 2000.  This issue, however, is still in a state of
flux.
Indeed, knowing how to deal with the cumulative impacts of water development,
what actually works, and what happens if it doesn’t are questions that have
perplexed participants from early on in the program.  It is difficult to evaluate how
effective the program has been to date, but it has allowed water development to
continue under state law within the framework of the ESA and has created a
cooperative process for resolving conflicts generated by the ESA.
The Upper Basin RIP is at a critical crossroads.  There is still strong opposition from
many water users in Colorado to setting aside flows for fish.  Some filed objections
to the instream flow water rights filings, which angered environmentalists who feel
the water users are trying to have it both ways -- meaning they are benefitting from
the current non-jeopardy status by continuing to divert water while opposing the
long-term requirements for recovery of the species. 
A total of approximately $64.7 million has been spent on the RIP program since its
inception.  There is an annual operating budget of $2.5 million, but long-term
funding estimates are that $70 to $100 million is needed for the significant capital
costs of acquiring habitat and water rights, fish ladders, hatcheries and research. 
These funds presumably will come from Congressional appropriations, funds
contributed from the three states and from small, one-time water development
“depletion fees.”  A more stable source of funding is being sought by redirecting
Upper Basin CRSPA power revenues, which will require federal legislation, and an
increase in state cost sharing for construction activities.
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The San Juan River Recovery Implementation Program (SJRRIP)
The San Juan River Basin makes up about one-fourth of the Upper Basin and
drains 25,000 square miles of the four corner states.  The San Juan River is the
second largest tributary of the Colorado.  It includes four Indian reservations, which
make up about 60 percent of the land in the basin.  Private land makes up about 13
percent of the basin and government land the rest.  At its confluence at Lake Powell,
the San Juan River produces an average annual flow of 2 maf; about half of which is
controlled upstream by Navajo Dam, which was authorized in 1956 by the Colorado
River Storage Project Act.
Navajo Dam and Reservoir (which stores 1.7 maf) have been described as “truly the
quintessential cornerstone of the future potential management options in the San
Juan River Basin” (Gold and Jensen, 1996).  Water users in the basin, including the
NIIP, depend on this reservoir.  New Mexico derives most of its Upper Basin
Compact water from this project and the San Juan-Chama Project.
The endangered fish program for the San Juan River Basin was developed as the
RPA to a jeopardy opinion on the Animas-La Plata Project, which as designed would
deplete 154,800 af from the Animas and La Plata rivers in Colorado and New
Mexico.  A MOU was signed by New Mexico, Colorado, and the Southern Ute Indian,
Ute Mountain Ute and Jicarilla Tribes and DOI to develop a recovery
implementation program to address the needs of two listed fish (squawfish and
razorback) and other native fishes.  The program was initiated in 1992 and is to run
for 15 years.
A second MOU was signed to deal with the NIIP and Navajo Reservoir releases. 
The Navajo Nation initially refused to participate because the RPA required
protection of flows from Navajo Reservoir for the life of the ALP, as opposed to the
duration of the SJRRIP.  This was later modified and the Navajo Nation is now a
full participant.  Sufficient progress toward recovery  of the two listed fish is
required by the RPA in order for there to be additional depletions above recognized
levels.  A seven-year research period was initiated to determine what flows are
needed for fish recovery, meaning that what constitutes “sufficient progress” is still
to be determined.
The main controversy is over the need for water releases in the spring for
endangered fish downstream of Navajo Dam, which impacts water available in
storage for Project users and other projects depending on the SJRRIP as the RPA. 
The conflict in the San Juan River Basin between endangered species and Native
American rights is profound.  The Navajo Nation opposes releases from the dam for
fish because they claim the stored water is reserved for full development of the NIIP
and the ultimate satisfaction of their reserved water rights.  The two Ute Tribes
claim the right to fully develop their reserved rights which were to be satisfied with
water developed by the ALP. 
The SJRRIP is similar to the Upper Basin program; the major differences are that it
includes more emphasis on water quality and involves a number of other native
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species to avoid listings in the future.  The SJRRIP is currently funded at a level of
$800,000 a year from BOR and FWS appropriations, but after the research period
has ended, it is anticipated that up to $15 million will be needed for capital projects
to recover the fish, with an annual operating cost of at least $600,000.
The Lower Basin Approach: The Multi-Species Conservation Program
Background.—  Extensive fish management and recovery efforts have been
carried out for years in the Lower Basin by cooperative efforts between BOR, Region
2 of FWS, the states, and Arizona State University.  In 1995, a Lower Basin
“management prospectus” was drafted by FWS biologists to focus research and
management efforts on the stabilization and enhancement of populations of
razorbacks and bonytails in Lake Mohave and Lake Havasu by restocking both fish
and continuing the program of using grow-out ponds in backwater areas of the lakes
to rear these fish to sizes that could escape predation and to ensure the survival of
the gene pool while long term solutions could be developed and implemented.  The
prospectus has been replaced by a Lower Basin Management Plan developed by the
FWS.
In August of 1996, the BOR completed a Biological Assessment (BA) of the impacts
of BOR operations in the lower main stem from Hoover Dam to the Mexican border
on endangered species.  As a result, Section 7 consultations were initiated with the
FWS and in April of 1997 a Biological Opinion was released which concluded that
the proposed action (including existing operations and maintenance) is likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of the bonytail chub, razorback sucker, and
southwestern willow flycatcher.  Two other species, the endangered Yuma clapper
rail and the proposed threatened flat-tailed horned lizard received a non-jeopardy
finding.  A RPA with 14 terms and conditions to reduce take of the three species was
approved by the FWS and submitted for public comment.  The Biological Opinion
addresses BOR’s discretionary program for continuing operations in the 100-year
floodplain from the upper end of Lake Mead to the Southerly International
Boundary (SIB) over the next five years, which is also the projected period for the
development of a long-term “multi-species conservation program.”  In short, the RPA
is designed to provide interim measures to assure sufficient progress toward
protection and recovery of these species while a long-term program is developed by
the Lower Basin states, federal agencies and other involved interests.
The Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program.—  In 1993, the
Lower Basin states and water users created a Steering Committee to explore
options for addressing endangered species concerns along the Lower Colorado River. 
The goal of this effort was  to develop a proactive approach that would provide ESA
compliance and avoid new listings, if possible, while continuing existing water and
power uses on the river.  A feasibility study was commissioned to explore
alternatives and a hybrid approach was selected which included a Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP) and incidental take permit under Section 10 of the ESA
merged with the expected Section 7 consultation process.  The states and water
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users believed that this approach would assure more state and stakeholder
involvement and control over the process and product, protect more species, control
costs, and help assure that water and power operations could continue.
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed by the DOI and the water
resources and fish and wildlife agencies of the three Lower Basin states in 1995 to
develop and implement what is now called the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species
Conservation Program (LCR MSCP).  A cost-sharing agree-ment between the states
and DOI was executed which established a 50-50 funding formula.  Several
environmental groups objected to the wording of the MOA, arguing that it placed
water and power operations at a higher priority than species recovery and would
compromise Section 7 requirements.  A Memorandum of Clarification was
negotiated and signed in 1996 which provided assurances that the MOA was not
intended to avoid compliance with Section 7 of the ESA or somehow delegate this
authority to the Steering Committee.  The Steering Committee was also expanded to
include representatives of Indian tribes and environmental groups.
The Steering Committee now has been redesignated as an “Ecosystem Conservation
and Recovery Implementation Team” (ECRIT) by the FWS.  The ESA authorizes the
Secretary to appoint “appropriate public and private agencies and institutions, and
other qualified persons”19 to help implement recovery actions and exempts this
committee from Federal Advisory Committee Act requirements.  The ECRIT
membership is being expanded to include public members representing various
interests like sport fishing and recreation, and additional tribes and environmental
groups.
The Steering Committee had agreed on and funded a series of interim conservation
measures to assure ESA compliance until a long-term conservation program could
be developed and implemented.  These will be reviewed annually by FWS and the
ECRIT to measure “sufficient progress.”  Consultants have been selected to work
with the ECRIT over the next 3 to 
4 years to prepare what is expected to be a 50-year plan.  Approximately 
102 species that are either listed or considered at risk have been identified as
occurring in or along the Lower Colorado River.  This list will be narrowed and
prioritized during the planning process.
This is a unique approach to endangered species planning as it places major
responsibility in a committee of state and federal agencies, Indian tribes, water
users and interest groups.  The FWS, however, has a statutory obligation to assure
that there is sufficient progress toward species recovery and has stated that if the
ECRIT is not meeting its objectives, FWS reserves the right to withdraw this
designation and proceed accordingly.  While this collaborative process seems to be
on track, there is still some concern by environmental groups that the RPA is
sufficient to meet ESA compliance.  Concerns have been raised also about the need
to expand the conservation program to include the Colorado River delta in Mexico.
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The Southwest Center for Biological Diversity (SCBD), which recently become a
member of the ECRIT, has filed a number of lawsuits over what it sees as the
failure of the FWS to designate and protect critical habitat for the southwestern
willow flycatcher, particularly in the upper Lake Mead delta.  At least 14 pairs of
flycatchers are known to be nesting in the delta habitat.  The SCBD contends that
higher lake levels in Lake Mead threaten to inundate and destroy prime nesting
sites for the flycatcher and are seeking a court order to require the lake to be
lowered, which would require releasing 3-4 maf of water from the reservoir.  BOR
believes it has no discretion to make such a release under the law and water users
and states are strongly opposed.  The issue of whether the ESA can be invoked to
radically change water and power operations on the Lower Colorado is a critical one;
whether any compromise solution can be found in the ECRIT process is yet unclear,
and studies, data collection, and discussions are proceeding.
The LCR MSCP can be contrasted with the Upper Basin RIP in a number of ways. 
First, establishing instream flows is not as major a concern for the Lower Colorado
main stem.  Since at least 1.5 maf must be delivered to the Mexican border each
year, there is adequate water in the river for the fish (although the timing of
releases and reservoir levels are issues).  Second, some biologists believe the
razorback sucker and bonytail have adapted to the reservoir habitat and that the
primary problem for the fish in the lower river is predation and competition for food
with the many non-native fish that occupy the same habitat.  And, by concentrating
on all species at risk (and not just fish), the Committee believes this will be a cost-
effective program, saving both more species and money over the long run.  In
addition, the LCR MSCP is focused solely on the main stem of the river and its 
100-year floodplain.  Some conservation groups have questioned whether the
program should be that limited given that the Lower Colorado main stem has been
so developed, and ask whether recovery and mitigation efforts should also include
some of the tributaries, such as the upper Gila river system. 
A budget of $4.5 million has been established to develop the 50-year conservation
plan and fund interim conservation measures.  The plan will 
be developed, with the assistance of a consulting team, over the next 3 to 
5 years.  The ultimate cost of implementing this program or how it will be funded is
unknown at this time.
Summary.—  There are a number of questions about the three recovery
implementation programs in the basin and especially how “recovery” will be
measured.  One problem is that there is not agreement as to how recovery is
defined; does it mean the endangered fish species must be “self sustaining” as the
Upper Basin RIP seems to indicate, or may recovery necessarily require hands-on
management in some areas for the foreseeable future?  And, the existing recovery
plans for big river fish do not specifically or adequately deal with many issues,
including how to control exotic species, which may be the most difficult challenge
and the key to successful recovery.  Finally, both federal and non-federal agencies
pursue stocking and management programs for sport fish to enhance recreation in
the basin.  These programs are often in conflict with and in competition for funds
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and support for native fish which could be very detrimental if cooperation cannot be
achieved between sport fishing advocates and native fish advocates. 
The Colorado River Delta and Upper Gulf Ecosystem
While the LCR MSCP stops at the Mexican border, there has been considerable
attention paid by scientists and environmental groups in recent years to the rest of
the ecosystem in Mexico.  The Colorado River delta was once one of the most
biologically significant wetlands in North America, home to a multitude of species of
plants, birds, waterfowl, and animals.  Once the main stem dams were built,
however, the delta lost its primary source of water, nutrients and silt the river once
generously provided with its spring flows, and has steadily deteriorated ever since.
Historically, the upper gulf tidal area, with its mix of freshwater and salt water,
provided important spawning and nursery habitat for shrimp, fish and other species
in the upper gulf food chain.  The vast salt marsh wetlands and cottonwood-willow
bosques observed by Aldo Leopold in the 1920s are mostly gone, with only remnants
remaining, supplied by agricultural run off and a few freshwater springs.  In the
upper gulf, the once prolific totoaba, a highly prized commercial and sport fish, is
nearly extinct, as is the vaquita, the world’s smallest porpoise and most rare
mammal.  Once thriving shrimp, commercial, and sport fisheries have steadily
declined, but noticeably improved when flood waters reached the gulf, such as in
1983-88, when millions of acre-feet of water was spilled from upstream reservoirs
and revitalized wetlands such as the Laguna Salada.  The Gila River floods in 1993
produced similar results.
In 1993, Mexico designated the delta and upper gulf as a Biosphere Reserve and has
now implemented a management plan to protect and restore its marine and other
resources and the local economies dependent on these resources.  Many
conservation organizations, scientists, government officials, and citizens groups in
Baja and Sonora have become actively involved in discussions about the restoration
potential of the ecosystem.  Some 
250,000 hectares of the delta is still undeveloped and parts could be re-
stored if water is available.  In addition, NAFTA has raised the promise of
environmental action on this part of the border.  The delta is also part of the
important Pacific Flyway for migratory waterfowl.  Large numbers of these and
other migrating birds depend on the remaining wetlands, raising the potential of
significant recreational, economic, and environmental benefits for the area if
restoration of other wetlands, such as the Laguna Salada, can occur.
The revival of the Cienega de Santa Clara has demonstrated that these wetlands
can be restored if water is made available.  The Cienega is now prime habitat for a
number of species, including a significant percentage of the endangered Yuma
Clapper Rail population.  This wetland now measures some 6,000 acres (2,428
hectares) as a result of receiving approximately 130,000 af/ yr of drainage water
from the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation Project that is bypassed to the delta through
the Main Outlet Drain Extension (MODE), constructed by the BOR as part of the
Major Issues
57
1974 Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act (CRBSCA).  The Wellton-Mohawk
water is too saline to meet treaty standards and is not, therefore, counted toward
Mexico’s entitlement.  Under the CRBSCA, the Wellton-Mohawk water would be
desalinated and 68,000 af delivered to the Northerly International Boundary (NIB)
of Mexico in the river.  Since the YDP has not operated since operationally tested
when completed, all the Wellton-Mohawk water has been diverted to the Cienega. 
If, however, the YDP is operated at full capacity, a substantial portion of the water
supply to the Cienega will be cut off unless replaced by other sources.  The impact of
the various operational scenarios for the YDP on the wetlands have not been
established.
Scientists and environmental groups on both sides of the border are concerned about
preserving this valuable wetland and considering what other restoration is possible
in the delta area.  Recent reports (Pacific Institute, 1996; Glenn et al., 1996) have
focused on the importance of these wetlands and the connection between the health
of the delta-upper gulf ecosystem and the river.  While it is unrealistic to restore this
ecosystem to its pre-dam status, the potential for some restoration and for
protecting what is left are evolving environmental issues in both countries. 
Conservation groups such as Environmental Defense Fund, Conservation
International, Pronatura, and the Southwest Center for Biodiversity have been
developing information and exploring alternatives informally with scientists and
other experts.  The questions to be answered are: what is possible, with what water,
from what source, and at what cost?  Is there water within the system that could be
made available for these purposes, including municipal wastewater, agricultural
return flows, flood flows, or other sources?  The answers aren’t so obvious.  It is an
extremely complicated issue, with an international treaty involved and Lower Basin
and Mexican water users intent on using every acre-foot of Colorado River water
available.  Yet it is an issue that cannot be ignored and will require discussion and
action on a binational level.
Glen Canyon Dam
On October 9, 1996, Secretary Babbitt signed the Record of Decision (ROD) for the
operation of Glen Canyon Dam, a significant milestone in a long process that began
in 1989 with the decision by Secretary Lujan to establish an interim flow regime and
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to re-evaluate dam operations. 
In 1992, the Grand Canyon Protection Act became law, which mandated the EIS and
operation of the dam to protect these downstream resource and cultural values.  An
extensive public process followed and over 30,000 comments were received on the
Draft EIS.  The purpose of the EIS was to evaluate options to minimize adverse
impacts on the downstream environment and cultural interests in Glen and Grand
Canyons.  At stake were competing interests for recreation, Native American
cultural interests, hydropower, sport fishing and protecting the natural resources of
the Grand Canyon.
The Final EIS, as approved by the Secretary, implements the “modified low
fluctuating flow alternative,” which also incorporates periodic beach-habitat
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building flows (high releases for short duration) to rebuild sandbars, deposit
nutrients and restore backwater channels.  The Final EIS took over five years and
nearly $60 million, paid by power users, to complete.  It has changed the way a
major federal dam in the West will be operated to alleviate some of the negative
impacts downstream.  As a result, about one third of the peaking capacity of the
power plant has been idled, which reduces the revenue producing capacity of this
facility significantly.
During the EIS process, the FWS issued a draft Biological Opinion stating that the
preferred alternative was unacceptable and would jeopardize the razorback sucker
and humpback chub.  The FWS preferred a “seasonally adjusted flow” for these fish. 
These flows will be studied as a part of the adaptive management process to
determine what will best protect the fish.  Other issues that remain are temperature
control modifications (should the water be warmed up to help native fish) and
sediment transport (should expensive modifications be made to transport sediment
downstream).
In March of 1996, a simulated flood release, or “spike flow” as it is commonly called,
of 45,000 cfs (about 50 percent of a normal flood) was agreed to by the states and
the Secretary in the 1996 Annual Operating Plan.  The purpose of the spike flow
was to move sediment within the system to rebuild beaches and sand bars and
remove exotic vegetation.  Since construction of Glen Canyon Dam, much of the
historic sediment supply has been trapped, although the Paria, the Little Colorado,
and other tributaries still contribute some.  It was estimated that the spike flow
would double the sand transport capability of the river.  The experiment was
pronounced a success, although monitoring over time will produce a more scientific
analysis.20  It is anticipated that additional periodic flushing flows will be
recommended in the future, particularly when the reservoirs are full, but this
remains a controversial issue as power users do not want to see a precedent
established whereby water is bypassed around the power plant and could challenge
its legality. 
In perspective, the Glen Canyon EIS and environmental studies process should be
analyzed for what can be done and what should not be done in terms of “lessons
learned” (Gold and Jensen, 1996).  Environmentalists are pleased; this is indeed a
major precedent as to what might be done to re-operate a major federal reclamation
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dam.  However, the fact that it involved the Grand Canyon National Park, enjoyed
bipartisan support, and Congress passed a law to deal with the issue were
significant factors.  Second, it is a classic example of how science can be brought to
bear on a natural resource management issue.  While the scientific studies were
extremely costly, as critics are quick to point out, scientists need to stay involved
over the long term as part of the adaptive management process.  The results could
have significant influence on future federal policy for dam operations in the West. 
Finally, the process was long, tedious, and contentious at times, as a result of
involving all interest groups with many conflicting agendas.  Such broad-based,
inclusive decision making processes are cumbersome and take time, but also may be
the only way to get it done.
A 26-member Adaptive Management Work Group has been appointed by the
Secretary as an advisory committee to facilitate the adaptive management process
and oversee the long range monitoring and research that will continue.  The
Secretary’s designee will chair the Adaptive Management Work Group, which
includes conservation groups, recreational interests, power purchasers, the seven
basin states, and the 12 cooperating federal and state agencies and tribes.
Salinity Control
Introduction
The salinity of the Colorado River, and to a lesser extent salt loading, has fluctuated
significantly over the period of record (1941-1995).  Salinity concentration is
generally inversely proportional to flow rate, in that it decreases in periods of high
flows and increases during periods of low flow, as illustrated in Figure 14.  While
high runoff and flood control releases have helped keep the river within standards
within recent years and Congress has taken a series of actions to control salinity,
salinity levels have had significant domestic and international impacts in the
Colorado River basin.
Human development shares the responsibility about equally with nature for the
levels of salinity that occur in the Colorado River.  As seen in the percentages below,
nearly half the salt is from natural sources:21
• Natural (saline springs, erosion of saline geologic formations, and runoff): 
47%
• Irrigation Return Flow:  37%
• Reservoir evaporation and phreatophyte use:  12%
• Municipal and Industrial:  1%
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Figure 14.—Salinity vs. flow at Imperial Dam.
(Source:  CRBSCF, 1996).
• Out-of-Basin Exports:  3%
Minute No. 242
In 1964, salinity became an international issue when the Mexican government
complained that deliveries of Colorado River water with salt concentrations of 2,000
ppm were affecting their ability to grow crops and asserted that this was in violation
of the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty.  Salinity became a major problem for Mexican
agriculture in the Mexicali Valley after the 75,000-acre Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation
District was developed in southern Arizona and the filling of Lake Powell reduced
flows in the river.  After ten years of negotiations, Mexico and the United States
signed Minute No. 242 to the Treaty in 1974 which established salinity standards
for water delivered upstream of Morelos Dam at no more than 
115 ppm plus or minus 30 ppm over the annual average salinity of water arriving at
Imperial Dam.  Approximately 140,000 af of water could continue to be delivered to
the SIB at substantially the same historic salinity level.
The Salinity Control Forum
In 1972, Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Water Act in P.L. 92-500 which
required the states to adopt, with EPA approval, basin-wide salinity standards
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based on numeric criteria.  The Act also required a triennial review to assess
whether the standards were being met.  The standards adopted and approved by
EPA and which are in effect today are:
• Hoover Dam: 723 mg/l22
• Parker Dam: 747 mg/l
• Imperial Dam: 879 mg/l
The Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum (CRBSCF) was established by the
basin states in 1974 to develop a basin-wide salinity control imple-mentation plan. 
The goal of the implementation plan is to maintain the salinity levels at or below
these 1972 levels and to offset the effects of water development on salinity.  The
most recent Triennial Review Report (CRBSCF, 1996) estimates the amount of salts
that would need to be removed by 2015, as well as with full development of compact
apportion-ments, to comply with the standards.  It is estimated that 1.48 million
tons of salt will need to be removed annually to meet the standards in 2015 and 1.8
million tons of salt a year will have to be removed at full development.  The
implementation plan is predicated on an average annual water supply to the basin
of 15 maf.  The standards can be exceeded on a temporary basis and are flow-
weighted average levels for the calendar year; the amount of water in the system
and runoff variations have a significant impact on salinity levels and can cause
salinity at Imperial Dam to fluctuate by as much as 450 mg/l.
Salinity Control Programs
In 1974, Congress enacted the CRBSCA in response to Mexico’s concerns and to
implement Minute No. 242 of the Mexican Water Treaty.  Title II of the CRBSCA
authorized four salinity control units in the Upper Basin and studies of a number of
others to improve irrigation efficiency, to reduce leaching of salts and dispose of
natural salt sources through evaporation and other processes.
A variety of salinity control programs have been implemented in the Colorado River
basin.  Current and potential projects and their associated removal rates are
identified in Table 8.  The contribution column is the tons per year of salt that is
being added to the Colorado River as a result of the 
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Table 8.—Salinity control projects in the Colorado River Basin
Source
Contribution
(tons/yr)
Current removal
(tons/yr)
Potential additional
removal
(tons/yr)
Grand Valley 580,000 198,000 92,600
Uinta Basin 450,000 83,600 48,700
Lower Gunnison 360,000 68,000 203,400
Dolores/McElmo Creek 119,000 34,000 35,000
Paradox Valley 205,000 128,000 52,000
Meeker Dome 48,000
Las Vegas Wash 3,800
Big Sandy River 164,000 24,600 28,300
Non-Point Sources (BLM) 25,000 49,600
Well Plugging (BLM) 8,400 5,620
San Juan/Hammond 1,000,000 27,700
Price/San Rafael 430,000 161,000
Unidentified BOR 178,600
Total 621,400 882,520
Source:  CRBSCF, 1996.  Specific information on various projects is provided in the
1996 Triennial Review Report.
project or geology in the vicinity of the project.  The total identified contribution that
full implementation of  the salinity control projects could have on reducing the salt
load is about 1.5 million tons per year, or an average of 67 mg/l more (measured
below Hoover Dam) than the concentration would be with only the current salinity
control measures in place in the year 2015.  The Colorado River carries an average
salt load of 
9 million tons per year past Hoover Dam.
After the base flow concentration of salt reaches 500 mg/l, each additional ton of salt
costs users an estimated $340.  Based on this estimate, all of the treatment
solutions implemented in salinity control projects are considered economically
feasible.  The Upper Basin salinity control projects have cost between $25 and $138
per ton of salt removed.  Reducing salinity in the 
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agricultural sector has also resulted in lower water use, as the participating farmers
have higher irrigation efficiencies.  A secondary benefit of increased irrigation
efficiency is lower fertilizer use.
Salinity control has also been implemented through the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program under the Clean Water
Act.  The implementation plan consists of placing effluent limitations on industrial
and municipal discharges.  The plan impacts direct or indirect discharges into the
Lower Basin.  The goal is to require industries applying for NPDES permits to have
a “no-salt” return policy, except when it is deemed not to be practicable. 
Municipalities are allowed a net increase of 400 mg/l in salinity.
Salinity Control Funding
In 1995, Congress increased the appropriations authorization ceiling for the
program by $75 million and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to implement a
basin-wide program and initiate additional cost effective programs without specific
Congressional approval.23  The 1996 Farm Bill24 consolidated the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) Colorado River basin salinity program with several other
programs intended to assist farmers with conservation improvements and
authorized $200 million a year for the years of 1997-2002 for these programs.  The
USDA has not yet allocated this money among the various programs.
DOI program costs are now 70 percent federal and non-reimbursable and 
30 percent reimbursable.   However, none of the BLM’s cost are reim-bursable.  The
Upper Basin may repay its share over a 50-year period with interest but the Lower
Basin must pay its share in the year the cost was incurred.  The USDA program
requires at least a 25 percent non-federal cost share.  The Lower Basin funds for
salinity control are derived from a 2.5-mill levy on hydroelectric energy generation
from the Hoover power plant. 
Federal funding for salinity control projects has been decreasing in recent years.  In
the past three years, Congress has appropriated $77 million, of which the BOR
received 70 percent, USDA 27 percent, and BLM 3 percent, although the CRBSCF
had recommended a funding level of $138 million.  Table 9 shows the drop in
appropriations over the last decade.  USDA funding has declined significantly in
recent years, from  $13.7 million in 1994 to $9.2 million in 1996.  These sharp cuts in
USDA funding, according to the 1996 Triennial Review Report, jeopardize “the
ability of the Plan of 
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Table 9.—Summary of Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program funding for
BOR, USDA, and BLM by Federal fiscal year since 1988
Federal
fiscal year
BOR
($)
USDA
($)
BLM
($)
1988 20,783,000 3,804,000 500,000
1989 16,798,000 5,452,000 500,000
1990 14,185,000 10,341,000 700,000
1991 24,984,000 14,783,000 873,000
1992 34,566,000 14,783,000 873,000
1993 33,817,000 13,783,000 866,000
1994 32,962,000 13,783,000 800,000
1995 12,540,000 4,500,000 800,000
1996 8,205,000 9,161,000 800,000
Source:  CRBSCF, 1996.
Implementation to be implemented in a manner that assures compliance with the
numeric criteria” (CRBSCF, 1996).  Some basin water interests are worried about
the long-term success of the program to meet these water quality standards unless
new funding sources are found to allow on-going and identified projects to be
completed.  As budgets for discretionary spending shrink even further in the next
few years, the ability to meet the numeric standards in the future is in question.
In a Supplemental Report to the 1996 Triennial Review Report, the CRBSCF
acknowledged that “for the first time... with the long term mean water supply in the
system... flow-adjusted salinity concentrations in the river system presently exceed
the numeric criteria” (CRBSCF, Supplemental Report, 1996).25
Economic Impacts
Increased salinity has major economic impacts throughout the Colorado River basin;
total estimated costs to the economy are now approaching 
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$1 billion annually.26  The agricultural sector is negatively impacted on both sides of
the ledger.  Salt buildup in the soil results in lower crop yields, which affects the
income side of the ledger, and requires higher water use to leach the salts, which
results in higher water and fertilizer costs.  High levels of salinity also add costs to
M&I users, from construction and operation costs of treatment facilities to corrosion
damage and more frequent replacement of plumbing and water use appliances. 
Bottled water, which is more expensive than tap water, has experienced a marked
increase in sales in parts of the Colorado River basin due to the high total dissolved
solids (TDS) in Colorado River water.27
The salinity of the source water is also affecting the amount of reclaimed water for
use in the Lower Basin states.  Potable use and resultant wastewater treatment
concentrates the salts.  Regulatory agencies have placed restrictions on reuse or
recharge of waters that exceed specified salinity levels.  These levels will soon be
reached in parts of California, and future use of effluent will require additional
treatment to reduce the salinity of the effluent prior to reuse.  The residents of
Tucson, Arizona passed an initiative that rejected the use of CAP water as a potable
water supply, unless it meets or exceeds the water quality of local groundwater,
because of the damage it caused to water heaters and residential plumbing when
CAP use was initiated by the city.
The San Diego area provides a good example of the economic impacts of high salinity
levels.  According to the SDCWA, wastewater salinity in the San Diego region has
increased over the past decade due to increased total salinity present in imported
Colorado River water to the return of historic TDS levels in the Colorado River and
MWD practices relating to blending Colorado River water with less-saline state
water project supplies.  Salinity levels on the river reached historic low levels after
the 1988 flood flows, and rose toward historic average levels in the decade since. 
During this time, MWD changed its blending practice to supply San Diego with a
supply that was high in Colorado River water, and thus higher in TDS.  During the
summer of 1995, the average wastewater salinity concentration was 1,260 ppm, a 20
percent increase over 1986.  Sustained salinity concentra-tions above 1,000 ppm are
expected to curtail the reclaimed water market demand in the San Diego area due to
potential long-term effects on plant growth and soil characteristics.  Reclaimed
water will have salinity levels greater than 1,000 ppm if the salinity of the potable
water supply increases above 700 ppm.  The salinity of Colorado River water has
increased from a dry season average of 485 ppm in 1986 to over 700 ppm in 1994. 
One of 
San Diego’s solutions is to demineralize reclaimed water.  A new 1-mgd facility will
deliver 1,200 af/yr (to produce 4,000 af/yr of blended supply) at 
a capital cost of approximately $3.5 million and annual operating costs of $0.3
million.
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The Yuma Desalting Plant
Title I of the CRBSCA authorized construction of the YDP, the MODE canal to
bypass Wellton-Mohawk water if the YDP was not operating, the construction of a
wellfield near the border to supplement the flows to the river, a limitation of
pumping within five miles of the border, the retirement of 10,000 acres of Wellton-
Mohawk lands, and the lining of 49 miles of the Coachella Canal, which would
reduce seepage by some 130,000 af and could be used to meet salinity control
objectives for an interim period, until such time as BOR cannot meet California’s
water orders.
Completed in 1992, at a cost of $258 million, the YDP now sits idle, costing
approximately $6.8 million per year to maintain in “ready-reserve” status.  At full
capacity, it is designed to produce 68,000 af of water per year with a TDS of 300 ppm
at an annual O&M cost of approximately $25 million.  This comes to approximately
$370 per af for the water, which does not include capital costs.  The Wellton-
Mohawk water must first be pre-treated before desalinated, which adds to the cost. 
A periodic expense associated with YDP is the need to replace the reverse osmosis
desalting membranes, which cost $18 million and take time to manufacture.  The
BOR has not included funds in its budget for this purpose and the longer the YDP
sits idle, the more obsolescent the technology and the more expensive it becomes to
bring it on line.28
The Yuma Area Office (YAO) of the BOR is currently analyzing options for the YDP,
including possible markets for the water if the plant is operated at one-third
capacity.  At one-third capacity, the YAO estimates the price will be $515 per acre
foot at the property line (a buyer must have a legal entitlement to use it and
transport it to the place of use.)  The city of Yuma has a right of first refusal on the
water produced and is said to be looking for an industry to locate there that could
use this water supply.  Other ideas have ranged from piping the water to California
to sending it to the Middle East by supertanker. 
Current Mexican Concerns
As noted, about 140,000 af is currently delivered to the SIB as return flows from the
Yuma Valley.  The average annual salinity of this water since 1974 has been 1,500
ppm, which the U.S. views as acceptable under Minute 
No. 242.  The average annual salinity of the water delivered at the NIB has not
exceeded 1,000 ppm since 1974 and the differential between the salinity of these
waters and those arriving at Imperial Dam has been within the terms of Minute No.
242 (Ybarra, 1996).  Mexico recently objected to the delivery of the SIB water,
stating that the water quality causes reduced yields on 93,860 acres where it is
used, causes soil deterioration and higher groundwater salinity, and is possibly
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contaminated with pesticides.  Mexico maintains that the quality of this water has
deteriorated over time and cannot be diluted enough to make it usable.  Mexico has
requested that the entire 1.5 maf be delivered at the NIB at Morelos Dam, which
would require finding another 140,000 af from the river.  At present, discussions are
taking place to resolve this issue and the BOR is looking at scenarios to produce
water in the 1,000 to 1,200 ppm range from other sources, including the Yuma-Mesa
wellfield, operating the YDP, or a combination of the two.
Indian Water Rights
Introduction
Issues surrounding water allocation and management are of central importance to
Indian tribes in the Colorado River basin.  The major issues include: the trust
responsibility of the federal government to protect Indian natural resources; the
effects of decisions of a myriad of federal agencies on Indian land, such as
endangered species regulation; quantifying remaining Indian water rights claims,
including adjudications in state courts and negotiated settlements; distribution of
hydropower revenues; whether reserved rights apply to groundwater as well as
surface water; marketing of Indian water off-reservation; the creation of a tribal
water bank and economic development bank; conflicts between states and Indian
tribes over the management of water; increased Indian participation in decisions
concerning water use and management; funding for infrastructure; a greater
institutional presence for Indian tribes in the basin; and recognition of tribal
sovereignty.
In the coming century, one of the most critical  issues to be addressed will be how to
integrate Indian water rights into the existing water management framework in the
basin.  While progress has been made in settling the claims of a number of Indian
tribes, some tribes with major claims have not yet had their rights determined.  And
even those that have settled reserved rights claims have not been able, in most
cases, to develop the water or achieve the full economic value of this resource
through on reservation use or by off reservation leasing.  How tribal water rights
are quantified and utilized will have an enormous  impact on future water
management in the Colorado River basin.
Winters Rights
The cornerstone of Indian reserved rights is the Winters doctrine.  This doctrine was
first established in 1908 in Winters v. United States and later expanded in a series of
cases.  In the Winters case, the Supreme Court held that when land was withdrawn
and reserved from the public domain for an Indian reservation, enough water to
fulfill the purposes of the reservation was implicitly reserved.  The water right is
given a priority date from the time the reservation was established and, unlike state
water rights, the right cannot be lost through non-use.
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While Indian reserved rights were first recognized by the Supreme Court in the
Winters case, they remained essentially unquantified in the Colorado River basin
until 1963 when the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. California.  In this landmark
case, five Indian tribes along the main stem of the Colorado River were granted use
of 905,496 acre-feet of annual water diversions from the Colorado River or the
quantity of water necessary to supply the use required for the irrigation of 136,636,
whichever is less.  The standard for quantification used by the court to determine
these rights was the Practicably Irrigable Acreage (PIA) standard.  Under the PIA
standard, Indian tribes are awarded enough water to irrigate all the practicably
irrigable acreage on the reservation. 
Indian Water Rights in the Colorado River Basin
Arizona v. California had significant long-term implications for water management
in the Colorado River basin.  First, this case put parameters on the Winters doctrine,
parameters which  could result in relatively large amounts of water for most Indian
tribes.  Second, this case placed Indian water rights squarely within the framework
of western water law, not only by quantifying the rights, but also by holding that the
Colorado River Indian Tribes were included in Arizona’s apportionment.  Finally,
this landmark decision means that Indian water rights could no longer be ignored
when making decisions about water allocation in Colorado River basin.
The inescapable fact is that Indian water rights have been largely ignored when
decisions were made concerning water allocation and management.  The Colorado
River Compact, for example, divided the use of Colorado River water among the
seven states in the Colorado River basin but virtually ignored the issue of Indian
water rights claims to Colorado River water, with the exception of Article VII of the
Compact, which states that nothing in the Compact shall be construed as affecting
the obligation of the United States to Indian Tribes.
However, the decision in Arizona v. California, coupled with increased tribal
activism beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, caused a number of Indian tribes to
actively seek to quantify their water rights.  In some cases, lawsuits were filed
seeking to bar non-Indian water uses.  Because most Indian water rights are senior,
dating from the establishment of the reservation, non-Indian users who had
appropriated water under state law became increasingly concerned about the
possible displacement of their own water rights.  Indian water rights were commonly
characterized as the “sword of Damocles” hanging over the basin because of the
uncertainty caused by such large claims to water, which, once quantified, could limit
non-Indian uses of water.  In fully-appropriated basins, for example, Indian claims
could mean that non-Indian water users with junior rights would have to forgo
water uses.
The most common method for determining the scope and priority of Indian water
rights has been general stream adjudications in state court in which all the water
rights to a river system, both Indian and non-Indian, are determined and assigned a
priority date.  The McCarran Amendment waives the United States’ sovereign
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immunity from suit in state court for purposes of its assertion of water rights both
on its own behalf and on the behalf of Indian tribes.  In some cases, such as the
massive Gila River Adjudication and the Little Colorado River Adjudication in
Arizona, both of which involve the water rights of a dozen Indian tribes, non-Indian
water users initiated general adjudications  in order to have Indian water rights
quantified in state rather than federal courts, which they viewed as friendlier
forums.  In Arizona, this prompted a decade long legal battle over whether the
adjudication was a fair and comprehensive process for determining tribal rights
under the McCarran Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Arizona
state court general stream adjudication process was fair and comprehensive, and so
long as the process remained fair and comprehensive, the Arizona courts could
adjudicate the United States’ and Tribes’ water rights claims in the state.  The
United States and Tribes have again challenged the fairness of the adjudications
based on amendments to the state adjudication law in 1994 which the United States
and Tribes view as discriminatory.  In addition to the sheer size of the general
stream adjudications, these lawsuits have been part of the reason the Arizona
adjudications have progressed so slowly.
Because of the length, expense and complexity of general stream adjudications,
many parties began to question the efficiency, equity, and practicality of resolving
these often complex disputes through  protracted litigation in general stream
adjudications.  Attention in the Colorado River basin turned to negotiating
settlements between the Indians and non Indian water users.  These settlements
usually require the approval of Congress, generally involve the states, DOI, the tribe
and water users who seek to lessen the impact of the settlement of Indian claims on
non-Indian water use.  Negotiated settlements have provided alternative sources of
water to settle the Indian claims, funding to develop water distribution systems, and
some allow intrastate off-reservation leasing to lessen the impact of Indian uses of
water on surrounding non-Indian water users.
Indian Settlements Within the Basin:  Some Case Studies
In the past 19 years, there have been a number of settlements of Indian water rights
in the basin that have been approved by Congress.  Thirty-four Indian reservations
are located within the Colorado River basin, with the status of their water claims
ranging from quantified in court, quantified through negotiated settlements, or still
unquantified.  A number of  tribes located outside of the boundaries of the basin,
such as the Mescalero Indian Reservation in New Mexico, have traditional or
aboriginal interests in the basin as well.  Each of these 57 reservations have very
different interests, needs, and desires concerning the management of the Colorado
River.  
Table 10 lists the settlements that have occurred in the basin and Table 11 lists the
major remaining outstanding Indian water rights claims in the basin.
Ak-Chin Settlement.—  The first negotiated settlement in the Colorado River
Basin was approved by Congress in 1978 (and amended in 1984 and 1992) and
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involved the water rights claims of the Ak-Chin Indian Community in Arizona.  It
was one of the few Indian settlements that was entirely federal funded.  The
settlement included an interim ground water supply from a 
new well field and a permanent supply of 85,000 af to be developed within 
25 years.  It was amended in 1982 to reduce the amount of the permanent supply,
which would be available by 1988, and required the government to pay damages for
failure to meet timely delivery.  The Ak-Chin will receive 50,000 af of Colorado River
water with a 1928 priority from an unused entitlement of the Gila Irrigation Project,
at a cost to the federal government of about $27 million.  The remainder of the
settlement water will come from a 58,300 af CAP allocation, although if unused,
some of this allocation will be available for other settlements or CAP use.  In 1992,
the Act was amended again to authorize some off reservation leasing of water in
parts of central Arizona.
Tohono O’odham Settlement.—  In 1982, Congress passed the Southern
Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act (SAWRSA) to settle the water claims 
of the San Xavier District and part of the Schuk Toak District of the Tohono
O’odham Nation.  The Act provided for 76,000 af of settlement water, 
37,000 of which would be supplied by the CAP, an additional 28,200 af of effluent
from the City of Tucson effluent and another 10,000 af of ground-water pumped
from the reservation.  The federal government would fund the infrastructure to
convey the water to the reservation and a $15 million trust fund was established to
pay for on-reservation distribution systems.  President Reagan vetoed the original
bill because of the federal expense -- over $100 million -- but a revised bill was
signed which included some local cost-sharing.  The federal government was
required to pay damages if water was not delivered to the tribe in ten years, which
was later modified by an amendment which further delayed any damage payments. 
The implementation of the settlement is complicated by allottees who have refused
to dismiss their claims.
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Table 10.—Settlements of tribal water rights in the Colorado River Basin
Settlement Indian tribe(s) State
Quantity of
entitlement
(af/yr)
Date of
settlement References
Ak-Chin Water Rights
Settlement
Ak-Chin Indian
Community
AZ 85,000 1978
1984
1992
PL 95-328
PL 95-530
PL 102-497
Southern Arizona Water
Rights Settlement
San Xavier &
Schuk Toak
Districts,
Tohono
O’odham
Nation
AZ 66,000 1982
1992
PL 97-293
PL 102-497
Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian
Community Water
Rights Settlement
Salt River Pima-
Maricopa
Indian
Community
AZ 122,400 1988 PL 100-512
Colorado Ute Indian
Water Rights Settlement
Southern Ute &
Ute Mountain
Ute Tribes
CO 70,000 1988 PL 100-585
Fort McDowell Indian
Community Water
Rights Settlement
Fort McDowell
Indian
Community
AZ 36,350 1990 PL 101-628
San Carlos Apache
Tribe Water Rights
Settlement
San Carlos
Apache Tribe
AZ 77,435 1992 PL 102-575
Utah Ute Indian Water
Rights Settlement   
Northern Ute
Tribe
UT 481,000 1992 PL 102-575
Jicarilla Apache Tribe
Water Settlement1
Jicarilla Apache
Tribe
NM 40,000 1992 PL 102-441
     1 This water is to be diverted from the San Juan system, including 6,500 af from the San Juan-
Chama Project (letter from Jessica Aberly, Attorney for Jicarilla Tribe, April 17, 1997).
Source:  Checchio and Colby (1993).
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Table 11.— Outstanding Indian water rights claims in the 
Colorado River Basin
Reservation State
Amount
(acre-feet)1
Camp Verde Arizona  6,599
Gila River Arizona 1,599,252
Hopi Arizona 140,406
Hualapai Arizona 14,495
Navajo Arizona 513,042 2
Pascua Yaqui Arizona 3,520
Tohono O’odham Arizona 650,000
Tonto Apache Arizona  191
White Mt. Apache Arizona  179,847
San Carlos Arizona Unknown3
Ute Mountain Ute/ Southern Ute Colorado  80,000 4
Cocopah Arizona 16,008 5
Quechan California 57,330 5
Colorado River Indian Tribes Arizona 21,000+ 5, 6
Fort Mojave California 12,087 5, 7
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Sources: Whiteing, 1997; Hansen, 1997; Eden and Wallace, 1992; Checchio and
Colby, 1993.
     1 Claim estimates are for annual demand and do not include fill or storage
requirements.  Also, in some cases, the claim may be the estimate of the federal
government on behalf of a reservation. 
     2 This number reflects claims only to the Little Colorado River in Arizona and
does not include claims to the main stem Colorado in Arizona, or for the Little
Colorado River in New Mexico or the San Juan Basin.  The total claims could
range from 2 million to 5 million af (Letter from Stanley Pollack, Navajo Nation,
supra).
     3 The water rights claims of this tribe were partially settled through a negotiated
settlement under which the Tribe received 77,435 acre-feet of water.  Outstanding
claims remain on the Gila and San Pedro rivers. 
     4 The water rights claims of these two tribes were quantified in a negotiated
settlement.  However, currently, the only water supply is the Dolores Project in
Colorado, which supplies about 25,000 acre-feet to the Ute Mountain Utes.  The
remainder of the claim for this tribe and the entire claim for the S. Mountain Utes is
to be supplied from the proposed Animas-La Plata Project. 
     5 MWD (1997) indicated that water rights claims related to the Colorado River,
Fort Mojave, and Fort Yuma [now Cocopah and Quechan] Indian Reservations are
outstanding in the respective amounts of 22,811; 12,003; and 67,097 acre-feet of
diversions or the quantity necessary to irrigate 3,420; 1,858; and 10,181 acres,
whichever is less.
     6 This amount is not yet settled and will depend on amount of acres,
     7 In addition, Fort Mojave has 129,767 acre-feet of water under existing Arizona
vs. California decrees.
The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of
1988.—  This very complex settlement involved seven municipalities, the Salt River
Project (SRP), irrigation districts, the State of Arizona and the Indian Community. 
When Roosevelt Dam was built on the Salt River in 1911, as one of the nation’s first
reclamation projects, it essentially shut off the flow of the Salt River through the
reservation.  Since the Community was not included in the reclamation project’s
water allocations and was only able to irrigate about one third of its lands with
groundwater and some surface water it received from SRP, litigation was filed in the
1970s.  When the Gila Adjudication was filed, the U.S. claimed 190,000 af on behalf
of the Community.
The eventual settlement provided the Community with 122,400 af of water from a
number of different sources, involving a number of complicated exchanges in which
the cities ended up with Colorado River water and the Community with SRP water,
some CAP water, and developed groundwater. In the final package, the federal
contribution was about $60 million, or about 58 percent according to one analysis
(Starler and Maxey, 1989), although various valuations have been attributed to the
federal and local shares.  The settlement also included a trust fund for the needed
infrastructure and rehabilitation of the existing system.  One of the key issues was
how to determine the value of the water contributed by the local entities to the
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settlement; the cities set a value of $3,000 per af, but this was later adjusted to
around $1,800 per af.  Except for some limited leasing of 13,300 af of water to the 7
cities of Maricopa County for 99 years, the Act restricts off reservation uses.
The final settlement reflects a realistic understanding of the current need for
substantial local contributions in Indian water settlements.  It also reflects an
understanding that litigation and the judiciary are not equipped to deal with the
necessary complexities of reaching a solution that will work for all the interests at
stake and that litigation risks must be factored into the equation in negotiated
settlements.
The Colorado Ute Water Settlement Act of 1988.—  The Ute Mountain Ute and
Southern Ute Indian Reservations were set aside for the benefit of the Tribes in
1868. The two reservations together encompass 900,000 acres in the San Juan
basin.  After years of litigation initially in federal court and later in state court, in
1985 the Tribes entered into settlement negotiations with the United States, the
States of Colorado, and New Mexico, and other non-Indian parties.  The parties
reached an agreement two years later in 1986.  The 1986 settlement agreement is
multifaceted, seeking to resolve all anticipated issues between the parties.  The
settlement of the Ute Tribes’ claims has essentially four parts: (1) providing
developed water supplies to the Ute Tribes though the Dolores Project and the ALP,
an approximate combined total of 88,000 af; (2) recognition of the Tribes’ legal
entitlement to defined water rights in other streams; (3) state and federal
endowment of a tribal development fund of $60.5 million, $20 million for the
Southern Ute Indian Tribe, and $40.5 million for the Ute Mountain Ute Indian
Tribe; and (4) detailed provisions for the administration of the tribal rights.
In 1988, Congress enacted legislation implementing the 1986 settlement agreement
(P.L. 100-585).  The ALP is the physical and political catalyst for the settlement. 
Under the terms of the settlement, the ALP is intended to provide the Ute Tribes
with combined totals of 32,500 af/yr of M&I water and 29,700 af/yr of agricultural
water.  The 1988 settlement legislation provides an additional benefit in that the
Ute Tribes are expressly exempted from paying any costs associated with the tribal
water until that water is actually used.
Although the settlement became “final” in 1991 upon the entry of consent decrees in
Colorado state court, which, among other things, required congressional
appropriation of the full development funds, the Ute Tribes may revive their claims
on the Animas and La Plata Rivers in the event that the facilities required to deliver
water in accordance with the terms of the Agreement are not completed by the year
2000.  Under the Agreement, the Ute Tribes are compelled the choose between
litigating and water provided under the ALP by the year 2005.
 
Construction on the ALP has been held up by lawsuits and a jeopardy opinion issued
by the FWS.  Eventually, FWS cleared part of the project and seven years of
research will help determine the future of the rest.  The ALP is presently
undergoing environmental compliance.  The BOR completed the Supplemental EIS
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in April 1996 pursuant to NEPA.  In addition, Governor Romer of Colorado has
convened meetings among the Ute Tribes, the other parties to the 1986 Settlement
Agreement and the 1988 Settlement Act, and the ALP opponents to attempt
resolution of the issues.
The State of Colorado would not agree to language in the 1988 Act implementing the
1986 settlement agreement authorizing out of state leasing of the Ute Tribe’s Water
rights on the basis that this is contrary to the LOR provisions that control use of
state apportionments.  A provision was included in the 1988 Act, however, which
provides that any water marketed off reservation will be treated as a Colorado
“state water right” for purposes of the LOR.  Many of the basin have adamantly
opposed interstate marketing of any Upper Basin apportionments and many other
interests and states have been opposed to interstate marketing of Indian water
rights.  However, as discussed below, various Indian tribes, including the Ute Tribes,
favor interstate marketing of water and have formally embraced this policy stance,
as part of the Ten Tribes Coalition.
Implementing Indian Settlements
Some tribes that have received settlements have been unable to develop their water
rights either from lack of funding or because of political problems or regulatory
restraints such as the ESA.  It is becoming increasingly difficult to turn paper water
rights into wet water.  The Utes, for example, are concerned that the fight over the
ALP will jeopardize their settlement agreement, since the water to implement it
would be delivered through that project.  The Jicarilla Apaches have 40,000 af of
water from the San Juan that faces environmental hurdles before it can be
developed.  As discussed, the Tohono O’odham Nation in southern Arizona is yet to
realize any water from their 1982 settlement passed by Congress.  The Utah Ute
Indian Water Rights settlement is subject to a compact being worked out with the
State of Utah.  The proposed revision to the compact allocates 480,000 af to the Ute
Indian Tribe for diversion and approximately 250,000 af for depletion.  However, the
original Ute Indian Compact of 1980 did not expressly provide for off-reservation
use of water and in exchange for the state’s consent to off-reservation use of water,
and the receipt by the Tribe of federal monies, Utah is seeking a reduction in the
allocation of water.  Discussions are ongoing between the Tribe and the state
concerning this issue.
The San Luis Rey Indian Water Settlement Act, which was approved by Congress in
1988, is stalled.  The Settlement was to provide 16,000 af of water, conserved as the
result of lining the All-American Canal,  to the San Luis Rey Water Authority
(SLRWA) at a discounted rate.  This would in turn allow the five Indian bands of the
SLRWA to release their claims against water users in San Diego County.  The All-
American Canal project, which is key to producing water to implement this
settlement, is on hold and this  project seems tied to resolution of other internal
disagreements between California water users.  During his speech to the CRWUA
last December, Secretary Babbitt stated that “securing such a settlement is in my
view key to advancing Colorado River issues of interest to the State of California.”
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Major Outstanding Claims
The Gila River Indian Community.—  The Gila River Indian Community (GRIC)
has one of the largest unresolved reserved water rights claims in the basin.  The
GRIC has a long history of agricultural use in the Gila and Salt River valleys in
central Arizona.  As the state was settled, however, upstream agricultural
development intercepted much of their surface water supply and ground water
supplies have been impacted by extensive pumping on adjacent irrigation districts.
The GRIC claims rights to approximately 1.5 maf and has been involved in
negotiations for several years to settle these claims.  A federal negotiating team
recommended a settlement number of 650,000 af, of which 300,000 would come from
the CAP.  For CAP water to be acceptable, however, it must be affordable and funds
must be available for distribution systems.  The GRIC also wants controls placed on
off-reservation pumping to protect their ground water supply.  The Arizona
Groundwater Act did not place pumping limits on agriculture in the Pinal County
AMA adjacent to the reservation.
Part of the GRIC’s claims involve the San Pedro River, a tributary to the Gila River
that flows north from Mexico, which has been impacted by groundwater pumping
around Sierra Vista and Fort Huachuca in southern Arizona.  Tribal and other
hydrologists believe that groundwater pumping there is capturing the river’s
subflow and has reduced historic flows to the reservation.  This issue ended up in
the Arizona Supreme Court, which upheld Arizona’s bifurcated legal system for
regulating groundwater and surface water, although after rehearing, an expanded
test for determining subflow is now back before the Supreme Court.  The DOI has
been attempting to facilitate a settlement in the upper San Pedro sub-basin, which
also involves protecting federal reserved instream flow rights to the BLM’s San
Pedro Riparian Conservation Area.
Navajo, Hopi, Zuni, and San Juan Southern Paiute Claims to the Little Colorado
River.—  The Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe have filed substantial claims in the
Little Colorado River adjudication.  In addition the Zuni Pueblo and San Juan
Southern Paiute Tribe also have claims in this watershed.  The tribes have been
negotiating for several years with SRP, Arizona, DOI, and other interests, including
Peabody Coal.  A potential settlement has focused on building a pipeline from Lake
Powell to bring water to the Navajo and Hopi reservations and to replace
groundwater currently pumped from the Black Mesa by Peabody Coal for their coal
slurry operation, which the Hopis believe is drying up their springs.  The settlement
water from Lake Powell could come out of Arizona’s CAP allocation, although it
would be diverted in the Upper Basin, which is an interesting twist.  Major obstacles
to the settlement include: how this expensive pipeline will be cost shared; problems
related to the Hopi-Navajo land dispute; rights of way, and other issues. In addition,
the Navajos have discussed the potential of off-reservation leasing , which may not
be acceptable to the state and SRP.  An Arizona judge is now attempting to facilitate
a settlement (Arizona General Stream Adjudication, Office of the Special Master,
1997).
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Navajo Claims to the San Juan River.—  The Navajo Nation also asserts a claim
to the San Juan River which is in excess of the entire New Mexico Compact
allocation, based on its extensive “practicable irrigable acreage” in the basin and
with a priority date of 1868.
When the NIIP was authorized, the Navajos agreed to share shortages in the San
Juan River of NIIP water during droughts.  New Mexico diverts an average of
110,000 af/yr of its Colorado River apportionment out of the 
San Juan Basin to the Rio Grande Basin through the San Juan-Chama Project. 
New Mexico supported the NIIP, which was designed to irrigate 110,630 acres with
508,000 af of San Juan water, in exchange for Navajo support for the San Juan
Chama diversion project.  As of 1993, only about 60,000 acres of the NIIP had been
developed (Checchio and Colby, 1993) and cost concerns could result in its
completion being delayed even longer or being downsized.  The legislation does not
treat this project as a settlement of any part of the Navajo reserved right claim. 
However, the shortage sharing provision in the law  serves a similar purpose.  In the
event of a shortage, NIIP, the San Juan-Chama Project, and other contractors for
the Navajo Reservoir supply will share the available supply.  The Navajos and the
State of New Mexico recently initiated discussions on the Navajo San Juan claims. 
Other Recent Developments
In 1992, the Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership (Ten Tribes) was created by
ten of the Indian tribes located in the Colorado River basin.  (The Ten Tribes
Position Paper is included in Appendix D.)  The purpose of this partnership is to
protect and develop tribal water resources, in recognition of their common interests
in the basin’s water issues.  While the Ten Tribes’ priority is to obtain water rights
for use on the reservations, many tribes also advocate off reservation marketing of
water rights.  They maintain that there should be no restrictions on marketing of
Indian water rights off reservation or interstate, whether used or unused, if the
tribes are to realize the full economic value of these resources.  The Ten Tribes
believe that marketing this water could help solve reallocation problems in the
Lower Basin while preserving existing wildlife habitat on undeveloped lands and
leaving some water in the river for endangered species.
One of the Ten Tribes’ major concerns is the administration of the ESA and its
impact on tribal interests.  For example, the Navajo Nation strongly objected to the
FWS Biological Opinion for Glen Canyon Dam because they did not believe the RPA
does more to protect the humpback chub than the preferred alternative and it will
increase costs to Navajo power customers.  The tribes object to the lack of
consultation by the FWS on endangered species actions, such as designation of
critical habitat, and take the position that Section 7 of the ESA is in direct conflict
with the Secretary’s trust responsibilities to protect their water rights and that the
burden to protect endangered fish falls more heavily on the tribes than on private
interests or the states.  They see the ESA as a new obstacle to obtaining full
realization and development of tribal water resources.  The Ten Tribes have
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recommended that all Indian water rights be considered as part of the
“environmental baseline” in biological opinions issued by the FWS.
Problems With Indian Settlements
In today’s climate of fiscal restraint, it is no longer possible to obtain the same high
priority or level of federal funding from the administration and Congress for Indian
water rights settlements as was possible in the 1980s.  DOI has developed new
criteria for Indian settlements which substantially reduce the federal cost share. 
The bottom line is that the federal check book is no longer quite so available to pay a
large part of the bill; states and non-Indian water users will have to contribute more
if settlements are to completed. 
The appropriate balance of state-water user/federal contributions is one of the most
difficult issues facing negotiators and legislators in the Colorado River basin, as the
Little Colorado negotiation is demonstrating.  The Secretary has a fiduciary
responsibility to pursue resolution of these claims and  to redress the failure of the
federal government to protect Indian water rights since the Winters decision.  Yet
there is considerable dissatisfaction with the level of priority given Indian
settlement funding by the Clinton Administration.  What priority and support
Congress and the Administration give to Indian water settlements in the next few
years will be critically important in determining if these claims can be settled out of
court. 
Marketing
With the end of the era of big federal water projects, many tribes in the Colorado
River basin may have lost  the opportunity to acquire substantial federal funds to
build projects to develop their water rights.  The question now is whether these
tribes will be able to realize the full value of their water resources, as they do for oil
and gas, by leasing these rights for use off reservation, either intrastate or
interstate.
There are substantial legal and political issues involved in off-reservation leasing of
tribal apportionments, and to date legislation implementing settlement agreements
has addressed this issue on a case by case basis. No interstate leasing of Indian
water rights in the basin has been approved and there is strong political opposition
to it for the simple reason that non-Indian interests can now use this water without
paying for it. 
The BOR draft regulations for the Lower Basin made a strong case for the legality of
tribal leasing of water off-reservation.  However, states and water users disagree
with this position and argue that tribal water rights that are leased for out of state
use deprive the state of its full apportionment under the Compact and are
prohibited under the LOR.  States want absolute control over their apportionments
and this includes Indian water.  State sovereignty is on a collision course with tribal
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29 Many states and water attorneys believe that approval by Congress of the Colorado River
Compact immunizes state compact rights from potential Commerce Clause arguments.  See,
Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Commission [769 F. 2d 568, review denied
476 U.S. 1163 (1986)] 
30 In BLM Colorado’s view: “It is mistaken to characterize the negotiations on the Dolores
River as a ‘consensus’ process that has ‘solved’ a water resource problem.  Rather, it should
be labeled as a productive ‘negotiation’ process that has ‘partially addressed’ a major
resource problem, with the prospect of even greater results” (BLM, 1997).
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sovereignty and possibly the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as articulated by
the Supreme Court in the Sporhase v. Nebraska case.29  The LOR has been read both
ways.  And the Secretary is in the middle, as fiduciary to the tribes.
Some experts have advocated that legislation is the preferable alternative, urging
enactment of specific  legislation to authorize leasing of Indian water rights
(Getches, 1993).  It also appears that the Secretary may be taking a more “go slow”
approach as  the next draft of regulations for the Lower Basin is expected to limit
Indian water marketing to water with a history of beneficial use, and possibly only
that which can be approved in the context of the Arizona Water Bank, which
substantially narrows the opportunities.  However, to require a tribe to develop
expensive and possibly unwarranted agriculture on the reservation in order to lease
the beneficial use value is a terribly inefficient use of resources.
The Ten Tribes plan takes a conciliatory approach; they proposed to work with the
states to achieve consensus and not undermine state apportion-ments.  Under their
proposal, any lease would be subject to a marketing 
plan developed by consensus with the seven basin states, the Ten Tribes
Partnership, and the Secretary.  If the tribes are willing to submit to some kind of
joint authority over water leasing with the states and Secretary, as the Ten Tribes
proposal seems to indicate, this would provide the states with a say in how Indian
apportionments are used.  Fair procedures need to be worked out in any new rules
which will allow for Indian marketing on a par with non- Indian marketing.  Some
equitable resolution of this issue is needed to avoid more conflict in the future and
to allow Indian communities to share in the economic value of Colorado River basin
water.  As stated by David Getches:  “Denying tribes the right to negotiate
arrangements for off reservation water uses robs them of much of the value of their
water and effectively limits the quantities of water to which they have rights”
(Getches, 1993).
Dolores River Watershed
The Dolores River watershed, in southwestern Colorado, provides a case study as to
how consensus can be reached when conflict is high over a water resource issue;30
how the federal government, local water users, states, and Indian tribes can work
together to solve a water resource problem; how to manage a resource involving
Colorado River Basin Study
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which has nearly doubled in size.  Population in the municipal areas served by the Dolores
Project is increasing, but not at the rate of Telluride.
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multiple jurisdictions; and what changes occur as traditional water users are faced
with accommodating other uses such as recreation and protection of fish habitat.
Background Information
From its headwaters in the San Juan Mountains to its intersection with the
Colorado River near Cisco, Utah, the Dolores River flows some 200 miles.  The river
courses across a range of biotic communities, from alpine grasslands to montane
forest areas to Sonoran desert lands.  Along the way, the River provides water for
municipal, industrial and agricultural uses of both Indian and non-Indian for a trout
fishery.  The Dolores River below McPhee Dam in southwestern Colorado, is a
popular fishing spot, drawing several thousands of anglers each year from Colorado
and from other Western states.  A 12-mile stretch from McPhee Dam down to the
Bradfield Bridge was recently named one of the 50 best trout streams in America by
Trout Magazine.  White water boating is also very popular on the Dolores River
downstream from McPhee Dam and relies entirely on releases from McPhee
Reservoir managed to avoid spills.
The Dolores River watershed encompasses approximately 4,620 square miles in
southwestern Colorado and southeastern Utah (Figure 15).  Most of the lands
within the watershed are owned by the BLM or USFS.31  The Dolores River,
including the San Miguel and its tributaries, discharged approxi-mately 544,000
af/yr to the Colorado River.  Beginning in the late nineteenth century, out-of-basin
diversions by the Montezuma Valley Irrigation Company (MVIC) reduced the flow of
the Dolores River to near zero during the irrigation season, July through October. 
With the 1987 completion of McPhee Reservoir, the primary storage facility for the
BOR’s Dolores Project, 69 percent of the historic flow of the Dolores River is
depleted annually (BLM, 1990), as opposed to 39 percent before Project
construction.
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Figure 15.—Dolores River watershed.
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The Dolores Project
The major purpose of the Dolores Project is to store and regulate flows of the
Dolores River for irrigation, down stream fish and wildlife enhancement and M&I
purposes.  Other purposes of the Project are to provide flatwater recreational
facilities in McPhee Reservoir, hydroelectric power generation, salinity control, fish
and wildlife enhancement and mitigation measures, area economic development,
and cultural resources and other mitigation.  To achieve the purposes of the Project
required a multi-agency effort.  The BOR purchased 10,000 acres of land adjacent to
and downstream of McPhee Reservoir and the associated water rights to protect the
area around McPhee Reservoir from development with the senior downstream
water rights deeded to the Colorado Division of Wildlife (CDOW).  Lands to the east
of the reservoir were turned over to the USFS to manage.  Lands to the west of the
reservoir and 300 acres below Bradfield Bridge were turned over to the BLM to
manage.  The BLM has historically managed most of the section of the River below
Bradfield Bridge.  Lands turned over to CDOW, BLM, and USFS are to be managed
for recreation and Dolores Project wildlife mitigation efforts, including a sport
fishery and river access.  BOR built and the BLM operates a cultural center
concerning the extensive Anasazi Indians ruins and archeological sites found in the
area, some of which were partially inundated by the reservoir or disturbed by
construction of Project delivery systems and roads.
Water rights for the Project are in the name of the Dolores Water Conservancy
District (DWCD), the repayment entity established under Colorado law for the
Dolores Project.  The MVIC holds senior rights for non-project water for irrigation
use in the Montezuma Valley (outside the Dolores River Watershed).  Average
annual diversions from the Dolores River pursuant to MVIC’s rights, together with
supplemental deliveries of Project water, were projected in the Definite Plan Report
(DPR) to be these approximately 143,000 af (Sheftel, 1997).
The average annual flow into McPhee Reservoir is 352,900 af (BLM, 1990).  The
reservoir has an active capacity of 229,000 af and a total capacity of 381,000 af.  The
average annual amount stored in the reservoir is 126,000 af; approximately 70,000
af of the average annual flow spills though managed releases to avoid a spill and
continues downstream.
The Dolores Project designed to supply an average annual of 90,900 af for irrigation,
8,700 af for M&I use, and 25,400 af for downstream fish and wildlife purposes.  The
Project will provide irrigation water for 61,600 acres of land, including full-service
irrigation water for 27,920 acres in the Dove Creek area and 7,500 acres on the Ute
Mountain Ute Indian Reservation, and supplemental irrigation water for 26,300
acres served by the MVIC.  Total demand for project irrigation water ranges from
78,500 af during wet years (when the MVIC lands have a full supply of non-Project
water) to 139,000 af during dry years (when MVIC non-project water is in short
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supply).  M&I uses are not yet fully developed,32 but the supply is expected to be
sufficient to meet future needs.
The Dolores Project now provides a dependable supply of water and therefore has
stabilized the economies of Montezuma and Dolores Counties, including the Ute
Mountain Ute Tribe.  There are many benefits , some measurable and some not. 
Sales of agricultural products directly attributable to the Dolores Project totaled
$11.7 million in 1996.  Remarkable increases in land and water values are also
measurable.  Not easily measurable are the benefits from archaeological mitigation
(Anasazi Heritage Center) and a dependable source of water for municipal and
recreational uses.
Water Shortages and Protection of the Trout Fishery
The original operating criteria for McPhee Reservoir were specified in the Final
Environmental Statement (FES) and DPR, published in 1977.  Based upon records
from 1928 to 1974, the FES/DPR indicated that and average 25,400 af/yr of storage
was sufficient to supply flows to support the trout fishery downstream of McPhee
Dam, designed to become a major sport fishery based on stocking and/or limitations
on fishery methods and catch and release requirements.  Releases from McPhee
Dam were determined each year based upon how much water was in storage in
McPhee Reservoir and how much snowpack was available in the watershed.  Based
upon these two totals, the year was declared dry, normal, or wet on March 1 of each
year.  If the river were declared dry, for the next 365 days, 20 cfs would be released
to support the downstream fishery.  In a normal year, 50 cfs would be released and
in wet years, 78 cfs.
The operating regime for McPhee Reservoir came under fire when the first dry year
was declared (1990) and the flow rate was changed from 78 cfs to 
20 cfs on March 1.  Biologists soon realized that the releases were not sufficient to
sustain the downstream trout fishery and Trout Unlimited (TU), with support from
CDOW, appealed to the BOR for increased flows.  When the BOR ordered additional
releases for the fishery, the DWCD challenged the BOR on the grounds that the
BOR lacked the authority to order the additional releases because they were not
specified DPR or FES and Project water was already otherwise allocated.  In June,
in a short-term DWCD agreement with BOR, flows were increased through the
summer.
Despite this agreement, the low flows during 1990 caused significant losses to the
trout fishery.  To avoid a repeat of such losses, extensive negotiations began
between BOR and the DWCD, with the input from TU, other management agencies
and water users.  In October 1990, the group established a three year interim
operating agreement (IOA) in which the 20/50/78 cfs schedule was discarded in favor
of the release of an average annual pool of water (“pool” management) of 25,400 af,
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together with up to 3,900 af of downstream water rights senior to the Project, and
an additional 3,900 af supplied during IOA period by the District.  
TU and CDOW argued that the fishery pool should be increased to 36,500 af and
challenged the original FES/DPR criteria.  In response, during the IOA period, the
BOR revised its assumption in its hydrological study and determined that the
original average annual reservation of water for the fishery in the FES /DPR was
short by 3,900 acre-feet.  Negotiations began again between the BOR and the
DWCD to permanently increase the pool of water to 29,300 af.
To increase the pool, the BOR requested a supply of 3,900 af from local entities.  The
MVIC suggested that it had an excess of 3,900 af water to sell to the BOR for $6
million.  However, stockholders of the MVIC opposed the sale of the water, arguing
it would cause a shortage for the company.  Meanwhile, the City of Cortez offered to
supply approximately, 3,900 af from its Dolores Project allocation for which Cortez,
in turn, would be forgiven part of its repayment debt to the District, an estimated
$500,000 annually.  While the MVIC Board of Directors tried in earnest to convince
its stockholders of the benefits of the sale, the new Clinton administration rescinded
all offers.
In February 1994, the BOR proposed that the DWCD release additional flows to
support the fishery, but would not waive what was ultimately the DWCD’s
repayment obligation to BOR for this additional water.  This decision met with vocal
opposition from local interests.  The general sentiment was that the BOR was not
taking responsibility for seeking to reallocate Project water to make up for its
mistakenly low calculation of average annual fishery reservation in the FES/DPR
when this water was already allocated others.  Further, the regional office of the
BOR requested $42 million to solve any remaining issues related to the Dolores
Project, but only $21 million was authorized.  Although local interests generally felt
betrayed by the BOR Washington, DC office, they found common ground among
themselves and a local coalition was established.
In 1996, an environmental assessment (EA) was completed which evaluated a
permanent operating regime for fish flows.  The operating criteria were modified to
release a managed pool of up to an average 29,300 af to provide seasonally
fluctuating downstream flows (comprised of a pool of the 25,400 af reserved in the
FES/DPR and up to 3,900 af of senior downstream water rights).  In addition, the
EA proposed that additional flows of 7,200 af/yr 
be acquired for fish and wildlife purposes, bringing the total releases to 36,500 af/yr.
To permanently increase the pool to up to 33,200 af/yr, the BOR purchased 3,900
af/yr from the DWCD.  In addition, BOR leased 3,300 af/yr from the Ute Mountain
Ute Tribe to reach a total average annual release of up to 36,500 af.  The Ute
Mountain Ute lease is for up to five years (until water year 2000) or until tribal
lands are developed for irrigation.  While the current arrangement provides an
adequate supply for fish in the near term, CDOW biologists believe a permanent
water source needs to be identified and acquired.  When the lease ends, the
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from the Dolores River.  BOR assumed that 825 shares of this stock could be purchased to
meet the 3,300 af increment at a total price of $742,500.  Based on a 50% cost share, BOR
offered half of $742,500, or $371,000.  In practice, however, local irrigators rarely trade
shares of the stock and when they do, market forces can drive the price up to $1,500 to$2000
per share (Sheftel, 1997).  Local water users do not believe that as many as 825 shares of the
stock will be traded in the foreseeable future.
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cooperation interested parties will need to acquire, lease, or otherwise obtain the
3,300 af increment.
Diverse interests have joined together to solve this problem, including the BOR, the
DWCD, BLM, CDOW, FWS, USFS, irrigators and other water users, and TU.  While
the BOR has offered $371,000 as its cost share,33 the cost to acquire a permanent
water source has been estimated by others to cost from $2 million to $10 million. 
Stakeholders are considering different strategies to secure the necessary funding,
including setting up an escrow account with a non-profit organization.  By
channeling funds to this account, agencies may have more flexibility in cost sharing
efforts and applying for grants.  For example, by demonstrating potential sellers and
the availability of collaborative funding, agencies may have more success securing
funds from programs such as the Land and Water Conservation Fund.  As monies
accumulate in the account, the stakeholders will seek to obtain water as
opportunities arise.
Lessons Learned
Consensus has been reached on a number of issues in the Dolores River Watershed
and a working coalition of stakeholders has formed.  Several lessons may be derived
from the process:
• Involve all affected interests early in the conflict. 
An extended public participation process must be established as early as possible in
conflicts over water.  All interests must be involved at the earliest stages of problem
identification, data gathering, and data analysis.  If the initial alternatives (for
reservoir management in this case) are determined only by agency officials and
traditional water users, conflicts can develop.  In the case of the Dolores, fishery and
recreational interests did not initially feel that they were fully included in the
process.  It took several years to establish a common ground between these
interests.  It is only in recent years that these interests have developed a good
working relationship.  The inclusion of all interests at the earliest stages of a
conflict can eliminate distrust among parties and decrease the time needed to
resolve a conflict.  Further, involving a broad spectrum of local residents and
resource users increases the likelihood the decision will be accepted and maintained
over the long term.
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• Allow a long time period, especially when conflicts are
entrenched.
When competing water uses are involved, particularly between newer uses of water
such as recreation and traditional uses such as agriculture, it can take a great deal
of time for the parties to reach common ground.  While in the Dolores River
watershed there was a common understanding of the issues, it took seven years for
the divers stakeholders to formulate solutions.  Example: The stakeholders
recognized from the beginning that the repayment contract between the DWCD and
the BOR was the governing factor.  It was recognized that since all of the
agricultural and municipal uses of the reservoir are trans-basin diversions, without
return flows from the Dolores River, any additional water for fish and wildlife
habitat below McPhee Reservoir would come from another user’s allocation. 
Therefore, irrigators had to be convinced the short-term damage (the burden of
greater shortage during drought periods) was outweighed by the long-term benefit
of a cooperative environmental/recreational community.  Once this understanding
was reached, a new operating regime for the dam was negotiated.  But until all
parties developed some measure of trust in each other, no solutions could be
reached. 
• Let solutions generate from the local interests.  
The traditional public participation model in water resource management generally
allows local residents to choose from alternatives developed by agency officials. 
Further, many decisions tend to be made at the national level of an agency, such as
the BOR.  In the Dolores River watershed, conflict over water management issues
rose when the national office of BOR made decisions about the basin without input
from basin residents.  Solutions to problems should not be unilaterally formulated
and imposed by agency officials.  They must be crafted with the participation of local
residents if consensus is to be achieved.
• Local leadership is essential.
In many high profile conflicts over water, personnel at the national level get
involved, whether it is a federal agency or an environmental group.  However, the
events in the Dolores River watershed suggest the need for leadership to develop at
the local level.  Local leadership is more acceptable, often ensures local economic
issues are not ignored, and engenders more trust in the community.  In the Dolores
River watershed, the conflict escalated with the entry of a national environmental
group.  National environmental groups, however, may be more effective by
participating through their state and local chapters.  National environmental groups
have historically been an important component in decisions about natural resources,
representing an important public interest that widens the debate on water resource
issues.  However, they may be much more effective if they utilize their expertise
gained at the grassroots level.
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• Maintain an open, not formal, public participation process.
Frequently, to settle conflicts over water management requires people who have
never worked together before to formulate a solution agreeable to all.  A
prerequisite to developing a solution is the establishment of a open, informal,
process of public participation.  Maintaining an open process with no hidden
agendas is important to overcoming distrust.  The best approach will be one that is
consensus-based and works to ensure that everyone’s concerns have been
addressed.  After a common understanding of the problem has been reached, it may
be more successful to establish informal working groups, rather than follow a more
traditional formal public participation procedure.  In the Dolores, much of the
discussion over water management issues is currently being conducted by a small,
informal, working group that is representative of all interests.  This group, which
emerged after many years of conflict and negotiation, meets regularly to discuss
dam operation and any other water management issues, such as salinity control.
• Federal agencies must provide resources.  
Federal agencies have an essential role to fill in settling conflicts by providing the
necessary resources, including personnel, technical advice, financial incentives, and
the establishment of research and monitoring programs.  Accurate scientific
information is needed to support the resolution of a conflict.  For example, in the
Dolores, the BOR mistake concerning the average annual  amount of water to be
reserved for the downstream fishery.  This mistake had to be addressed before a
new operating plan could be established.  Once an accurate assessment of the water
reserved for the fish was established, negotiations could proceed.  Further, an
important service provided by the BOR and DWCD in the Dolores was the
establishment of a hotline for rafters to provide information on river flows during
the rafting season.  Under no obligation to establish such a service, the BOR and the
DWCD improved working relations with this group.
Future Concerns
Collaboration between the diverse group of stakeholders on Dolores River did not
come easily.  The conflict can best be characterized as traditional water users pitted
against “newer” demands on the river such as fishermen and rafters.  A number of
compromises were made during extensive formal and informal negotiations between
the major parties, yet many residents in the watershed still oppose any additional
allocation of water for fish.  A recent survey of DWCD constituents revealed a
sentiment that their interests had not been protected by DWCD’s agreeing to
provide more water for fish downstream; any additional water allocated to fish flows
is viewed by many local residents as a “California water grab.”  Residents argue that
the water cannot be put to a beneficial use in the watershed if it is allocated for fish
flows because the water goes straight to the Colorado River (which to residents of
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Dolores Rivers.  This resolution of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe’s reserved water rights cost
the potential for Dolores Project irrigation of 10,000 acres of land, which, in the view of the
DWCD, was a monumental sacrifice.
35 World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987.
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the watershed, means California).  As one resident noted of the recent survey, “The
local community spoke loud and clear -- no more water for fish.”
Another outstanding issue in the watershed stems from the ALP.  While the
watershed currently has unused M&I water, the BOR recently withheld approval for
DWCD to lease it to agricultural users pending resolution of issues related to the
ALP.  In the current negotiations concerning ALP, alternatives are being explored to
full construction of the ALP.  If a modified ALP was agreed to by the parties involved
in these negotiations, the BOR has stated that excess water from existing BOR
projects in the Four Corners region (including the Dolores Project) may be required
to fulfill Indian settlement obligations.34
Recommendations
A Vision of the Colorado River Basin in 2025
In developing this report, we have attempted to step into the future and
conceptualize a vision for the basin for the year 2025.  The basic premise of this
vision is that we should be working toward three general goals in developing water
policy for the basin in the next century: they are equity, efficiency, and sustainability
in water use and management. 
• Equity in terms of fairness to entitlement holders who have acquired
rights to water within the existing system, in regulation of water use
when regulation is called for, and in dealing with the rights of Indian
communities to realize the full value of their water resources.
• Efficiency in the use of a limited and valuable resource that will become
even more in demand and more valuable in the future.  Efficiency argues
for flexibility in water management and the LOR, to allow water to move
to its highest and best use, to more carefully analyze what constitutes
reasonable beneficial use, and to instill a conservation ethic in the basin.
• Sustainability speaks to the “ability to meet the needs of the present
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs,”35 recognizing the limitations of our natural resources and
maintaining the integrity of natural ecological systems for future
generations.  Maintaining healthy aquatic systems and, whenever
possible, restoring what has been lost should be a goal for the basin.
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These suggested goals are admittedly general and idealistic, but it is really up to the
leaders and citizens of the basin to set goals for water policy and management for
the future.  Such a vision necessarily requires a critical look at present practices in
water management in the basin; what is working and what could be improved? 
What institutional changes might facilitate moving in this direction?  What are the
unresolved and difficult issues ahead?  How can we integrate different values in
decision making?
An obvious problem with this approach is that those currently in charge of water
management in the basin, while generally acknowledging the problems that exist in
moving toward equitable, efficient, and sustainable water management, do not see a
need for changing much in a system they believe has served them well.  Thus, for
example, few water users or state water officials (with the possible exception of
Nevada) want to see a basin-wide commission, forum, or council created, as has
been suggested by a number of students of the Colorado River (Getches, 1997;
Weatherford, 1994; Kenney, 1995; MacDonnell and Driver, 1996), that would
include a broader public process and more diverse interests in formulating policy
than has traditionally been the case.  Although change is occurring, many of the
major water policy decisions that affect millions of people are still made by a
relatively small group of water managers and stakeholders with little real
opportunity for meaningful public input.  And, more often than not, these decisions
are challenged  by some aggrieved interest, invoking the LOR or regulatory statutes
such as the ESA. 
In recent years, there has been an increasing level of gridlock in water management
within the basin and,  except for a few examples, (such as in the Glen Canyon EIS
and adaptive management process), the broad spectrum of public and private
interests, including, commercial, academic, conservation, recreation, citizen groups,
Indian communities, and others have not been involved at the front end in water
policy decisions and often get involved only after decisions have been made through
litigation or political action.  (The decision by the voters in Tucson to block the use of
CAP water is a case in point.)  While litigation does play a role by forcing a conflict
to a decision, it is increasingly more complex, more expensive and less desirable as a
means of issue resolution.  Conflicts over water in the next century must invoke
alternative ways for dispute resolution and more consensus driven processes. 
Important issues are being avoided and left for the future because of a lack of
consensus or an unwillingness to provide the leadership and funding to resolve
them.  And some issues are linked to other issues by interest groups to maximize
leverage, which usually results in no action on either issue. 
Few have advocated any major changes in the LOR, at least partly out of fear of
opening Pandora’s box and partly out of a sense that it is flexible enough to
accommodate evolving changes in values over time.  Major planning, management,
and funding decisions have been deferred because there has been enough water to
meet all consumptive needs and the reservoirs are expected to stay full for some
years.  With growing demand for water in the basin and the inevitable drought
cycles, however, there is a need to examine how the basin will meet these challenges
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in the next century without some institutional changes.  Moreover, scientists have
argued for some time that the natural river system has been shorted its entitlement,
that it is extremely important to protect what is left and restore what is possible of
the natural functions of  rivers in the basin before even more aquatic systems
collapse and more species and natural communities disappear forever. 
A Vision of Basin Management 
Simply stated, this proposed water management vision for the 21st century is to see
the Colorado River basin states, Indian tribes and the federal government agree on
the terms of shared responsibility for water management and evolve toward a
system that allows for increased state responsibility and that considers all interests
and values.  Such a process should include a council or forum that meets regularly
and involves the basin states, Indian communities, the federal government, and
other interests.  This forum would serve as a means of facilitating regular discussion
and developing consensus on such unresolved issues as:
• How to resolve Indian water rights claims and integrate tribal water
management within basin management; 
• What changes in federal law are needed to provide states and local water
providers with maximum responsibility and operational flexibility -- and
less federal involvement -- for water management within the framework
of federal laws and policies that reflect overriding national interests; 
• How ecosystem needs can be agreed on and met, providing adequate
resources to protect valuable natural systems; and
• How to allocate the basin’s water supply to meet changing demands
within the framework of existing water rights and the LOR.
Ideally, such a process would identify common goals and find common ground for
achieving them throughout the basin, help develop the political support for the
important decisions to come, and assure that state and tribal apportionments are
equitably and efficiently utilized to meet the future agricultural, municipal,
ecological, and recreational demands for water within the basin.
Water Management
Recommendation:  The basin states and Secretary of the Interior should
agree on and formalize a cooperative management structure for the basin
to address and resolve major water management issues affecting the
public interest and which defers to state implementation and management
wherever possible.
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As we move into the 21st century, we should move toward improving the governance
process for addressing water management problems and develop a more inclusive,
cooperative, and less parochial approach.
The Secretary of the Interior has considerable authority in the Lower Basin to
administer water delivery contracts and over reservoir and facilities operations that
affect both sub-basins.  The Secretary, through the BOR, works in a cooperative
manner with the basin states, Indian tribes and other interests to reach consensus
if possible on major management issues in the basin.  However, this is an ad hoc
system and the emphasis and priority for resolving Colorado River issues is subject
to change, particularly as top DOI personnel and the Department’s priorities
change.  The Seven States and Ten Tribes (7/10) process and the Lower Basin
Technical Committee (LBTC) made attempts over the past several years to develop
consensus on key management issues, but these efforts fell short and did not always
include other interest groups.  The LBTC did develop a concept paper on a “Lower
Basin Forum” which would include three representatives from each of the Lower
Basin states, a tribal representative, and the BOR, but it dissolved after concluding
it had gone as far as it could in discussing alternatives for a regional solution in the
Lower Basin.  The seven basin states and some tribes continue to meet on an
occasional basis, but there is neither an institutional process nor a basin-wide forum
where the agenda of pressing issues can be discussed and all interests heard from.
Existing Cooperative Efforts
There are forums and mechanisms in the basin for addressing particular issues (see
Figure 16).  The Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum serves this purpose,
but for a single issue; the Upper Basin Recovery Implementation Program and San
Juan River Recovery Implementation Program are forums for resolving endangered
fish issues in the Upper Basin; the Upper Colorado River Basin Commission brings
the Upper Basin states together to address technical and substantive policy
questions that affect their interests; and, the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species
Conservation Program that is getting underway has the potential to bring together a
good number of interest groups, agencies, and stakeholders to deal proactively with
endangered species issues along the lower main stem of the river.  In addition, the
Colorado River Management Work Group meets regularly to provide input to the
BOR on the annual operating plan.  Finally, the IBWC works on water management
and water quality issues of concern to both countries in the border region of the
basin and has an enhanced role under NAFTA.  But there is no single entity that
does or can serve as a forum for 
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Figure 16.—Collaborative water management programs in the Colorado River Basin.
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Congress in the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980.  It has its critics,
but the Council has provided a forum for debating issues and developing alternatives and, at
least to some degree, working toward consensus in how the Columbia River basin can be
better managed, particularly to enhance anadromous fish populations.
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dealing with the many difficult, often overlapping issues in the Colorado River basin
that require cooperation, consensus and political action if they are to be resolved
over the next few decades.36
For the states to play a larger role in the future and decrease the federal presence in
the basin, which seems to be their desire, they must step forward and help devise a
system for sharing and eventually replacing federal governance.  For many years,
the West has relied on Congress and the federal bureaucracies to  provide the
money and personnel to meet water development and management needs, money for
dams, distribution systems, Indian water settlements, or salinity control programs. 
Balancing the federal budget by 2002, or whenever, threatens to remove much of the
discretionary funding for these and similar programs in the future.  It will be
necessary for the states and beneficiaries of the reclamation system to assume even
more of the programmatic and funding responsibilities for water management in the
basin in the next century.
Conservation organizations, who have learned not to rely so much on federal
agencies to achieve results in ecosystem protection, are turning to local and
watershed-based efforts  to effect change, and this trend will most likely increase. 
Until fairly recently, it was primarily the federal agencies that drove efforts to
protect and expand non-consumptive water uses and flow regimes for fish, wildlife,
and recreation.  In the future, more and more of these issues will be decided and
implemented at the state and watershed level.  The evolution of Habitat
Conservation Plans on private lands and cooperative efforts for endangered species
recovery programs between water users, conservationists, and agencies and the
development of watershed councils and forums are examples of this trend toward
designing regional and local solutions through cooperative efforts. 
And there are many new interest groups that are now engaged in water
management debates once left primarily to the states and “water buffalos,” as they
are fondly known.  A number of national and regional conservation groups have
emerged as major players in Colorado River water debates and newer ones such as
the SCBD have served notice they intend to be fully involved in major Colorado
River issues.  The western cities have created the Western Urban Water Coalition,
reflecting the major stake the cities have in western water policy and in the
Colorado River basin in particular.  The Ten Tribes have joined together to pursue
issues of mutual interest in the basin.  New recreational interests have been
organized, including river guides and other outfitter organizations in both sub-
basins.  Trout Unlimited and the Federation of Fly Casters have been very active in
recent years in both sub-basins to protect trout flows and habitat.  And, more
recently, bankers and other commercial interests have become involved in water
policy issues, such as the financial health of the CAP, as they realize more and more
that future economic growth and stability depends on sound water management. 
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Border issues including the delta-upper gulf ecosystem, water quality standards,
wastewater treatment, and others will be of greater significance as NAFTA
matures.  Representatives of Mexican interests are and will be involved in many of
these issues in the future.  The growing list of diverse interests that are now
involved makes it clear that a more inclusive process for decision making and
consensus building is both necessary and inevitable in the basin.
For the foreseeable future, some decisions, such as reservoir operations, surplus
criteria, and how to meet the Mexican treaty obligation, will ultimately be made by
the Secretary unless the law is substantially changed to remove that authority. 
Many believe the Secretary needs to retain this authority in order to exert
leadership and make the hard decisions when necessary.  The Secretary was
designated by Congress in the BCPA and by other federal statutes, such as the ESA
and NEPA, and as fiduciary to Indian tribes, to administer these federal laws and
policies.  His office is where the buck stops.
The degree of collaboration and consensus building in these decisions is extremely
important, however, and even though the Secretary has extraordinary authority in
the Lower Basin, the system is moving toward a more consensus-driven process.  As
stated by Gary Weatherford in his testimony before the Senate Water and Power
Subcommittee: 
Whether as a policy matter the Lower Basin ought to be the object of
disproportionate Federal control of river management is a timely
question... National and international interests will continue to justify
an effective federal presence in the Lower Basin but not in the looming
profile that inhibits or frustrates legitimate state, tribal, or local
government roles and initiatives. A more proportionate federal profile
could encourage greater state participation and responsibility in River
management, in cooperation with the tribes, laying a stronger regional
foundation for sustained integrated water management (Weatherford,
1994).
The Colorado River Basin Coordinating Council
This process of moving toward “integrated management” could be given some
structure to assist its evolution.  The Secretary has broad authority under the
CRBPA and could create an advisory committee -- or council -- which  could be
formally constituted and expanded by consent to include representa-tives of the
basin states, Indian tribes, and other interests.  A draft of an organizational chart
(Figure 17) outlines one way a “Colorado River Basin Coordinating Council”
(CRBCC) could look and function.
The CRBCC could serve as a clearinghouse for debate, policy initiatives, and
consensus building.  This Council would not have to be created by interstate
compact, at least initially, but established informally, possibly through a
Memorandum of Agreement, and later formalized by Compact or Congressional
action. 
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68 U. Colorado Law Review, No. 3 (1997).
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The Colorado River basin has made progress in recent years in including more
diverse interests in decision processes, such as the reoperation of Glen Canyon
Dam, and more recently in the LCR MSCP, but it would seem that an institution
that brought all the interests to the table on a regular basis is preferable to the
traditional approach.  As Figure 17 reflects, these issues could work their way up to
the CRBCC from workgroups or subcommittees of federal and state agencies, water
users, tribal members, conservation organizations, and other interest groups, where
they would be discussed, debated, and modified as necessary to solve other problems
and reach consensus. 
The proposed CRBCC does not necessitate creating a massive new layer of
bureaucracy, as some may contend.  It would provide a forum for articulating long-
term planning objectives, for consensus building and problem solving, and for
discussion of major outstanding policy issues, such as drought management, Indian
water rights settlement policies, the quantification and resolution of other federal
reserved rights claims, interstate marketing concepts, deliveries to Mexico, salinity
control alternatives, the allocation and use of tributaries, coordinating and funding
endangered species recovery programs, and possible privatization of federal water
and power facilities.  In a real sense, this Council would be a way to transition to a
new system of governance in the basin with more state and local control over the
future.37
This is not a novel proposal.  Others have argued for similar institutions, including a
compact to create such a commission and various levels of authority for it (Getches,
1997; Weatherford, 1994; Getches, 1991).  MacDonnell and Driver (1996) went
further in recommending that a new basin commission take over management of all
federal facilities, be responsible for Mexican water deliveries and be self-supporting
from hydropower revenues and water delivery charges, among other things.  This 
may eventually happen, but if so it will be an evolutionary process, and it could
begin with the creation of a better institutional framework than now exists.
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Figure 17.—Proposed framework of Colorado River Basin Coordinating Council.
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Recommendation:   The federal government should undertake a thorough
review with the basin states and tribes over the next several years to
determine how the various agencies could be reorganized to provide more
efficient, cost-effective service in administering their programs without
sacrificing the national interest or trust responsibilities.  In addition,
whenever feasible, federal agencies with water management programs and
responsibilities should be organized along watershed or sub-basin
boundaries.
This recommendation reflects a larger problem in the West as a result of multiple
overlays of federal agency jurisdiction and involvement in water policy issues.  Each
agency has its own biologists, policy officials, and planners; the considerable
inefficiencies and frustrations of dealing with the number of agencies and different
offices of the same agency have been pointed out to the Commission by others.  This
is a difficult problem to solve, but federal budget cutting may force the issue and
reform and reorganization of the federal natural resources bureaucracy could
conceivably happen in the foreseeable future.
With respect to the Colorado River basin, as the maps in Appendix A demonstrate,
the various federal agencies with major programmatic responsibilities are organized
quite differently within the basin.  For example, the BOR, FWS, and NPS have two
sub-basin regional offices, whereas the EPA, NRCS, and USFS have three regions,
which are all different.  The BIA has five regions and the BLM has seven state
offices.  It would be preferable if agencies were organized around basin lines, or at
the very least sub-basin boundaries, to assure closer coordination and accountability
for what happens in the basin.  The basin was divided politically by the Compact in
1922, but decisions about many issues affect the entire basin and should reflect a
minimum of differences between representatives of the same agencies.
A good example of this is the Virgin River watershed.  The Virgin River flows
through three states (Utah, Arizona, and Nevada).  There are many difficult water
management issues in this watershed which require coordination and cooperation
by all three states and the federal agencies, such as unresolved Indian water rights;
dam proposals in Utah; flow requirements for endangered fish recovery; wild and
scenic river proposals; reserved water rights for national parks; potential major
diversions and pipelines by Nevada and Utah; salinity issues and others.  Moreover,
the water supply of the Virgin River has not been allocated between the three
states.  A compact commission or some other mechanism will be needed to do this at
some point; the alternative is to file an original action in the Supreme Court.  The
various water development plans within the watershed make such an agreement
imperative.
The many federal agencies should be coordinating their programs within the Virgin
River watershed.  There are three regional offices of the FWS with jurisdiction;
three state offices of the BLM; two of the USFS; two of the EPA; two of the NPS,
and the Lower Colorado Regional office of BOR.  Any agency initiatives in the
watershed, therefore, require coordination between these agencies and states.  Any
water management plan for the Virgin River must involve all three states, and
reflect a single position from each of the federal agencies. 
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In the past few years, the term “ecosystem management” has been widely used and
the FWS and other agencies have developed concept papers and held forums to
discuss implementing this new mandate.  The shift to ecosystem management needs
to be more clearly communicated to the basin states and interests so there is a
better understanding and acceptance of how this will impact basin interests.
 
It might be productive to streamline and consolidate agency functions along
watershed and sub-basin lines wherever feasible to avoid duplicative or inconsistent
decisions and policies and hopefully improve efficiency in water and resource
management within the basin.
Recommendation:  A centralized and integrated data center for the
Colorado River basin should be established to collect and provide a
comprehensive, reliable, scientific and economic database that is
electronically available to all who need it.
Information used for resource management decisions in the Colorado River basin is
collected by a broad range of agencies on the federal, state, and local levels.  The fact
that information is spread among so many sources has complicated the resolution of
basin-wide issues and led to severe data gaps.  In addition, reports produced by
agencies are often difficult to obtain as publication outlets are limited, manuscript
backlogs are large, and time to appearance of papers is long.  Furthermore, many
agency reports are interim in nature, funded by short-term contracts with time
constraints that may necessitate less-than-final reduction and interpretation of
data, and errors or premature conclusions may result (Minckley et al., 1991).
There is a need for reliable data to be widely available from a common source. 
Consistent, comprehensive data on water use, economic and cost/benefit analyses,
for example, is needed to improve the ability to plan for future water use in the
basin and to identify opportunities for water efficiency improvements and
reallocations (Pacific Institute, 1996).
One possible solution is to appoint a single entity to serve as a central repository for
data and to publish information.  The USGS could fill this role, incorporating
ongoing research on such diverse subjects as hydrology, fish habitat, salinity control,
and the economic impacts of the endangered fish recovery program.  Such a
suggestion is likely to meet with opposition, however, as many agencies are very
proprietary about  data.  Another possibility would be the creation of a new entity,
developed by resource agencies, conservation groups, and other interests, to serve as
a data repository.  To some extent, this effort has been undertaken in the basin by
the Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center (GCMRC), a federal
organization within the DOI, but not under any single agency.  The GCMRC already
stores considerable data collected through the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies. 
It is possible that the GCMRC could be expanded and refocused to cover the whole
basin under the direct aegis of the Secretary with inter-agency staffing. 
Another alternative would be to create a centralized access point to data, as opposed
to a single repository for data.  In this case, there would not be a single guardian for
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data.  Information would be distributed, allowing agencies to maintain control of the
data they produce, reducing anxiety about confidentiality of data and methods.
The Internet provides a viable means to organize data on the Colorado River basin. 
In this decade, the Internet has become the repository of a measureless amount of
information; tens of millions of people now tap into on-line resources each day.  A
vast amount of data on the Colorado River is now available on-line, and a
centralized access point could be developed for the basin.  Such an access point has
already been created for the San Francisco Bay Delta area.  The Bay Delta Internet
Resource Center (BDIRC) is a World Wide Web site that provides the public with a
comprehensive on-line library to information, reports, databases and other relevant
material available via the Internet.  The computer code used to create the BDIRC is
public domain and could be modified relatively easily and cheaply into a comparable
site for the Colorado River basin.
In the first phase of this effort, agencies would put “metadata” (data about data) on-
line.  For example, the USGS would indicate that it has developed an ARC/INFO
GIS layer showing annual herbicide use by county for the entire Colorado River
basin.  While the layer itself need not be on-line, its availability would be made
public and a contact name could be provided for further information.  As the
technology of the Internet continues to improve, it will become easier to move into
the next phase of development of a data center, which would involve actually
providing data on-line in a format that can be downloaded.  Putting data on-line
eliminates communications issues associated with different time zones, provides
relief from many data requests from the public, and reduces paper work.  A vast
amount of data are already available this way, typically at no cost, directly from its
source 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
Creation of a centralized access point to data would be a fundamental step toward
identifying gaps and redundancies.  If, for example, two different data sources had
generated estimates of precipitation for an area, both precipitation databases would
show up under a general “hydrology” subject category.38 Cross-referencing
information in a variety of ways would help clarify where more or less information
was needed and new compilations and collaborations could be developed and
encouraged.  Clearly, the water community in the Colorado River basin would
benefit from the creation of a common entry point to data and, eventually, a common
pool of data.
Recommendation:  The Secretary, basin states and Indian tribes, with
input from other interests, should agree on a plan for reservoir operation
and surplus and shortage criteria that is equitable to all interests and
meets federal statutory obligations and treaty obligations to Mexico.
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This recommendation highlights a process that is underway and needs to be
completed in the near future.  The difficulty to date in achieving agreement between
the states  stems from a number of concerns about protecting apportionments from
risk if more than 7.5 maf a year is diverted in the Lower Basin.  In 1991, California
suggested that Lake Mead be operated to utilize what it considers excess storage  to
meet California’s needs and avoid unnecessary flood control releases. In response,
the other basin states insisted on protection against any shortages that might occur
as a result of such reoperation.  California would like to be able to continue
diverting surplus water in excess of its 4.4 maf basic apportionment and keep the
MWD aqueduct full while it implements a plan to live within that apportionment
over a period of time.  California argued that the failure of the federal government
to augment the basin’s water supply and to operate the YDP diminished the storage
available by 6.5 maf between March 1988 and the end of December 1991 (State of
California, 1991).  And California and other states maintain that meeting the 1.5
maf treaty obligation to Mexico is a federal obligation.  On the other hand, some
environmental organizations are advocating operating changes in the reservoirs,
such as lowering Lake Mead to protect nesting sites for the endangered
southwestern willow flycatcher.
These are issues that must be addressed in the process of developing new criteria
for how to determine surpluses and shortages and reservoir operation and must be
defined within the context of Upper Basin delivery obligations, protecting
apportionments, fulfilling trust responsibilities to tribes, and Mexican treaty
deliveries.  The Upper Basin states must be involved in these discussions as the
“equalization requirement” for Lake Powell and Lake Mead under Section 602(a)(3)
of the CRBPA is an important issue to the Upper Basin.  While these are highly
technical discussions, there is a need also to consider the impacts of these decisions
on salinity, habitat and endangered species, the treaty water, flood control, and
other concerns.
This process should also revisit the issue of whether or how it is possible to augment
the river’s water supply and should decide the future of the YDP (discussed below). 
If the YDP is operated, which is opposed by the BOR and the Administration, it
could cost federal taxpayers over $300 million in 10 years, an untenable budgetary
scenario in the current fiscal environment.  Much cheaper water is most certainly
available in the basin, and if it is now the federal government’s obligation to provide
the treaty water, it can do so by leasing or purchasing water on a willing buyer,
willing seller basis.  Nevertheless, the federal government and the states’
responsibilities and roles in meeting the treaty obligation should be clarified in this
process. 
Recommendation: An interstate water bank should be established in the
Lower Basin along the lines proposed by Arizona, with maximum
flexibility for marketing and banking water, including tribal water.
Some of California’s and Nevada’s water supply problems could be solved with the
implementation of the Arizona Water Bank’s 100,000 af annual interstate
component.  This will require the adoption of rules and regulations, which are being
drafted now by the BOR.  As discussed in this report, the Lower Basin water bank
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could become the means to store water in excess years in Arizona’s aquifers by
direct recharge programs or in-lieu use by farmers and others whose groundwater
would then be banked for future use.  This program might also alleviate some of the
need for top water banking in Lake Mead, which risks flood control spills.  Tribal
involvement depends on whether tribes view this bank as being of any benefit to
meet their objectives, which is still being discussed.  There are other potential
problems with the water bank from a water management and equity standpoint that
were discussed earlier in the report.  
The proposed Arizona Water Bank represents a breakthrough in efforts by Lower
Basin states to create a mechanism to store water for periods of less supply and to
allow some degree of interstate commerce.  State control over transfers of
apportionments and forbearance agreements seems essential, however, if there is to
be any agreement.  States fear losing control over state apportionments in a free
market.  The remaining obstacle seems to be how flexible the regulations will be and
whether they will be satisfactory to all the states.  Since the BOR is planning on
issuing other regulations as well for the Lower Basin, there may be efforts to link
these rules with other issues.  The water bank rules should be considered on their
own merits, and should allow for maximum flexibility for the banking of unused
apportionments, surplus water, Indian water, and other available water in the
Lower Basin.
Recommendation:  The basin states and local water managers need to
develop stronger conservation programs to maximize conservation and
reuse potential and more clearly define and regulate reasonable beneficial
use.  In the lower Colorado River basin, the Bureau of Reclamation and
the states, working together, need to more clearly define and regulate
reasonable beneficial use.
Water conservation is the most effective tool in demand management and often the
cheapest source of new water supplies.  The reason it has not been employed very
effectively is price.  Water has always been very cheap in the basin and throughout
the West.  Federal reclamation water has always been subsidized, and reclamation
law also includes an “ability to pay” policy for users.  Many irrigation districts in the
basin pay almost nothing for federal water and project repayment costs for
agricultural water are interest-free.  M&I water costs vary in the basin from a few
dollars per acre-foot to several hundred dollars.  The Congressional Budget Office
reported that only about 19 percent of the actual cost of federal reclamation water is
paid by users (North and Miller, 1987).  A study cited earlier in this report (Gardner,
1983) underlines the fact that less water would be used in agriculture if the price
were higher.
Cropping patterns contribute significantly to water use.  Throughout the basin,
much of the irrigation water supply is used to grow low-value, high water use crops
such as cotton and alfalfa.  In southern California, alfalfa and irrigated pasture
account for 54 percent of the agricultural water used, which indicates that crop
substitution and increased irrigation efficiency could produce significant
conservation savings (Pacific Institute, 1996).
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However, government-imposed regulatory programs to require conservation have
had minimal impact.  The Reclamation Reform Act requirements for all BOR
contractors to develop and implement conservation plans (there are approximately
860) are virtually unenforceable, even though new criteria were adopted in 1989 and
the plans must be updated every five years. The 1994 regulations proposed by BOR
did include tougher conservation requirements and these regulations should be
revisited, updated, and again proposed.
Nevertheless, regulatory conservation programs are not going to bring about major
efficiencies in agricultural use, primarily because it is difficult to mandate what
conservation expenditures are affordable.  Funding for on-farm technical services, if
available, and cost-share programs seem to work best.  Farmers will implement
conservation to save on costs, particularly energy costs, but it is difficult for
government to dictate what other conservation is affordable in a given situation.  It
is safe to say that if water was priced higher, there would be additional
conservation.
With the exception of Arizona, most states approach conservation as a voluntary
and incentive-based program, although many local jurisdictions have implemented
low-flow plumbing and landscape ordinances successfully.  Arizona’s groundwater
law requires conservation in all sectors, but has had limited results that can be
quantified.
Conservation initiatives should focus on financing extraordinary conserva-tion
(beyond what a farmer would otherwise do because it is too costly) in exchange for
the ability to market the conserved water.  Such market transfers may be the
solution for meeting urban needs in California and other states when surplus water
is no longer available from the Colorado River.  For example, SDCWA plans to
pursue additional agreements with IID to free up, through conservation, as much as
500,000 af of water for its growing needs.  Conservation transfers from the Imperial
Valley should be encouraged as they also will help alleviate a serious and growing
environmental and economic problem  from the excessive drainage water flowing
into the Salton Sea.  
  
States have the authority to oversee and determine standards of beneficial use, but
there are few cases where this has occurred.  The “use it or lose it” premise of
western water law has generally led to erring on the side of excessive use, with flood
irrigation of low value crops using much of the basin’s water.  Yet, no one wants
agriculture to disappear so that all the water can be used to grow cities.  States
should enforce beneficial use more aggressively than they now do throughout the
basin, which might encourage marginal lands to be retired, reduce salinity impacts
and provide more water for other uses. 
Reuse
Reuse of treated wastewater must be a major component of future water supply
planning in the Colorado River basin.  Effluent is the only growing supply of water
in the basin and it is currently underutilized.  Reuse requires treatment to meet
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water quality criteria for the intended use.  As a result, it has been cheaper in many
cases to discharge treated water into the ocean than to reuse it.  Because potable
use requires the most stringent treatment, non-potable uses are more common.  As
treatment technology advances, however, water reuse should become a more
economically feasible option to meet many more water demands.  Taking into
consideration that potable water rates are on the increase, long-term projections
show that reclaimed water is a cost-effective alternative to meet future demand.
A number of significant projects have already been implemented that have resulted
in regulatory acceptance of application of recycled water for many uses that reduce
demands on imported supplies.  While landscape irrigation and groundwater
replenishment have historically been the predominant uses for recycled water,
agricultural irrigation, industrial applications and use for toilet flushing have the
potential to dramatically expand the use of recycled water as a replacement of
potable water supplies.
It is evident that there are significant quantities of unused water that can be used
beneficially as a substitute for potable water supplies.  Experience has shown,
however, that cost and development of markets for recycled water are constraints to
the economic viability of reuse.  Unit costs of recycled water are typically higher in
early years of operation until the full market develops.  Increased public and
regulatory acceptance of recycled water and improved treatment technologies are
key to overcoming economic barriers that constrain expansion of recycled water use.
Long-term planning is required if reuse is to be implemented more successfully.  The
construction of the  new International Wastewater Treatment Plant in Tijuana and
the South Bay Ocean Outfall demonstrates that there is still a serious need to
develop integrated water resource plans which fully consider the  reuse of
wastewater.  The outfall has been designed to dispose of 195,000 af/yr39 of treated
effluent into the Pacific Ocean, which does not need the water or the nutrients. 
Most of this water originated in the Colorado River basin and should be reused
within the basin.  If water can be diverted from the river to Tijuana and San Diego,
the resulting effluent is just as necessary as a water supply for reuse within the
basin, including  for environmental mitigation purposes.  Municipal effluent and
other wastewater is being recognized as a valuable water resource and efforts made
by water planners to maximize its use in developing new integrated water resource
plans.
Ecosystem Sustainability
Recommendation:  Recovery plans for endangered fish in the Colorado
River basin should be consolidated in one multi-species recovery plan and
recovery goals more clearly defined.  In addition, the three different
recovery implementation programs in the basin should be coordinated.
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A new multi-species recovery plan is needed for the endangered big river fish that
sets recovery goals and identifies and prioritizes recovery efforts.  Such a range-wide
plan will help focus the debate: where is the best habitat; where is the chance for
success the highest; should the fish be recovered throughout the basin; how can
these three recovery implementation efforts be coordinated; should funding be
consolidated?  
There are currently three separate programs for endangered fish in the basin. 
While customized approaches to recovery may be needed, based on the different
conditions, status and abundance of habitat, and other factors in a particular sub-
basin, there should be a single multi-species recovery plan.  Furthermore, there
should be a forum and on-going process in which all interests can review and discuss
recovery plan issues with the FWS and other agencies. 
The question of what constitutes recovery is a difficult one perplexing scientists and
policy personnel alike.  Recovery efforts should be oriented toward preventing
extinction, stabilizing and improving viable populations in representative areas of
the critical habitat in the basin.  Progress toward recovery has to be reevaluated
periodically and management efforts may be required for an indefinite period of
time.
The LCR MSCP is still in the planning stage, but as proposed it will include all the
various species at risk along the lower river, with the aim of preventing further
listings and recovery of all listed species.  The process of developing such a multi-
species plan will not be easy nor without controversy, but the proponents of this
approach have reached out to include the major stakeholders and interest groups
and have worked hard to overcome some initial differences of opinion with
environmental groups on how this fits within the ESA.  The LCR MSCP represents
a new approach to addressing endangered species, combining Section 7 and Section
10 actions, and should be evaluated as a potential model for ESA compliance in
other western river systems.
Clearly, obtaining adequate funding for the three sub-basin programs will be more
difficult in the future.  Total funding needs will run into the hundreds of millions of
dollars over the next decade and major capital expenditures are yet to come. 
Congress might well ask why there is not one budget for the federal side.  In the
next few years, as the federal budget goes through major readjustments, such an
arrangement may be inevitable and discussions should begin to take place soon as
to how duplication of effort and expense can be avoided.  Funding sources for the
various programs are different and power revenues, which are a potential partial
source, are allocated differently in the basin.  It may be that these programs have to
proceed independently, but if there is one recovery plan for the four fish, recovery
efforts, and possibly spending, should be coordinated.  This is not currently being
done. 
Currently, there is also a bureaucratic wall between the two regions of the FWS that
oversee these recovery plans; Region 2 and Region 6 do not seem to agree on fish
recovery and there is limited cooperation.  Region 2 in the Lower Basin has its own
management plan which, as the report discusses, is a somewhat different approach
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than that being implemented by the RIP in the Upper Basin.  Region 6 has the lead
on the recovery plan for the entire Colorado River basin, but the recovery team has
no members from the Lower Basin with the exception of the Arizona Game and Fish
Department.  A basin-wide recovery team should be reconstituted representing all
the various viewpoints and scientific expertise that exist in the basin.
Recommendation:  The Secretary should establish a policy which allows
for more public input into the development of reasonable and prudent
alternatives under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.  The FWS
should develop policies that provide water development interests with
accountability and more clearly defined, realistic mitigation requirements
that will provide the maximum possible certainty for existing and planned
water development projects.
One of the major problems identified by water users and others is the Section 7
consultation process between the FWS and other federal agencies.  Until recently,
these consultations were closed and the resulting RPAs announced summarily.  This
process has been opened up to some degree, but not enough.  There is now an
opportunity to comment on  RPAs, as is being done with the Lower Basin Biological
Opinion, but what should be done to avoid jeopardy, and at what cost, is still often
decided by the two agencies.  The RPA for the CAP, discussed in the report, is a
classic example.  A more inclusive process for Section 7 consultations should produce
more consensus and buy in as to what needs to be done to avoid jeopardy under the
ESA. This could be accomplished administratively or by rule making, but a
uniformly consistent process should be implemented.
How the ESA is applied on the ground is a major source of frustration for water
users, in the Upper Basin in particular.  Decisions by agency biologists are subject to
being revisited and changed.   Water users want to know that once a decision is
made it will stick.  Yet it is difficult for agency biologists to say with certainty what
will work and that a decision can’t be revisited.  The fact is, we don’t know all that
much about what these species need.  Yet water users need to know how much
water they can develop at some point.  There is a definite need to improve the ESA
process to provide some degree of certainty.  One suggestion is to move toward a
framework that allows for “adaptive management” of mitigation in the future as
conditions change or new information becomes available, but that does not
unreasonably subject the water development community to an open-ended process. 
This issue must be dealt with in the reauthorization of the law. 
Recommendation:  An environmental trust fund should be established
with dedicated funding for endangered species recovery, habitat
restoration, and environmental enhancement in the basin.
There is a need for a dedicated funding source for environmental enhancement and
mitigation in the basin. The hydropower revenue “cash cow” should not be the only
source.  A number of organizations have recommended that an environmental trust
fund be established, which could be financed from a number of sources, such as a
surcharge on water transfers and for banked water.  Agricultural water
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apportionments converted for municipal purposes, for example, could include a
surcharge to help finance environmental enhancement in the basin.  With more than 
20 million water consumers in the basin, even a $5 increase in annual water rates
per consumer  would produce a substantial fund.  Creative uses of matching funds
from sources like the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (which is the repository
for initial funding for the LCR MSCP) could be utilized to leverage dollars with local
and private matches.  In testimony before the Senate Water and Power
Subcommittee in 1994, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) suggested that an
ecological assessment of the restoration potential in the Lower Basin be conducted
by the National Academy of Sciences to determine the scope of funding needed
(Yardas, 1994).
The BOR reportedly considered creating an environmental fund in an early version
of its proposed regulations for the Lower Basin, but the draft regulations stopped
short and provided only for user fees to allow BOR to recoup its costs for
administering apportionments.  The Secretary should initiate discussions with
public and private interests on the need for trust funds, how they could be used for
environmental mitigation, and how they could be funded for both the Upper Basin
and Lower Basin.  Environmental restoration and enhancement was a low funding
priority during the water development era, but should receive a higher priority in
the next century as these values are incorporated into future water management
decisions. 
Recommendation:  A Binational Commission should be established to
review and make recommendations on the potential for restoration of the
Colorado River delta and the environmental and economic benefits and
costs of such restoration.
The possibility of restoring parts of the Colorado River delta/lower river ecosystem
is an emerging issue.  While it is not yet a high priority of the governments of the
U.S. or Mexico, it should be noted that most environmental issues in the basin have
generally percolated up from the grassroots before government got involved.  Such is
the case with this issue.  Moreover, it is an opportunity for the two countries to work
cooperatively to address a number of environmental and water management
problems in this border region and to invoke the NAFTA process and resources to do
so.
Mexican environmental groups call this the “white spot on the map” syndrome,
meaning the delta and the lower river don’t even show up on the maps, which stop
at the border, as part of the ecosystem.  They argue that the delta would not have
been allowed to deteriorate if the river was all in one country or at least the
problems would have been addressed before now. 
The reestablishment of the Cienega de Santa Clara has served as a catalyst for
scientists and interest groups on both sides of the border to focus on this once great
ecosystem and to begin to analyze the connection between the decline of the health
of marine fisheries of the upper gulf and the lack of nutrients, sediment, and water
since the main stem dams were closed.  Some work has been done by scientists in
both countries to analyze the biological resources, the decline of the marine
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resources, and economic impacts, but more research is needed to determine the
impacts of sediment and nutrient loss and the potential for restoration, as well as
how water could be managed better to make a significant difference to the
ecosystem and local economies.  Is there water available that could be reused or
used more efficiently for wetlands?  Can some of the agricultural return flow and
municipal discharges to the New River, which flows north into the already
overflowing Salton Sea, be rerouted to the delta?  Can the water from planned
Mexicali wastewater treatment plant be used for these purposes?  And can flood
releases in high water years be coordinated and engineered by the two countries to
recharge the upper gulf?
These are questions raised in recent years by the Pacific Institute report, Sandra
Postel of the Global Water Policy Institute, Conservation International, EDF, and
scientists from both sides of the border.  The next step should be a comprehensive
binational study to determine what restoration alternatives exist in the delta, at
what cost, and with what likely effect.  This will require binational consultations
and an agreement with Mexico, and involvement by states and non-governmental
organizations in both countries as well as other institutions such as the IBWC, to
plan, fund, and implement this study.  The delta may represent the best and most
cost-effective opportunity for restoration of a major wetland in the Southwest and
one that could again provide the functions of a river delta/tidal estuary/marine
system and help restore the economies of the communities that once depended upon
it.
In addition, this bilateral process could discuss linking protection efforts in both
countries to protect and enhance the Pacific Flyway.  The Delta is a significant
winter and flyway habitat for a variety of waterfowl and neo-Tropical birds.  The
Bioreserve includes the upper gulf, delta, and greater Sonoran ecosystem, which
extends into the U.S. and the lower Colorado River basin.  Discussions between the
two countries should focus on how they can cooperate to manage and restore this
international ecosystem.
One issue of more immediate concern is to obtain a firm water supply for the
Cienega.  If the YDP is operated, the Cienega will lose a substantial portion of its
water supply.  It has done well on the highly saline Wellton-Mohawk discharge
water, but this is not a firm supply.  A decision needs to be made on what to do with
the YDP, but if it is operated, a replacement water supply should be provided to the
Cienega.
The Salton Sea:  A Snapshot of Non-Sustainability
The growing environmental problems associated with the Salton Sea in the Imperial
Valley highlight how multifaceted and complex a water resource management issue
can become.
The Salton Sea is the largest lake in California with a volume of over 7 maf.  It is a
major stopover on the Pacific Flyway and provides winter habitat for a variety of
migrating species of birds and waterfowl.  At the south end a major wildlife refuge,
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established in 1930, is temporary home to over 350 species.  Once a major tourist
attraction, millions of visitors flocked to its shores to enjoy the water recreation,
fishing and boating the lake offered.  Today there is no fishing or swimming and the
marina is all but abandoned, as are many lakeside properties because of the very
high water levels, salinity, and pollution.  This past year, there was a major bird kill
on the Sea, including a large percentage of the brown pelican population, which has
been attributed to avian botulism; the FWS and California Department of Game &
Fish are still investigating the causes of this contamination. 
Since this is a closed basin, the Sea would have evaporated over time.  However,
over 1 maf/year flows into the Salton Sea, mostly from the New and Alamo rivers
and discharged agricultural tailwater from the Imperial and Mexicali valleys.  The
New River is extremely polluted by untreated municipal sewage and other
wastewater from Mexicali, a fast-growing border city in Baja California.  Currently,
the salinity level of the Sea reaches 44,000 ppm, which is more saline than
seawater, due to the evaporation and highly saline inflow.  EPA and the state are
also concerned about levels of selenium in the sediments and in the inflow water,
although the federal standard is not exceeded in the Sea.  The State of California,
environmental groups, and property owners are concerned that if the water quality
continues to deteriorate the Sea will be too saline and polluted to support even
wildlife.
IID points out that it is caught in the middle of the Sea’s problems.  Because each
acre-foot of water IID uses contains a ton of salt, more water is needed to flush this
salt from the soil.  The high salinity of the Colorado River water leads to even higher
salinity concentrations in the Imperial Valley and yet higher salinity by the time it
reaches the Salton Sea.
EPA has been puzzling over what to do about this mess for years, but there has
been little progress.  The issues involve cross-border pollution, both point source and
non-point source (the rivers flow north out of Mexico), salinity control, water
conservation (can IID reduce its use and thus its discharges?), NAFTA (the siting of
a new wastewater treatment plant near Mexicali), reuse (can this highly saline
water be treated and reused), and ecosystem protection and restoration (can any of
this water be transported to the delta for ecosystem restoration; can the fish and
wildlife dependent on the Sea be protected?)
What can be done about it?  Various ideas have been suggested, but none have
taken hold.  Local governments have created the multi-jurisdictional Salton Sea
Authority to work with federal and state agencies on solutions to stabilize the
salinity and water levels.  Some contend that a reduction in agricultural tailwater
from conservation within IID could lead to increased salinity levels.  A new
desalinization plant has been suggested and is being explored, as is dividing the lake
with a dike and trying to restore the water quality of at least part of it for wildlife. 
The construction of a new wastewater treatment plant in Mexicali should also help
reduce pollution in the inflow if not the salinity. 
If this growing problem is to be resolved in the near future, it is going to take
leadership and massive resources from both sides of the border.  It is well beyond
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the normal scope of issues delegated to the IBWC and should be added to the
agenda of the proposed Binational Commission.
Salinity Control
Recommendation:  The Secretary should commission a comprehensive
study of alternatives to operation of the Yuma Desalting Plant and what
should be done with this facility if it is determined not to be in the long-
term interest to operate the Plant.
Operation of the YDP is not the most cost-effective way to meet the Mexican Treaty
obligation and in fact is an extremely expensive alternative.  By the BOR’s own
estimates, the YDP is not needed for the next  20 to 25 years to help meet treaty
salinity standards.  This projection is based on a number of factors, but primarily
because of the projected surplus water supply in the basin (Bryant, 1997).  It now
costs $6.8 million a year to be maintained in ready-reserve status and would cost
$5.5 million a year (plus an initial additional cost of $8.7 million) to mothball.  The
Yuma Area Office of the BOR would like to operate the facility at one-third capacity
(at an estimated cost of $12 million a year) but there is no present market for that
water, which would cost $515 an af to produce.  Moreover, new desalting
membranes might be needed before the plant could go on line, which would cost at
least $18 million.  
While the basin states continue to strongly support operation of the YDP, it is
difficult to see how such operation can be justified.  The BOR has declined to
request funds to operate the YDP because it can’t be justified.  Dan Beard, the
former Commissioner of BOR, was asked when he took office when he planned to
operate the YDP.  His answer was “never.”  Since it is the obligation of the federal
government to meet the treaty salinity standards, the Secretary should explore
cheaper ways to do it.
Although it may have seemed like the technological answer to the Mexico salinity
issue in the early 1970s, operating the YDP is a decision that needs to be revisited
and other alternatives explored.  The BOR could lease or purchase water rights,
including agricultural or Indian apportionments, enter into fallowing agreements, or
purchase and retire marginal lands.  One suggestion is to exchange the power
needed to run the YDP for the water rights needed to make up for its inoperation
(Wahl, 1989).  The drainage water from the Wellton-Mohawk Project could continue
to be bypassed through the MODE canal to the Cienega, assuring that this wetland
survives.
The Secretary, in consultation with the states and other interests, should
commission a study to explore these and other alternatives as to what should be
done with the YDP.  Part of the facility may be useful as a water treatment plant
and there may be other commercial or salvage value.  It is time for the federal
government and the states to decide whether the YDP should ever be operated.
Recommendation:  Future salinity control programs should emphasize on-
farm irrigation management, reuse and conservation, fallowing
agreements, and retirement of marginal lands. 
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Without question, salinity in the Colorado River basin is and will continue 
to be a major economic and environmental issue in the next century.  Currently, the
economic impacts of salinity are estimated at close to 
$1 billion a year.
The salinity standards adopted by the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum
and approved by EPA are currently being met at the three measuring points on the
river (Hoover, Parker, and Imperial Dams).  And although the latest projections
contained in the 1996 triennial review indicate that the standards will be met
through 2015.  However, there are danger signs that this might not hold true if
funding targets slip, and depending on other factors such as climate and flow.  And
the BOR’s model projections show that salinity at Imperial Dam will increase sooner
than projected and exceed standards as soon as 2003 (Bryant, 1997).  The BOR’s
Yuma Area Office has discounted these projections on the basis that there was
insufficient data to calibrate the model.
Mexico is already complaining about the quality of  deliveries at the SIB and may
object if NIB deliveries begin to exceed the maximum of 145 ppm over the Imperial
Dam level, especially if that level is at or exceeding the 
U.S. EPA approved numeric criteria at Imperial Dam.
Over the past few years, funding has declined and future budget cuts have to be
anticipated which would impact salinity control programs.  The new Farm Bill (P.L.
104-127) consolidated the USDA Colorado River Salinity Program in the new
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and lumped the appropriations
for it with three other voluntary conservation programs.  Congress appropriated
$200 million for EQIP, but USDA has not allocated this money among projects. 
There is a waiting list of applicants for these funds, which require cost-sharing, and
the difficulty will be in prioritizing projects that will be most cost-effective. 
In the coming years, the states and federal government should analyze whether
salinity control dollars are more effective if spent on reducing irrigation of marginal
lands which require excessive flushing of salts, through either voluntary sales or
fallowing agreements.  The CRBSCF, BOR, and EPA should begin to develop a plan
which incorporates a water rights acquisition strategy to reduce salinity.
Indian Water Rights
Recommendation:  The federal government should develop a more
effective strategy and establish priorities for settling and implementing
Indian water rights claims in the basin.
As discussed in this study, there are a number of major outstanding Indian water
rights claims in the basin that have not been settled.  Some, such as the claims of
the Gila River Indian Community, remaining claims by the San Carlos Apache
Tribe, and the Navajo and Hopi in the Little Colorado River watershed, are in
litigation as part of the Arizona General Stream Adjudication.  The constitutionality
of the Arizona Adjudication Statute, as revised several years ago, has been attacked
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by the tribes and is probably going to be reviewed by the State Supreme Court and
possibly the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  Some claims have not been litigated, and some claims that
have been settled are on hold for lack of funding or other problems in implementing
the settlements.  Major examples of the latter include the Ute tribes in Colorado
and the Tohono O’odham and San Carlos Apache Tribe in Arizona.  In the past four
years, there has been only one settlement approved by Congress, the Yavapai-
Prescott Apache Settlement in 1994.
There has been considerable criticism of the DOI role in effectuating and facilitating
settlements in recent years, although significant funding has been provided for that
purpose.  Tribal representatives are clearly frustrated with the priority given to
water settlements by the Administration and the lack of funding available for
evaluating claims and litigation support.  With more projected funding cuts, the
prospects don’t look much better for the immediate future.  Clearly, obtaining the
funding needed to both negotiate and settle these claims and to implement
settlements is significant.  Cost-sharing of settlements, which now require a larger
local contribution, has been an inhibiting factor as well.  The lack of strong DOI
leadership in the settlement process has reached the point that tribal advocates are
questioning whether the DOI is still committed to a settlement strategy.  Litigation
of these rights will take much longer and will be more costly for all concerned.  The
Gila River Adjudication, initiated in large part to quantify the rights of Arizona
tribes in state court, has dragged on for 18 years, costing millions of dollars, with no
end in sight.  However, there is currently little incentive for non-Indian users to
settle; they are using their water and may rather litigate for years than settle.
The tribes’ water rights are similar to mineral, oil, and gas resources held by the
tribes; they are important assets for the economic sustainability of the Indian
communities.  It is therefore essential that the Indian communities be able to utilize
those rights on the reservation or receive the market value of the water by leasing
the water rights to other users.  It has been nearly 
90 years since the Winters decision and there is a limit to the tribes’ patience.
This and future administrations need to send a strong signal to the tribes in the
basin -- and throughout the West -- that the federal government is committed to the
settlement process and that it will give it high priority and provide the funds and
personnel needed.  One alternative is to establish a separate Settlement
Commission outside DOI to provide a single focal point for completing settlements
and developing new funding strategies for implementing them.  The other
alternative is for tribes to more aggressively litigate these claims, possibly changing
the “risk analysis” by non-Indian users.
 
Recommendation:  The basin states and tribes should agree on a plan for
integrating tribal water use, banking, and leasing of tribal water in state
and interstate water marketing systems. 
How tribal water use is integrated into water management in the basin will be an
enormous challenge over the next few decades.  Tribes have their own management
authorities governing on-reservation use and are not subject to state regulation of
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water use.  In many cases, federal regulations govern water use under contracts
with the BOR, such as with tribes in Arizona that receive CAP water.
The magnitude of Indian water rights and how they will be used in the future are
significant issues for the states.  It is anticipated, for example, that in Arizona over
40 percent of the CAP water supply could end up being allocated to tribes to settle
claims.  However, a fair pricing mechanism for tribal CAP water must be established
if CAP water is to be acceptable.  Tribal representatives argue that CAP water
should not cost more than other water the tribe would otherwise have diverted. 
This is a major issue for tribes in Arizona, such as the Gila River Indian Community.
The Arizona tribes have also objected to the fact that there is no Indian
representation on the CAWCD Board that administers the project.  The CAWCD
Board is elected under state law from the three counties in the project service area
(which includes some reservations), and it is not likely that tribal members could
win an election.  Yet some mechanism to include tribal concerns in the operation of
the project seems reasonable.
Many tribes are interested in pursuing off-reservation leasing of undeveloped
settlement water as a source of revenue for economic development on the
reservation.  Given the lack of federal appropriations to finance Indian water
delivery infrastructure, water marketing may be the only mechanism available to
tribes to finance construction costs for on-reservation uses.  Some settlements have
authorized off-reservation use, but often limited it to certain areas within the state. 
Tribal water is considered part of the states’ total apportionment and states take a
dim view of transfers of any apportionment out of state.  New concepts such as
forbearance agreements may get around Compact restrictions.
A potential partial solution could be adoption of an integrated tribal/state water
bank and marketing institution along the lines of that proposed by the Ten Tribes
Partnership (Appendix D).  The proposal suggests that tribes can work with the
states to develop a consensus on marketing of tribal water and that tribal water
could be used to meet demands in the Lower Basin.  The Ten Tribes believe using
tribal water to meet this need eliminates the risk to states’ apportionments.  The
proposal by the Ten Tribes to develop a leasing program in conjunction with the
basin states and the Secretary is a dramatic first step.  If the Lower Basin states
ignore this proposal and rely on surplus water, which includes unused tribal water,
this inequity can only lead to increased friction between the Indian and non-Indian
governments in the basin.  
Conclusion
Fourteen years ago, a group of scholars came together at Bishop’s Lodge, near Santa
Fe, New Mexico, the site where the Colorado River Compact was drafted some 60
years earlier, to reflect on what had happened since and to provide some wisdom
and guidance for the future (Weatherford and Brown, 1986).  Most of the
recommendations that appear above probably appear in one form or another in the
proceedings of that symposium. It was perhaps best summed up by Gilbert White, a
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participant and one of the true authorities on western water, who wrote then of a
“new confluence of views”: 
A great stream like the Colorado can flow a long distance without any
significant input from tributaries.  Then it can be joined by a new tributary
with fresh flow downstream from headwaters.  We are at such a point in the
flow of thought about the Colorado.  After a long reach in time, during which
the main channel has changed only a little, it is swelled by a rush of new
perspectives on resources, needs, values and technologies originating in diverse
social and economic landscapes. The basin is physically different than it was
in 1922; its national setting has changed; its population is different; and
perceptions of it have altered.  These inputs are mingling with the views long
implicit in the “Law of the River.” 
One suspects that Professor White would still agree with this philosophical
assessment today.  Perhaps even more so. 
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Appendix B
Major Components of the Law of the River
• The River and Harbor Act, March 3, 1899.
• The Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902.
• Reclamation of Indian Lands in Yuma, Colorado River, and Pyramid Lake
Indian Reservations Act of April 21, 1904.
• Yuma Project authorized by the Secretary of the Interior on May 10, 1904,
pursuant to section 4 of the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902.
• Protection of Property Along the Colorado River Act of June 25, 1910.
• Warren Act of February 21, 1910.
• Patents and Water-Right Certificates Acts of August 9, 1912 and August 26,
1912.
• Yuma Auxiliary Project Act of January 25, 1917.
• Availability of Money for Yuma Auxiliary Project Act of February 11, 1918.
• Sale of Water for Miscellaneous Purposes Act of February 25, 1920.
• Federal Power Act of June 10, 1920.
• The Colorado River Compact, 1922.
• The Colorado River Front Work and Levee System Acts of March 3, 1925;
June 21, 1927.
• The Boulder Canyon Project Act of December 21, 1928.
• The California Limitation Act of March 4, 1929.
• The California Seven Party Agreement of August 18, 1931.
• The Rivers and Harbors Act of August 30, 1935.
• The Parker Dam Power Project Appropriation Act of May 2, 1939.
• The Reclamation Project Act of August 4, 1939.
• The Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act of July 19, 1940.
• The Mexican Water Treaty, February 3, 1944.
• Gila Project Act of July 30, 1947.
• The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of October 11, 1948.
• Consolidate Parker Dam Power Project and Davis Dam Project Act of May 28,
1954.
• Palo Verde Diversion Dam Act of August 31, 1954.
• Change Boundaries, Yuma Auxiliary Project Act of February 15, 1956.
• The Colorado River Storage Project Act of April 11, 1956.
• Water Supply Act of July 3, 1958.
• Boulder City Act of September 2, 1958.
• Report of the Special Master, Simon H. Rifkind, Arizona v. California, et al,.
December 5, 1960.
• United States Supreme Court Decree, Arizona v. California, March 9, 1964.
• International Flood Control Measures, Lower Colorado River Act of August
10, 1964.
• Southern Nevada (Robert B. Griffith) Water Project Act of October 22, 1965.
• The Colorado River Basin Project Act of September 30, 1968.
• The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
• Criteria for the Coordinated Long Range Operation of Colorado River
Reservoirs, June 8, 1970.
• Supplemental Irrigation Facilities, Yuma Division, Act of September 25, 1970.
• Minutes 218, March 22, 1965; 241, July 14, 1972 (replaced 218); and 242,
August 30, 1973, (replaced 241) of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, pursuant to the Mexican Water Treaty.
• The Endangered Species Act of 1973.
• The Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act of June 24, 1974.
• The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by the Clean Water Act
of 1977.
• United States Supreme Court Supplemental Decrees,  Arizona v. California,
January 9, 1979, and April 16, 1984.
• Hoover Power Plant Act of August 17, 1984 (98 Stat. 1333).
• The Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992.
• The Numerous Colorado River Water Delivery and Project Repayment
Contracts with the States of Arizona and Nevada, cities, water districts, and
individuals.
• Hoover and Parker-Davis Power Marketing Contracts.
Appendix C
C-2
Letter of Dec. 9, 1996, from Six States to California
Text of letter may be requested from the Commission office.
Appendix D
Position Paper of the Ten Tribes with Water Rights 
In the Colorado River Basin
Submitted to the Seven States in the Colorado River Basin
Text of position paper may be requested from the Commission office.
